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Abstract 
 
This dissertation provides some explanations of the causes of poverty in rural India, 
by investigating poverty determinants that are too often neglected in the literature and 
in policy debates. It proceeds in three main chapters, each addressing a specific 
research question. 
The first chapter focuses on the process of agricultural transformation in the state of 
Andhra Pradesh. In the early stages of economic development, all countries undergo a 
process of transformation of their production and employment structure. As a result, 
agricultural output as a share of total GDP decreases, as does rural employment as a 
share of total employment. Over the last 50 years, the share of agriculture in total 
output has considerably declined in Andhra Pradesh. However, the agricultural sector 
continues to employ the great majority of the labour force. The theoretical section of 
this chapter shows how structural change is affected by the characteristics of food 
demand and by income inequality. The empirical analysis, using novel 
semiparametric methods, estimates food Engel curves and food elasticities, which are 
used to simulate the effects on changes in income distribution on the composition of 
demand. 
The second chapter analyses the stabilising effect of irrigation on household 
expenditure. The expansion of irrigation infrastructure, together with the introduction 
of hybrid seeds and chemical fertilisers, was the most important technological 
advancement in Indian agriculture of the last 50 years. The positive impact of 
irrigation on income of rural households has been extensively documented, but its 
stabilising effect has been largely neglected. The first part of the chapter builds a 
theoretical model that establishes the causal links between access to irrigation, income 
stability, and consumption smoothing over the seasonal cycle. The empirical analysis 
assesses the stabilising impact of irrigation on expenditure using modern impact 
evaluation techniques. The findings indicate that consumption patterns of households 
with access to irrigation are more stable over the seasonal cycle and over the years.  
The third chapter studies the effect of income uncertainty on educational choices 
made by the rural poor. It investigates the demand side of education in order to 
understand why a large number of rural children do not enrol or complete primary 
education. The theoretical part of the chapter presents an inter-temporal consumption 
model that shows how the expectation of income variability negatively affects 
household expenditure on education. The empirical analysis uses a duration model 
with time covariates in order to estimate the determinants of child progress in school, 
and provides evidence that income variability negatively affects investments in 
education. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
Poverty in India has been the focus of a heated debate in recent times (Deaton and 
Kozel, 2005). Official poverty statistics are published by the Planning Commission of 
the government of India based on expenditure data collected by the National Sample 
Survey Organisation (NSSO). A number of technical controversies regarding the data, 
the indicators, and the methodologies used to measure poverty have resulted in 
estimates that diverge from those presented in official statistics. Bhalla (2002) using 
consumption data from the National Accounts, rather than from the NSSO, finds that 
poverty in India is much less than what is reported by the Indian government. Ray and 
Lancaster (2005), using a poverty line based on caloric requirements, rather than on the 
purchase of a basic basket of goods like the NSSO, find that poverty in India is much 
worse than what is revealed in official statistics. Deaton (2008), after adjusting the 
expenditure data and the official poverty line with price indices different from the 
official Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers (CPIAL) used by the NSSO, 
finds that poverty has not decreased by the amount declared by the Indian government. 
 
In spite of these controversies a general consensus has emerged that poverty in India has 
decreased over the last two decades, but that the rate of decrease is substantially lower 
than the one depicted by official statistics (Ravallion, 2008). The decrease in poverty is 
particularly low once we consider the sustained rates of growth in the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) witnessed by India in recent times. Not all Indians have shared in the 
benefits of this process of overall economic growth. Ravallion (2004) shows that though 
absolute poverty in India fell since the early 1990s, the rate of pro-poor growth was 
appreciably lower than the rate of economic growth, resulting in a distributional shift 
against the poor. Banerjee and Picketty (2005) considering a much longer period of time 
(from 1922 to 2000) show that since the mid 1980s much of the economic growth 
reported at the country level was captured by a top income group representing less than 
1% of total population, a group whose income is often not recorded in official statistics. 
 
There is also considerable evidence that poverty in India has not decreased in some 
geographic areas and among some disadvantaged social groups. First, a large number of 
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studies have found that the patterns of economic growth among Indian states have 
diverged over the last two decades, and that the divide between forward and backward 
states has increased (see for example Kurian, 2000, Rao et al., 1999, Sachs et al., 2002). 
Second, a significant increase in inequality between rural and urban areas has been 
documented (see for example Deaton and Dreze, 2002, Jha, 2000). Finally, the most 
vulnerable social groups, the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes in particular, 
have not substantially improved their living conditions over the last decades (see for 
example Gang et al., 2008, Sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003). 
 
The uneven process of economic growth and the persistence of poverty in some Indian 
states, in rural areas, and among disadvantaged groups, suggest that not all Indian 
citizens have the same opportunities for escaping from poverty. This is also supported 
by qualitative evidence. For example, Krishna et al. (2004) using qualitative indicators 
of poverty in 36 villages of rural Andhra Pradesh found that nearly 80% of poor 
households reported as poor in 1978-79 were still poor in 2003-04. This body of 
evidence on the persistence of poverty in India suggests that there are some factors, 
largely out of the control of single individuals that prevent the poor from escaping 
poverty. There is a large literature in developing economics that provides an explanation 
to these phenomena by positing the existence of poverty traps (see for example 
Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005, Bowles et al., 2006b, Carter and Barrett, 2006). Poverty 
traps are self-reinforcing mechanisms that cause poverty to persist. The identification of 
these mechanisms casts doubts on the ability of markets to secure economic progress for 
all, and provides a possible explanation for the observed large income inequalities 
between countries and individuals. 
 
This dissertation draws on economic models of poverty traps in order to explain the 
persistence of poverty among rural households in India. The three chapters comprising 
this dissertation investigate the economic mechanisms determining the persistence of 
poverty at both the macro and microeconomic level. The three sections that follow this 
introduction set the context of the study and briefly illustrate the data and the 
methodology used. The dissertation then proceeds in three main chapters. Each chapter 
addresses a specific research question and can be read separately from the others as a 
free-standing essay. The concluding chapter discusses the findings of the three main 
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chapters and the explanations they offer of the persistence of poverty in rural India in 
light of the economic theory of poverty traps.  
1.2 Setting the context: the state of Andhra Pradesh 
The present study focuses on the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh rather than on India for 
three main reasons. First, a large amount of micro and macro data was available for this 
state. Empirical research occupies a central part of each chapter, and the availability of 
data was a decisive factor. Second, in order to answer the questions asked in each 
chapter, the data required a series of adjustment that could hardly be made at the 
country level. These adjustments include, for example, the correction of expenditure 
data for regional variation in prices, or the combination of household consumption data 
with wage and rainfall data obtained from other sources at the regional level. Finally, 
over the last four years I have had the opportunity to conduct research in many districts 
of Andhra Pradesh, and this has deepened my understanding of the most urgent 
development issues and of the policy options available. 
 
The state of Andhra Pradesh was officially founded in 1956 by uniting nine districts of 
the Telangana region, located in the north of the state and surrounding the capital 
Hyderabad, to other 11 districts that were formerly part of the Madras presidency, 
located south of Hyderabad and on the coast of modern Andhra Pradesh. These 20 
districts shared a common language (Telugu), but had different histories. The Telangana 
region had been independently administered by a Nizam (governor) since the occupation 
by the Moghul Empire in the seventeenth century, while the 11 districts of the Coastal 
and Rayalseema regions had been under British rule since the eighteenth century. In the 
late 1950s, soon after the foundation of the state, three additional districts were created 
from the existing 20 and, as a result, modern Andhra Pradesh is composed of 23 
administrative districts. 
 
Researchers and public officials often group contiguous and homogeneous areas of the 
state into regions. The most common grouping is the subdivision in administrative 
districts described above, which will be widely used in the present study. Very common, 
and frequently used in this study, is also the grouping into three historical macro 
regions: Coastal Andhra, Rayalseema, and Telangana, whose main characteristics can 
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be summarised in the following way. Coastal Andhra is the richest region of the state in 
terms of per capita income and other development indicators. It is served by good 
infrastructure and benefits from good soils and rainfall. Telangana, with the exception 
of the state capital Hyderabad, is poor and infrastructure is inadequate, though part of 
the region has good soils and rainfall. Rayalseema is very dry and with poor prospects 
of agricultural growth. It is the poorest area of the state in terms of income and other 
development indicators.  
 
Andhra Pradesh is the fifth largest state in India with a population of 76 million 
according to the census of 2001. The state GDP has grown at an average rate of 5% per 
year between 1960 and 2005 in absolute terms, and of 3% in per capita terms. These 
growth rates are similar to those experienced by India as a whole, and in terms of per 
capita income, Andhra Pradesh normally ranks in the richer half of Indian states. 
However, a large fraction of the population lives in poverty, particularly in rural areas. 
 
According to official data published by the Planning Commission (Government of 
India, 2007), poverty in Andhra Pradesh is lower than in the rest of India and has 
rapidly declined over the last 30 years. Table 1.1 shows official poverty rates of Andhra 
Pradesh and India over the last 30 years based on data collected by the NSSO. Poverty 
rates in Andhra Pradesh are not only lower than those of India, but are much lower in 
rural areas as compared to urban areas, which is at odds with common perceptions and 
empirical evidence elsewhere in the country. Official poverty headcounts however are 
incorrect for two reasons. First, they are based on caloric poverty lines set in 1973-74 
and it is believed that the cost of these lines was set too low in Andhra Pradesh, 
particularly in rural areas (Subrahmanyam, 2003). Since the poverty lines are updated 
using the consumer price index, the initial error is carried over at each new survey 
round. Second, the consumer price indices used to adjust the poverty lines are based on 
household consumption shares of 1973-4. As a larger share of expenditure was spent on 
food in 1973-74 and food prices have decreased since then, the result is an 
underestimation of poverty (Deaton, 2008). 
 
When poverty lines are adjusted and alternative price indices are used, poverty rates 
turn out to be very different. For example Deaton (2003) reports poverty headcounts for 
Andhra Pradesh that are nearly twice those of official statistics, and in which the 
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relation between rural and urban poverty is reversed. Rural poverty appears to be at 
least twice the size of urban poverty. In addition, if a caloric poverty line is calculated at 
each round, either in terms of number of calories or in terms of the cost of the same 
calories, the number of poor increases dramatically, and poverty in Andhra Pradesh 
appears to have increased over the last 30 years (see Palmer-Jones and Sen, 2001, 
Patnaik, 2007, Ray and Lancaster, 2005). It should also be mentioned that there are 
doubts regarding the reliability of the survey data used in the calculation of official 
poverty lines. Bhalla (2002) finds that household consumption reported by the survey 
method was only 55% of consumption reported by National Accounts in 1999-00 and 
that the poverty count based on the latter data was only 13%.  
 
 Table 1.1 Official poverty headcount in Andhra Pradesh and India 
 1973-74 
(%) 
1977-78 
(%) 
1983-84 
(%) 
1987-88 
(%) 
1993-94 
(%) 
1999-00 
(%) 
2004-05 
(%) 
Andhra Pradesh        
rural  48.4 38.1 26.8 21.0 15.9 11.0 10.8 
urban  52.6 46.5 41.2 41.1 38.8 26.6 27.1 
India        
  rural  56.4 53.1 45.6 39.1 37.3 27.1 28.3 
urban  49.0 45.2 40.8 38.2 32.4 23.6 25.7 
Source: Government of India(2007), Reddy et al. (2003b), and Himanshu (2007). 
 
In a series of papers, Dubey and Palmer-Jones (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) question the use 
of official poverty lines for the assessment of living standards, including their adjusted 
versions, and recommend the use of revised or alternative welfare indicators. They point 
to major flaws of Deaton’s price adjustments based on the calculation of unit values and 
on the anchoring of poverty lines to a specific poverty line (2005c). They provide their 
own estimates of poverty headcounts and find that in Andhra Pradesh, contrary to what 
is reported by official statistics, poverty is much higher in rural areas than in urban 
areas, though poverty in urban areas turns out to be slightly higher than the estimates 
based on Deaton adjustments (2005a). Finally, they observe that the neglect of 
environmental variables, such as the quality of education and health services, police, 
water, and justice, produce poverty lines that are not truly representative of standards of 
living (2005b). They also suggest that this might explain the observed lack of 
correlation between poverty measures and other indicators of well-being. The results of 
their analysis call for substantial revisions of the poverty indicators used, and for the 
adoption of multiple indicators of well-being in conducting welfare analysis. 
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Official poverty figures are not matched by an analogous improvement in other human 
development indicators. Malnutrition rates are very high, despite improvements in the 
last 15 years, though they are lower than in the rest of India. Table 1.2 reports the 
percentage of stunted and underweight children under five calculated by the National 
Family and Health Survey (NFHS). Stunting is an indicator of long-term food 
deprivation, while wasting is an indicator of short-term deprivation. A child is stunted 
when height-for-age is more than two standard deviations away from the reference 
norm, and is underweight when weight-for-age is below two standard deviations from 
the norm. More than a third of children in Andhra Pradesh were reported stunted or 
underweight, a level of malnutrition which is very high not only in absolute terms, but 
also in comparison to other countries. For example the percentage of underweight 
children in sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 was 29.6%. It has also been observed that the 
reduction in malnutrition rates is much less than might be expected given the sustained 
growth in per capita incomes over the period. This can only be attributed to a decline in 
the consumption of calories per capita, a phenomenon that is not well understood and 
for which a convincing explanation has yet to be put forward (Deaton and Dreze, 2008). 
 
Table 1.2 Stunting and wasting in Andhra Pradesh and India 
 1992-93 
(%) 
1998-99 
(%) 
2005-06 
(%) 
Andhra Pradesh    
stunting n/a 38.6 33.8 
wasting  49.1 37.6 36.4 
India    
stunting  47.1 45.5 38.4 
wasting  51.9 47.0 45.9 
Source: MEASURE DHS online STATcompiler. 
 
Child mortality has declined considerably over the last 15 years, but little progress has 
been made with respect to infant mortality, which is now higher than in the rest of India. 
Table 1.3 shows mortality rates of infants and children in Andhra Pradesh and India 
reported by the NFHS. Note that these rates are very high both in absolute and relative 
terms. Countries outside Asia with similar infant mortality rates are Zimbabwe (60% in 
2005), Tanzania (68% in 2004) and Liberia (71% in 2007). Interestingly, high infant 
mortality in Andhra Pradesh is largely driven by high neonatal mortality, while 
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postnatal mortality follows the same decreasing pattern shown by child mortality. Child 
and postnatal mortality reflect exogenous causes of death and are normally correlated 
with factors like income per capita, education and vaccination. Neonatal mortality 
reflects endogenous causes of death and is correlated with factors like health care and 
mother’s status at the time of delivery. This suggests that in Andhra Pradesh ante-natal 
care and mothers’ health status at delivery are particularly poor. 
 
Table 1.3 Infant and child mortality in Andhra Pradesh and India 
 1992-93 
(‰) 
1998-99 
(‰) 
2005-06 
(‰) 
Andhra Pradesh    
infant mortality 73.1 70.8 68.4 
child mortality 24.6 22.0 11.1 
India    
infant mortality 86.3 73.0 65.0 
child mortality 35.5 30.5 21.8 
Source: MEASURE DHS online STATcompiler. 
 
Illiteracy rates are much higher in Andhra Pradesh than in the rest of India. Indeed 
Andhra Pradesh has the fifth highest illiteracy rate in the country. Table 1.4 show the 
data on education levels in Andhra Pradesh and India over the last 15 years calculated 
by the NFHS. Despite the significant progress made, large differences in educational 
achievements still exist between urban and rural areas, boys and girls, social groups, and 
developed and underdeveloped regions (Reddy and Rao, 2003). 
 
Table 1.4 Educational attainments in Andhra Pradesh and India 
 1992-93 
(%) 
1998-99 
(%) 
2005-06 
(%) 
 male female male female male female 
Andhra Pradesh       
Illiterate 37.0 58.8 29.4 50.2 27.0 45.1 
Primary 29.3 22.7 31.2 27.2 28.0 23.7 
Secondary 25.9 14.7 27.9 18.2 36.9 27.3 
Higher 6.4 2.4 11.5 4.4 7.9 3.7 
India       
Illiterate 29.2 54.7 21.6 44.4 21.9 41.5 
Primary 36.3 26.9 33.0 28.0 28.7 25.1 
Secondary 25.5 13.4 32.1 20.8 40.9 28.5 
Higher 6.1 2.6 13.3 6.8 8.3 4.7 
Source: MEASURE DHS online STATcompiler. 
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1.3 Data used  
This study makes intensive use of data both at the micro and the aggregate level. Each 
chapter contains an empirical section, where the theoretical hypotheses formulated are 
tested using econometric methods. This section briefly discusses the data and more 
detailed information on the data and the adjustments made for the empirical analysis is 
provided in each chapter.  
 
The expenditure survey data collected by the NSSO are the most important data for this 
study. NSSO surveys are a legacy of the survey experiments initiated by the statistician 
P.C. Mahalanobis in the late 1930s. Mahalanobis pioneered the now popular method of 
collecting consumption data from random samples of households. The Planning 
Commission of India rapidly adopted the survey data collection method in order to 
monitor living standards and deal with distributional issues. Every year since 1944, the 
NSSO has been interviewing a very large number of household throughout India, 
collecting detailed information on consumption of food and non-food items (the ‘thin’ 
rounds). In addition, every five years, larger surveys are conducted in an exercise that 
sees the participation of more than 100,000 Indian households (the ‘thick’ rounds). This 
dissertation uses the last four thick rounds conducted in 1983-83 (38
th
 round), 1987-88 
(43
rd
 round), 1993-94 (50
th
 round), 1999-00 (55
th
 round) and 2004-05 (61
st
 round). The 
data collected during the 55
th
 survey round have generated a heated debate, in which 
their reliability has been questioned due to changes made to the questionnaire. The 
availability of the latest large survey round however, allows the analysis of variables 
that are comparable across surveys and that span a period of nearly 25 years. 
 
Second in importance are the census data. The Ministry of Home Affairs has conducted 
a population census 14 times every ten years since 1881. Scope and coverage of the 
census have changed over time and the information collected now includes, alongside 
demographic characteristics of every Indian household, data on village facilities, 
education, fertility and migration. This dissertation uses data from the Census of 
Villages of Andhra Pradesh, which aggregates population census data at the village 
level, for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001.  
 
9 
 
  
Another important source of data for this study is the Directorate of Economics and 
Statistics (DES). The DES is part of the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation and 
operates under the Ministry of Agriculture. The DES collects a vast amount of data at 
the state level on a wide range of issues, from agricultural added value, to crop yields, 
land use and agricultural prices. This study makes extensive use of two DES 
publications. The first is Golden Jubilee of Andhra Pradesh: 1956-2005- 50 years 
(DES, 2005), a collection of state and district level data on a large number of 
socioeconomic variables over the last 50 years. The second publication is Agricultural 
Wages in India (DES, 1975-2005), which contains data on wages of skilled and 
unskilled labour by month and by district for every Indian state since 1955. 
Finally, the website indiastat, inaugurated by the Government of India in 2000, has been 
an important and easily accessible source for some state and district level data, such as 
district rainfall, price indices, crop yields and land use. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
This dissertation comprises three main chapters, that follow a similar structure, and a 
final concluding chapter. In each chapter, after a short introduction to the topic, a review 
of the literature is presented. A theoretical model establishing causal relationships is 
formulated algebraically, based on a set of reasonable hypotheses and assumptions. The 
data used to empirically test the hypotheses made are presented and descriptive statistics 
are shown. The econometric methods used to estimate the hypothesised causal 
relationships are illustrated and results are presented of the estimations and tests 
performed. A final section concludes.  
 
Chapter 2, Food demand and the agricultural transformation in Andhra Pradesh, 
provides a theoretical and empirical contribution to models of structural change. 
Historical accounts of the agricultural transformation in the economic literature point to 
two main drivers of structural change: technological progress in agriculture and inelastic 
food demand. Economic models of structural change however, neglect the importance 
of demand factors in shaping the process of agricultural transformation. Food demand 
depends on both the current level of living standards and on the distribution of income. 
The extent to which structural change is affected by the assumptions made regarding 
consumers’ preferences and existing income inequality is analysed. The effects of 
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changes in income distribution on food consumption are assessed by estimating the 
elasticity of food demand using novel semiparametric methods. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the large share of agricultural 
employment observed in Andhra Pradesh can be partially explained by the poor 
operation of the Engel’s law of demand. Living standards are very low in Andhra 
Pradesh, and the vast majority of households are not able to consume the minimum 
recommended number of calories per day. A large proportion of any increase in per 
capita income is therefore spent on food. In addition, as the distribution of income 
becomes more equal, food demand further increases, because the poor, who spend 
proportionally more on food, have more resources. The high level of food demand helps 
sustaining food prices and labour demand in agriculture, thus impairing the prospects of 
industrialisation and wider economic growth. 
 
Chapter 2 proceeds in seven sections. After a brief introduction in Section 2.1, Section 
2.2 reviews the literature on the agricultural transformation. Section 2.3 builds a simple 
general equilibrium model showing that the size of employment in agriculture is 
determined in the long term by technological progress in agriculture, while the pace of 
structural change in the employment of the labour force depends on the characteristics 
of food demand and on the existing income distribution. Section 2.4 presents some 
stylised facts on agricultural output and employment, technological progress, food 
demand and income inequality in Andhra Pradesh. Section 2.5 illustrates the advantages 
of semiparametric methods for estimating food demand. Section 2.6 estimates food 
expenditure elasticities in order to assess the effect of changes in income and income 
distribution on the pattern of structural change of the economy. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
Chapter 3, The stabilising effect of irrigation on households’ expenditure, analyses the 
stabilising effect of irrigation on household expenditure. Research on the benefits of 
irrigation has primarily focused on its ability to increase farmers’ and agricultural 
labourers’ incomes, while disregarding its effect on income and consumption 
variability. In this chapter the hypothesis is made that irrigation reduces income 
uncertainty and the need for precautionary savings as an insurance mechanism. The 
present study is probably the first attempt to assess the stabilising impact of irrigation on 
household expenditure and saving decisions. A theoretical model establishing the causal 
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links between access to water, income stability, and consumption smoothing over the 
seasonal cycle is constructed, and modern impact evaluation techniques are employed to 
measure the stabilising effect of irrigation.  
 
The empirical analysis finds that households without irrigation have more unstable 
consumption patterns, that their consumption tracks income more closely, and that they 
engage in precautionary savings in order to smooth income fluctuations. The 
combination of high production risk and liquidity constraints is the source of three 
negative welfare effects. First, high consumption instability is a welfare loss in itself. 
Second, higher income instability implies higher precautionary savings, which are an 
inefficient form of savings. Finally, vulnerability to production shocks poses the risk of 
falling into chronic poverty for extremely poor households. 
 
Chapter 3 proceeds in eight sections. Section 3.1 is the introduction. Section 3.2 reviews 
the literature on poverty and seasonality. Section 3.3 reviews the literature on 
consumption smoothing and on the impact of irrigation on rural income. Section 3.4 
builds an intertemporal consumption model over the seasonal cycle that incorporates 
uncertainty of future income. Section 3.5 describes in detail the data used in the analysis 
and the adjustments made to expenditure figures. Section 3.6 presents some descriptive 
statistics on irrigation in the state, rainfall patterns and characteristics of farmer and 
agricultural labour households with and without irrigation. Section 3.7 describes the 
Roy model used to detect the difference in consumption patterns of irrigated and non-
irrigated households. Section 3.8 presents the findings on the impact of irrigation and 
output uncertainty on household expenditure. Section 3.9 concludes. 
 
Chapter 4, Income uncertainty and investments in human capital, studies the effect of 
production risk and uncertainty on educational choices made by the rural poor. In rural 
India, investment opportunities are limited and for the majority of household the most 
important and profitable investment is their children’s education. The state of education 
in rural India is however very poor and the main causes for this on the supply side are 
well known. Chapter 4 investigates the demand side of education in order to understand 
why a large fraction of rural children do not enrol or do not complete primary education. 
The analysis conducted is innovative in two ways. First, this is the first study of the 
effect of income uncertainty on educational choices in developing countries, as the 
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economics of education literature has restricted the study of uncertainty to the effect of 
the variability of future earnings on schooling decisions. Second, the empirical analysis 
employs new econometric techniques by estimating child progress in school using a 
duration model with time covariates.  
 
The empirical analysis finds that income uncertainty negatively affects schooling 
decisions of rural households and expenditure on education of farmers and agricultural 
labourers. The empirical analysis also finds that education expenditure by households 
with non-irrigated farms and agricultural labourers living in non-irrigated villages is not 
affected by income uncertainty. These results point to production risk and uncertainty as 
factors that contribute to determine the low levels of investments in human capital by 
Indian rural households. 
 
Chapter 4 proceeds in eight sections. Section 4.1 introduces the topic. Section 4.2 
reviews the literature on education in Andhra Pradesh and the effect of uncertainty on 
household schooling decisions in developing countries. Section 4.3 constructs an 
intertemporal utility maximisation model of investments in education, which 
incorporates a precautionary motive for saving. Section 4.4 describes the data and the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 discusses the econometric methods 
employed for the estimation of a school attainment model and an education expenditure 
model. Section 4.6 presents descriptive statistics on education in Andhra Pradesh across 
regions, gender and social classes using birth cohort analysis. Section 4.7 presents the 
findings on the effect of uncertainty on investments in human capital. Section 4.8 
concludes. 
 
Chapter 5, The conclusions, revisits the empirical findings of the three preceding 
chapters in light of the theory of poverty traps and provides some explanations for the 
persistence of poverty in rural Andhra Pradesh. Firstly, the theoretical elements of 
poverty trap models are discussed. Secondly, it is discussed how the findings of each 
chapter constitute elements of poverty traps. Finally, a number of directions for future 
research are described. 
 
Three main poverty traps are identified: an under-consumption trap; an irrigation and 
liquidity trap; and an educational trap. At the macroeonomic level it is suggested that 
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the inability of Andhra Pradesh to industrialise is a result of the extreme poverty of its 
rural population, which restricts the market for manufacturing products and prevents the 
exploitation of economies of scale. At the microeconomic level it is maintained that 
production risk, combined with a failure of credit and insurance markets, prevents 
households from escaping poverty. High production risk forces poor household to save 
for precautionary reasons and to underinvest in production activities and educational 
choices that offer higher rates of return. 
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2 Food demand and the agricultural transformation in 
Andhra Pradesh 
2.1 Introduction 
Andhra Pradesh is sometimes called ‘the rice bowl of India’, and is commonly referred 
to as an agricultural state. Over the last 50 years however, agricultural output as a share 
of GDP has decreased from more than 60% per cent to less than 30%, and in the late 
1980s the service sector has become the leading sector of the economy. The relative 
decline of agriculture in total GDP is the combined result of poor growth of the 
agricultural sector and of a more sustained growth in manufacturing and services. The 
bulk of labour employment however, continues to be concentrated in agriculture. Today, 
nearly 70% of the total workforce is employed by the agricultural sector and the share 
has not significantly decreased over time. Moreover, while the absolute number of 
farmers has remained fairly stable over the last 50 years, the number of agricultural 
labourers has increased, and they now represent more than 40% of the total workforce.  
 
Official poverty statistics report low and declining poverty rates in rural Andhra Pradesh 
over the last 25 years. Official poverty headcounts however are plagued by technical 
problems that raise doubt about the reliability of poverty estimates. Calculations made 
by independent researchers show much higher poverty rates, particularly in rural areas, 
and less progress over time. Furthermore, living standards of rural households in 
Andhra Pradesh, as measured by various socioeconomic indicators like literacy rates 
and infant mortality, are low not only by international standards, but also in comparison 
to other Indian states. The prospects of improving living conditions of rural households 
largely rely on changing the structural composition of the labour force. However, the 
development of the non-farm sector in rural areas is modest, while migration to urban 
areas is negligible and labour employed in agriculture is either stable or growing. 
 
This chapter provides an account of the process of agricultural transformation in Andhra 
Pradesh. Several factors may explain the evolution of the sectoral composition of the 
labour force, but two principal forces shaping the agricultural transformation process are 
technological progress in agriculture and inelastic demand for food products. The 
present analysis focuses on the latter, and assesses the extent to which inelastic food 
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demand can explain the pattern of structural change in the economy. It argues that in the 
early stages of development, when living standard are very low and household income 
is spent mainly on food, the process of structural change is slow unless there is a large 
increase in income inequality. 
 
This chapter proceeds in seven sections. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on the 
characteristics and the determinants of the process of agricultural transformation; the 
literature on the relationship between inequality and economic growth; and the literature 
on the impact of under-consumption on economic stagnation. Section 2.3 develops a 
simple general equilibrium model of the economy and of the effects that different 
assumptions regarding food demand have on agricultural employment. Section 2.4 
presents descriptive statistics on the process of structural change in Andhra Pradesh. 
Section 2.5 introduces the econometric methods employed in the empirical estimation of 
food demand. Section 2.6 presents the results of the estimation of parametric and 
semiparametric food Engel curves. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 The agricultural transformation 
In the early stages of economic growth, countries undergo a process of sectoral 
transformation of their production structure both in terms of output and employment. 
All countries begin the development process with a production and employment base 
that is predominantly rural, and become rich by expanding the modern sector. 
Traditionally, at least in the experience of European countries, the modern sector was 
the manufacturing sector. However, in more recent times, some developing countries 
have modernised through the expansion of the service sector without having to undergo 
an intensive process of industrialisation. 
 
The process of transition of the economy from an agricultural to a modern state is 
known as agricultural transformation, and is one of the most documented processes of 
growth economics. At the time of Kuznets’ writings, the cross-country negative 
relationship between the size of the agricultural sector and per capita income, and the 
positive relationship between the size of the manufacturing sector and per capita income 
were already well known. Kuznets (1957) collected a large amount of evidence in 
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support of this observation, and also documented the simultaneous decline over time of 
the labour force employed in agriculture, the large increase in the share of the labour 
force employed by the service sector, and the modest increase of employment in 
manufacturing. Other surveys of the sectoral development process conducted in more 
recent times have confirmed the validity of the patterns described by Kuznets. The 
surveys by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) and Mundlak et al. (1997) are particularly 
extensive both in terms of countries and of time periods covered. 
 
Given that the agricultural transformation has been almost universally documented 
across different countries and time periods, it seems obvious that explanations of 
economic growth should also explain the process of agricultural transformation. 
However, modern economic growth theory, which begun with the work of Solow 
(1956), has focused entirely on aggregate growth, neglecting the sectoral composition of 
the economy and the transformation the economy undergoes in the course of 
development. Perhaps, as suggested by Temple (2005), this neglect results from the 
need for an eclectic approach in studying the sectoral transformation. Or perhaps 
sectoral models are not popular because they deal with issues that are considered 
intractable, like increasing returns to scale. 
 
Economists have attempted to explain the process of agricultural transformation by 
using dual economic models. In a dual model, the economy is divided in two sectors. 
One is poor, rural, and traditional, whilst the other is rich, modern, and industrialised. 
The two sectors are characterised by different production processes and growth 
dynamics. Dual models analyse how the two sectors interact in the course of the growth 
process. The formulation of dual economic models dates back at least to Lewis (1954), 
and Ricardo’s interpretation of the industrial revolution in England (see Hayami and 
Godo 2005) can be considered a very early example of this type of approach. Recent 
surveys of duality in economics can be found in Ranis (1988), Bardhan and Udry 
(1999), and Temple (2005).  
 
The main characteristics of dual economic models are described by Dixit (1973). First, 
the agricultural and the modern sector are characterised by different production 
processes. While agricultural production occurs under constant or decreasing returns to 
scale, manufacturing production occurs under increasing returns to scale. Second, the 
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agricultural sector produces mostly consumption goods, while investment goods are 
produced by the manufacturing sector. Third, consumer demand for agricultural goods 
is inelastic with respect to income, while there are no restrictions on the income 
elasticity of demand of manufactured goods.  
 
Two other elements could be added to this list. First, the characteristics of the 
organisation of production are very different in the two sectors. While production in 
manufacturing tends to concentrate in large production units, in agriculture, even in 
modern times and countries, the family farm is the unit of production. This has 
implications for the market structure of the two sectors, particularly with respect to the 
determination of prices. Second, contrary to common belief, most of the world poor live 
in rural areas, and the processes of migration and urbanisation are strongly associated 
with poverty reduction (Ravallion et al., 2007). There is therefore a strong welfare 
argument in favour of studying the interaction of agriculture and the rest of the economy 
in the course of the development process. 
 
Historical and economic interpretations of the process of agricultural transformation 
focus on two main elements: technological progress in agriculture, and the Engel’s law 
of demand. See for example the classical treatment of this topic by Hayami and Ruttan 
(1971), Timmer (1988), and Mundlak (2005). Technological progress in agriculture has 
often been considered the trigger of the industrial revolution in England and Europe. A 
classical example is the introduction in England of the Norfolk system which started the 
agricultural revolution (Hayami and Godo, 2005). This was a new system of crop 
rotation, whereby fallow land was planted with forage crops that would increase 
livestock production, and ultimately crop production via the increase of manure 
production. The application of science to agriculture in modern times has led to much 
greater achievements in agricultural production. The discovery of hybrid varieties in the 
1930s led to extraordinary increases in yields of wheat and corn in particular. Some of 
this technology was subsequently passed on to some developing countries in the late 
1960s leading to what is now known as the green revolution.  
 
Whatever the source and the characteristics of technological advancement in 
agriculture, the result has always been an increase in productivity of either labour or 
land or both. Productivity gains in agriculture in the post second world-war period were 
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particularly impressive. Mundlak et al. (1997) find that in 80% of the 130 countries 
studied over the period 1960-1990, labour productivity grew faster in agriculture than in 
the rest of the economy. Overall, the median difference of productivity growth rates 
between agriculture and non-agriculture was above 1%. Similar data disaggregated by 
geographic areas and with reference to older periods can be found in Timmer (1988). 
 
Technological progress in agriculture generates an output surplus, and this is where the 
Engel’s law of demand comes into play. There is an obvious physical limit to human 
consumption of food. Even if populations are growing in body size and consuming 
increasing quantities of food, there is still a clear limit to the amount of food that can be 
consumed. As a result, as income increases food consumption increases less than 
proportionally. This phenomenon is commonly known as Engel’s law. In principle, food 
consumption could further increase if new products, for example new food varieties or 
better qualities of existing varieties, were introduced. Indeed new food products are 
constantly introduced, but this does not shift household budgets towards the 
consumption of more food because even more new non-food products are constantly 
introduced. 
 
The production of an agricultural surplus has in turn obvious effects on labour demand 
and prices. In the course of economic development, both employment in agriculture and 
agricultural prices decrease. Mundlak et al. (1997) in a sample of 130 countries over the 
period 1950-1990 observed an average annual decline in the agricultural labour force of 
about 2%. As for agricultural prices, Binswanger et al. (1987) showed that real 
international agricultural prices declined between 0.5 and 0.7% per year over the period 
from 1900 to 1984. In the short term, the labour surplus thus generated may or may not 
find employment in the modern sector, but in the long term the migration of labour to 
more productive non-agricultural enterprises appears inevitable. The description of this 
process can be enriched by adding more details, like the role played by governments in 
sustaining agriculture, the role of education in helping the allocation of labour in non-
agricultural activities, the role of endogenous versus exogenous technological change, 
and so on. However, technological progress and Engel’s law alone explain much of the 
process that Mundlak (2000) calls the curse of agriculture; through its own 
development, agriculture becomes unimportant.  
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While the effects of technological progress on economic growth have been extensively 
studied in models of economic growth, the effects of Engel’s law have been much less 
investigated. The central role of food demand in dual models of economic development 
has been highlighted by Dixit (1973). The Engel’s law operates differently depending 
on the level of living standards in the economy and on the existing distribution of 
income. Economists building dual economic models often make crucial assumptions 
about preferences and consumers’ demand neglecting the role that these have in driving 
the results of their models.  
 
This chapter describes the effects of different characteristics of food demand on the 
development of the agricultural sector. This is accomplished by first building a dual 
model of the process of agricultural transformation in Andhra Pradesh. The model 
solution shows how the characteristics of consumers’ preferences and of food demand 
shape the pace of the transformation process.
 1
 The change in employment in rural areas 
following technological change in agriculture critically depends on the income elasticity 
of food demand in the economy. The poorer the population and the larger the income 
elasticity o food demand, the lower is the impact of technological progress on 
agricultural employment and overall economic growth.  The chapter then proceeds to 
estimate the specific form assumed by food demand in Andhra Pradesh in order shed 
further light on the characteristics of the development process in the state. The 
estimation of food demand elasticities offers the opportunity to simulate the impact of 
income inequality on economic growth. It is found that, within the neoclassical model 
of agricultural transformation, changes in the income distribution affect the pace of 
economic growth. The characteristics of this process and the links to the theory of 
under-consumption are discussed in the following sections. 
2.2.2 Inequality, food demand and economic growth 
The study of the relationship between inequality and economic growth was pioneered 
by the path-breaking work of Kutznets (1955). Kuznets analysed the correlation 
between inequality and income across a number of countries and formulated what 
became known as the inverted-U hypothesis. According to this hypothesis – in fact the 
observation of an empirical regularity - in the early stages of economic development 
income inequality increases, but at later stages income disparities tend to disappear. 
                                                 
1
 See equation (2.21) in Section 2.3.5. 
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This hypothesis was formalised by Robinson (1975) in the context of a dual economic 
model. Robinson’s model is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that 
there are large differences in productivities and wages between urban and rural 
occupations. The second assumption is that there is a larger variety of occupations, and 
therefore wages, in urban areas compared to rural areas. Under these assumptions, as the 
development process forces the labour force to migrate from rural to urban areas, 
overall inequality increases. Further, the number of workers employed in highly paid 
jobs and the variability of wages in urban areas also increase. In spite of its great 
popularity, the inverted-U hypothesis has found little empirical support. Early empirical 
work by Ahluwalia (1975) confirmed the presence of an inverted-U hypothesis, but 
more recent studies have not found a clear relationship between income and inequality 
across countries (Anand and Kanbur, 1993, Deininger and Squire, 1996, World Bank, 
2006).  
 
There is also a body of literature that investigates the opposite direction of causality 
running from inequality to income growth. Some of this work studies how inequality 
may generate political demands for redistributions that affect long term growth (Bertola, 
1993, Perotti, 1992, Persson and Tabellini, 1994). There is also empirical evidence from 
cross country studies that inequality, in particular land inequality, negatively affects 
income growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). This latter argument was made strongly in 
the 2006 World Development Report on equity and development (World Bank, 2006). 
The World Bank report argues that initial levels of inequality affects economic growth 
in at least two ways. First, unequal access to markets results in individual economic 
choices that are inefficient for the economy as a whole. Second, unequal societies give 
rise to institutions that tend to perpetuate inequality and that miss opportunities for 
innovation and investments (World Bank, 2006).  
 
There is yet another way in which inequality affects income distribution. Income not 
only determines the level of consumption but also its composition. This follows from 
the non-linearity of Engel curves. As income increases, households’ demand for food 
increases less than proportionally. Since individuals with different incomes consume 
food in different proportions, changes in the distribution of income affect food demand. 
This is known in demand theory as the aggregation problem: the transition from micro 
to macroeconomics of consumer behaviour (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980c). The 
21 
 
  
literature on the aggregation problem, that dates back to Antonelli (1886), has shown 
that exact aggregation of individual consumer demand is possible only if Engel curves 
are linear (Blundell and Stoker, 2005). Given that food Engel curves have been proved 
to be non-linear by hundreds of empirical studies, food consumption cannot be 
expressed as a function of income levels ignoring the distribution of income. 
 
Figure 2.1 Food Engel curve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to illustrate the relevance of the distribution of income in determining food 
consumption patterns consider the chart in Figure 2.1. Suppose the economy is 
composed of only two individuals: the first individual (A) is poor while the second (B) 
is rich. Their average income is Y, while their average food consumption is F1. 
 
Figure 2.2 Food Engel curve with equalising transfer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consider now a reduction in income disparity between the two individuals (Figure 2.2), 
by operating an income transfer from the rich individual (B) to the poor (A). While 
average income Y remains unchanged after the transfer, average food consumption 
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increases to F2. After the transfer, food consumption of the rich has only marginally 
decreased, while food consumption of the poor has increased dramatically.  
 
This example shows that a change in the distribution of income affects food 
consumption. A decrease in inequality increases aggregate food demand, while an 
increase in inequality reduces aggregate food demand. Since one of the conclusions of 
this chapter is that the rate of urbanisation is a function of the income elasticity of 
demand, it follows that an increase in inequality accelerates the process of agricultural 
transformation.  
 
There have been attempts in the literature to model the relationship between economic 
growth and inequality through demand patterns. De Janvry and Sadoulet (1983) 
formulate a model showing that high initial inequality in Brazil and Mexico, via 
consumption patterns, determines inequitable economic growth over the 1960s and the 
1970s. Similarly, Baland and Ray (1991) developed a model in which the levels of 
output and employment are affected by the distribution of income via the structure of 
demand. In their model, income inequality generates high demand for luxury goods, 
which diverts resources from the production of necessities, and the market clears by 
reducing overall employment. The role of demand factors in the development of a dual 
economy is also the focus of a study by Bourguignon (1990), who concludes that an 
unambiguous reduction in inequality is unlikely at an early stage of development. 
 
This chapter investigates the role of demand factors empirically, rather than modelling 
the interplay of inequality and economic growth via consumption patterns as in the 
studies mentioned above. Given the estimates of income elasticities of food demand, the 
effects of changes in income distribution on the food expenditure share of the economy 
are simulated. The simulations are then used to estimate the share of the changes in food 
demand that are explained by an increase in income and by a change in the distribution 
of income.  
2.2.3 Economic growth and under-consumption theories 
The main hypothesis formulated in this chapter is that extreme poverty and high food 
demand retard the process of economic growth. Weak demand for the goods produced 
in the non-agricultural sector prevents the economy from taking off, unless this demand 
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is generated outside the domestic economy. The effect can be so large to constrain the 
economy into a low equilibrium poverty trap. 
 
The idea that low levels of demand produce economic stagnation is not new in 
economics and dates back at least to Malthus (Bleany, 1976). Bleany (1976) reviews 
several ‘under-consumption’ theories that explain economic stagnation with poor 
consumers’ demand, and distinguishes two main strands of this literature. The first is 
the Malthusian type which is concerned with savings, while the second is the 
Sismondian type which is concerned with income distribution. The argument put 
forward by Malthus runs in the following way (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005). Incomes 
of workers and landowners are entirely spent in the purchase of consumer goods, and 
completely resolve in effective demand. Profits, however, are mostly saved, and if the 
profits share in the economy increases more rapidly than the wage share, then the 
incomes paid to workers will not be able to provide a level of effective demand 
sufficient to absorb the value of the supply they produce. This arguments was further 
developed by Hobson in order to explain the business cycle (Bleany, 1976). Similarly to 
Malthus, Hobson argues that in expansion phases real wages decrease because do not 
fully adjust to the rise in prices (Bleany, 1976). At the same time, the profits share in the 
economy, and therefore savings and investments, increase. The result is that production 
increases more rapidly than demand, unsold inventories accumulate, prices and profits 
drop and the economy enters into depression. 
 
While the Malthusian theory of underconsuption proposes a suggestive explanation of 
the business cycle, the Sismondian theory advances an explanation of economic 
stagnation that is closer in spirit to the one proposed in this chapter. Sismondi believed 
that the division of society between rich and poor was at the origin of economic crises 
and stagnation (Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005). Sismondi begins with the observation 
that the poor buy necessities while the rich buy luxuries. If the income distribution is 
skewed, the market for luxuries shrinks or never takes off. The poverty of workers is 
therefore the ultimate cause of economic stagnation, which should be addressed by 
redistributive policies. In a similar vein, Baran and Sweazy formulated a theory in 
which the unequal accumulation of income generated by the oligopolistic structure of 
the economy creates a problem of lack of demand (Bleany, 1976). This in turn creates a 
tendency of capitalist economies to stagnate.  
24 
 
  
 
More recently, Murphy et al. (1989a) built a model in which the equality of income 
distribution is a precondition for growth. This model predicts that in order for the non-
agricultural sector to exploit increasing returns to scale, a minimum level of aggregate 
level of demand for manufactured goods is required. Weak demand originating from 
widespread poverty prevents the economy from taking off. These conclusions are 
obtained while assuming decreasing or constant returns to scale in agriculture and 
increasing returns to scale in manufacturing. These assumptions have been shown to 
generate economy-wide poverty traps (Bloom et al., 2003, Graham and Temple, 2006). 
The interpretation of the model presented in this chapter as a poverty trap model will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5, while the validity of the model in the open economy case 
is discussed in Section 2.7 of the present chapter. 
2.3 A model of agricultural transformation in Andhra Pradesh 
This section builds a simple general equilibrium model to explain the process of 
agricultural transformation in Andhra Pradesh. Several similar models can be found in 
the literature and the one presented here is particularly akin to the one formulated by 
Matsuyama (1992). Matsuyama formulated a general equilibrium model to show that a 
country’s path to industrialisation varies depending on the economy being closed or 
open, and depending on its comparative advantage in the production of agricultural and 
manufacturing goods. The purpose of the model presented here is different, but the 
design of the structure of the economy and the assumptions regarding the functional 
relationship that govern production and consumption are very similar to those employed 
by Matsuyama (1992). 
 
An early model of the process of agricultural transformation that stood the test of time is 
the one developed by Jorgenson (1961, 1967). Jorgenson modelled the joint dynamics 
of population, agricultural productivity, and demand for food. His model shows that 
agricultural transformation can be obtained either through technological advancement in 
agriculture or through the introduction of measures of fertility control. In more recent 
times, models in the same vein have been produced by Eswaran and Kotwal (1993) who 
showed the welfare effect on the poor of technological progress in agriculture; 
Echevarria (1997), who showed how the sectoral composition of the economy affects 
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per capita income growth and vice versa; Leitner (2000), who modelled the effects of 
agricultural transformation on the saving ratio; and Gollin and Parente (2002), who 
aimed to explain differences in the rates of industrialisation between countries. Two 
other similar models deserve a separate mention for their originality. The first is a dual 
economic model built by Bourguignon (1990) that shows the possible effects of sectoral 
economic growth on inequality. The second is a model by Caselli and Coleman (2001) 
which shows how the agricultural transformation of the economy of the United States 
was accelerated by heavy investments in education in the southern agricultural states. 
 
The model presented in this section shares with all these models a simplified 
characterisation of the structure of the economy, some basic assumptions regarding 
production and consumption processes, and the belief that technological progress in 
agriculture is the trigger of wider economic progress. Unlike the models mentioned 
above however, the one presented here focuses on the implications that different 
assumptions regarding the consumption function have on the results of this class of 
economic models. 
 
The structure of the model is extremely simplified in order to focus attention on two 
determinants of economic development: technological progress in agriculture and 
inelastic food demand. The economy consists of only two sectors: agriculture, which 
produces food, and the modern sector, which produces a non-food item. Disaggregating 
the modern sector into manufacturing and services would bring the model closer to 
reality, but would not change the specification of the main economic relationship 
considered. The characteristics of the production process in the two sectors are very 
different. While it is assumed that production in the agricultural sector operates under 
constant returns to scale, it is assumed that the modern sector is characterised by 
increasing returns to scale. Agriculture employs land and labour, while the modern 
sector employs labour and capital. There is exogenous technological progress in 
agriculture that raises agricultural productivity and the production of food. The inelastic 
income demand for food brings agricultural prices down, and consequently labour 
demand in agriculture decreases. Workers move from the agricultural sector to the 
modern sector, where productivity is higher because of the presence of increasing 
returns to scale. The benefits of growth are distributed according to the contribution of 
each factor to the production process. Society is composed of four income classes: 
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farmers, agricultural labourers, capitalists, and urban workers. The dynamics of 
population, capital, and savings are ignored, and the attention is focused on the joint 
effect of technological progress and food demand on the sectoral composition of 
employment. 
 
The model is built on a series of simplifying assumptions. The first is that the economy 
is closed and that the state engages in limited trade with the rest of the world. A second 
assumption is that prices are determined by the market, and that the state does not 
intervene in agricultural markets. Third, technological progress in agriculture is 
exogenous, and lastly, workers are allowed to move freely across sectors. The model is 
described in more detail in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Agricultural production 
All farmers cultivate plots of land of the same size and share the same production 
function. Production uses only one variable factor: labour (N), in the proportion a (with 
0<a<1), and one fixed factor: land (L). Farmers in Andhra Pradesh typically use very 
little capital, and the exclusion of capital from the agricultural production function is 
hence not too unrealistic. Total agricultural factor productivity (Ba) measures the current 
state of technology in agriculture. This variable can be thought of as the size of 
irrigation infrastructure, which together with the diffusion of modern seeds is the main 
determinant of increased agricultural productivity in Andhra Pradesh. Agriculture 
produces only one good (A) which is consumed as food. This good could be rice, which 
makes up to 30-40% of total food expenditure of an average household in Andhra 
Pradesh. The production function is the standard Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to 
scale: 
 
    1LaNBA a           (2.1) 
 
Notice that the price of the agricultural good (Pa) is used as the numéraire, which means 
that all equations are divided throughout by the price Pa. As a result, the agricultural 
price cancels out from all equations, while the price of the manufactured good (Pm) 
becomes the terms of trade between manufacturing and agriculture, that is the price of 
the manufactured good relative to the price of the agricultural good.  
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Agricultural labour is paid a wage wa. The farm’s cost function is simply aNwC a , 
while the profit function is aNwA a . Farmers employ labour to maximise profits, 
and the equilibrium wage per worker in agriculture is: 
 
aN
A
wa            (2.2) 
 
Farmers’ profits consist of an implicit land rent (rl). Rent is the value of agricultural 
output left after farmers pay all hired labour including their own: aNwAr al  , 
substituting the equilibrium wage for wa, the land rent is )1(  Arl and the land rent 
per unit of land is: 
 
L
A
rl )1(            (2.3) 
 
Note that farmers also employ their own labour in the farm, that there is no 
unemployment, and that all agricultural labour force works for the same number of 
days. This implies that farmers’ income is larger than agricultural labourers’ income. 
2.3.2 Manufacturing production  
In the modern sector each firm (Fi) uses one variable factor (labour Ni), and one fixed 
factor (capital Ki), to produce the manufactured good Mi. The manufacturing sector in 
Andhra Pradesh is rather underdeveloped. The service sector produces the largest share 
of non-agricultural GDP and is the largest employer in the modern sector. Therefore, 
there is no dominant manufacturing product playing the role that rice plays in the 
agricultural sector. The good M can be thought of as cotton textile, or more generally as 
cloth, because the production of this good employs the largest share of the 
manufacturing workforce in Andhra Pradesh. Given that there are only two sectors in 
the economy, manufacturing production employs (1 − a)N units of labour, where a is 
the share of labour employed in agriculture defined in the section above.  
 
In manufacturing there are increasing return to scale determined by production 
externalities. The assumption that increasing returns to scale are external to the firm is 
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adopted. This assumption is common in the growth economics literature (see for 
example Romer, 2006). In this formulation, each firm operates under constant returns to 
scale, but production externalities are generated at the level of the entire economy so 
that aggregate output grows under increasing returns to scale. Given the poor level of 
capitalisation of manufacturing in Andhra Pradesh, the externality is assumed to emerge 
from the workers’ learning-by-doing during the production process and from 
specialisation in the division of labour. Technological progress can thus be modelled as 
an increasing function of the number of manufacturing workers.  
 
Firms decide the levels of factors employment based on the current state of technology 
(Ti), and on the current marginal productivity of labour and capital (β and 1-β 
respectively). As a by-product of the production process, firms end up with more output 
than expected. Output is then distributed to factors in proportion to their contributions to 
production. The production function of the single firm is a Cobb-Douglas with constant 
returns to scale: 
 
.        (2.4) 
 
Total factor productivity (T) is a function of manufacturing employment in the 
economy, where the parameter λ is the increasing returns to scale parameter: 
 
   NBT ii  1           (2.5) 
 
Substituting this expression for total factor productivity in the manufacturing production 
function we have: 
 
   miiii PNKNBM
   11         (2.6) 
 
By aggregating over all firms total output is: 
 
   mm PKNBM
 

 11         (2.7) 
 
miiii PKNTM
  1
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in which the returns to scale are increasing, as the sum of labour and capital 
productivities is larger than one, and equal to 1+ λ. Note that the inclusion of increasing 
returns to scale in manufacturing implies that a movement of labour from agriculture 
has the effect of increasing workers’ productivity in manufacturing and per capita 
output of the entire economy. 
 
All firms maximise profits, employ the same technology, and use the same level of 
capital and labour (that is: Mi=M/F,    FNN i /1  , and Ki=K/F). Factors payments 
to capital (rk) and labour (wm) are:  
 
  mm
P
N
M
w




1
         (2.8) 
 
  mk P
K
M
r  1          (2.9) 
 
As in the case of the agricultural sector, capitalists earn a capital rent (rk) in addition to a 
wage (wm) for their own work in the firm, from which it immediately follows that they 
attain higher incomes than manufacturing workers. 
2.3.3 Income 
There are four income classes in the economy, two in manufacturing and two in 
agriculture. In manufacturing workers earn a wage wm, while capitalists earn a rent rk for 
each unit of capital in addition to their labour income. Similarly, in agriculture workers 
earn a wage wa, while farmers earn an implicit rent for their land rl in addition to the 
remuneration for the use of their own labour. Table 2.1 summarises the expressions for 
incomes accruing to each class. 
 
Table 2.1 Income distribution by class 
 
Income class Income 
Capitalists Krk + mNwa)1(   
Manufacturing workers 
mNwa)1(   
Farmers 
al aNwLr   
Agricultural labourers 
aaNw  
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Aggregating over all income classes and assuming that in the long term wages in 
agriculture and in manufacturing are equal (wa = wm = w), total income (Y) in the 
economy is simply: 
 
KrLrwNY kl           (2.10) 
2.3.4 Consumption 
Consumption of agricultural and manufactured goods are functions of income and 
prices. The demand equations in general form are: ),( ia PYfC  , and ),( im PYfC  . 
The particular forms assumed by the demand functions depend on the assumptions 
made regarding consumers’ preferences. Three cases will be considered: homothetic 
preferences, hierarchical preferences and quasi-homothetic preferences. The demand 
equations for each system of preferences will be derived, and their ability to describe 
observed consumers’ behaviour will be discussed. 
 
Notice that demand equations derived from the theory of consumer behaviour must 
satisfy three basic requirements (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980c). These are the adding-
up condition, homogeneity, and a reasonable representation of observed consumer 
behaviour.
2
 The adding-up condition stipulates that consumers cannot spend more than 
their income (Ca+Cm=Y) and that the budget constraint must be satisfied. It also implies 
some testable restrictions on the derivatives of the demand functions with respect to 
income that are known as Engel’s equations.3 Homogeneity means that changes in 
income and prices by the same amount do not change the quantity demanded of any of 
the goods. Formally this is equivalent to demand equations that are homogenous of 
degree zero:   ),(, pyfpyf ii  . Finally, demand equations should be able to 
represent luxuries (goods whose demands increases more than proportionally with 
                                                 
2
 There are two other properties that demand equations must satisfy: symmetry and negativity. These 
however are not relevant for the present discussion. 
3
 Engel’s equations state that changes in income and prices determine changes in the composition of the 
budget constraint, leaving its value unchanged. Formally,  Engel’s equations state that the sum of the 
derivatives with respect to income of all goods are equal to one: 
 
1



i
i
i
y
q
p . In budget shares form the Engel’s equations are:   
i
iiw 1 , where w is the share 
consumed of good i, and η is the income elasticity for the same good. 
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income), necessities (whose demand increases less than proportionally with income), 
and inferior goods (whose demand decreases as income increases). 
 
Homothetic preferences 
Homothetic preferences mean that preferences are independent of total expenditure 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980c). For a factor θ>0 the utility function is homogenous of 
degree one: 
 
   ii qUqU             (2.11) 
 
In other words, doubling the quantities consumed of each good doubles utility, and 
utility is produced under constant returns to scale. The composition of the budget is 
therefore independent of the scale of total expenditure. The Cobb-Douglas and the 
Constant Elasticity of Substitution are typical examples of utility functions with 
homothetic preferences. Appendix A shows how to obtain a set of demand equations 
from the maximisation of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The derived quantities 
demanded of the two goods are: 
 
cYCa                                 and                             
m
m
P
Y
cC )1(     (2.12) 
 
It can be easily verified that the adding-up and homogeneity conditions are satisfied. 
These demand equations however perform rather poorly in representing consumer 
behaviour. All income elasticities are equal to one and no luxuries or necessities are 
allowed. The Engel functions are straight lines through the origin, and the consumption 
shares of all commodities are constant and independent of total expenditure. Most 
importantly, homotheticity is contradicted by empirical budget studies. Expenditure 
elasticities are rarely equal to one. The budget composition varies across households of 
increasing expenditure, and over time as total expenditure increases for all households. 
 
Hierarchic preferences 
Hierarchic preferences mean that consumers have a hierarchy of wants over different 
goods. A hierarchic utility function implies that the set of goods purchased changes with 
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total expenditure. As income increases the number of goods purchased also increases, as 
some new goods are purchased while others are abandoned, and in general the rich 
purchase a larger number of goods than the poor. The concept of hierarchical 
preferences has received little attention by demand theorists, with the notable exception 
of Fraser Jackson (1984), but it has been widely used in agricultural transformation 
models for its simplicity and tractability.  
 
With only two goods, hierarchic preferences mean that consumers spend all their 
income on the inferior item (food) until they reach a level of satisfaction (ga), after 
which any additional income is spent on the superior good (the manufactured good). 
The demand equations for the two goods in the two states are: 
 
YCa     and  
0mC   if agY      (2.13) 
 
aa gC     and   am gYC     if  agY   
 
Adding-up and homogeneity are obviously satisfied. Hierarchic demand equations 
represent a considerable improvement in terms of representing consumer behaviour 
compared to the homothetic case. While in the homothetic case all income elasticities 
are equal to one, in the hierarchic case they are allowed to switch from the value of zero 
to the value of one as expenditure increases. This however is a credible representation 
of consumers demand for only a small number of goods, and an alternative formulation 
that lies between the homothetic and the hierarchical case is required to better 
approximate consumer behaviour. 
 
Quasi-homothetic preferences 
Quasi-homothetic preferences imply a minimum level of expenditure on at least one of 
the goods. A typical utility function for this type of preferences is: 
 
)ln()1()ln( mmaa gCcgCcU        (2.14) 
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where ga and gm represent the minimum expenditure on food and on the manufactured 
good respectively. The derived demand functions, assuming for simplicity that there is 
no minimum expenditure on the manufacturing good, are:
 4
 
 
)( aaa gYcgC      and      ))(1( amm gYcPC      (2.15) 
 
Adding-up is satisfied provided that the sum of the propensities to consume of the two 
goods is equal to one, and in the equations above this was imposed by construction. 
Income elasticities can now take any value, and are given by: 
 
a
a
w
c
    and    
m
m
w
c 1
     (2.16) 
 
Luxuries will have elasticities greater than one, while necessities will have elasticity 
less than one. As expenditure increases, the share of expenditure on luxuries over total 
expenditure increases, while the share of expenditure on necessities decreases.  
 
While homothetic Engel curves are lines through the origin, quasi-homothetic Engel 
curves are straight lines that do not go through the origin. The elasticities vary with the 
share of each good consumed over total expenditure, and therefore vary with total 
expenditure. In the long term however, as expenditure grows to infinity all income 
elasticities become equal to one, budget shares become equal to c and c-1, and the 
system becomes homothetic.
5
  
 
Quasi-homothetic demand functions represent a considerable improvement in terms of 
characterising consumer behaviour compared to the homothetic and the hierarchic 
cases. There are however two characteristics of these demand equations that contradict 
observed consumer behaviour. First, the propensities to consume can only be positive, 
which rules out inferior goods. Secondly, in cross-sectional studies of household 
budgets Engel curves have been found to be non-linear.  
                                                 
4
 See Appendix A for the derivation of these demand equations. 
5
 This can be seen by applying l’Hôpital rule. Both the denominator and the numerator of the elasticities 
in (2.16) grow to infinity as expenditure increases. Differentiating both terms with respect to 1 we have 
c/c=1. 
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2.3.5 Model solution 
The model can be solved by setting three equilibrium conditions. The first condition is 
the equality of the agricultural and urban wages, which follows from the assumptions of 
free movement of labour and absence of unemployment. The second and third 
conditions are the equality of supply and demand in the markets for the agricultural and 
manufactured goods: 
 
ma ww  ,  aCA  ,    and  mCM     (2.17) 
 
By equating the wage equations (2.2) and (2.8) and the output equations (2.1) and (2.7) 
to the respective demand equations, the model can be reduced to a system of three 
equations in three unknowns: the share of agricultural employment in total employment 
(a), total income (Y), and the sectoral terms of trade (Pm):  
 
)(afPm            (2.18) 
)(afY   
),( YPfa m  
 
A sequential solution can be obtained by solving the equality in the labour market for 
the terms of trade, solving the equality in the market for the agricultural product for 
income, and then substituting the expressions for income and the terms of trade in the 
equilibrium of supply and demand of the manufactured good. Appendix B illustrates the 
solutions obtained under the three different hypotheses regarding the consumption 
function. 
 
The model solution proposed produces an expression for the share of employment in 
agriculture in terms of the exogenous variables and parameters: 
).,,,,,,,( aa BNKLgcfa   The effect of technological progress in agriculture on 
employment in the agricultural sector can be seen in comparative statics by 
differentiating the agricultural employment share with respect to the total factor 
productivity: 
aB
a


.  In what follows it will be shown that the sign and size of this 
derivative depend on the assumptions made regarding the consumption function.  
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The homothetic case 
In the case of homothetic preferences there is a unique solution for the share of 
employment in the agricultural sector that depends only on the production elasticity of 
labour in the two sectors, and on the income elasticity of food. The share of 
employment in agriculture increases with the average propensity to consume food and 
with labour productivity in agriculture, and it decreases with the increase in labour 
productivity in the manufacturing sector: 
 
cc
c
a



          (2.19) 
 
The derivative 
aB
a


with respect to total factor productivity in agriculture is zero, and 
the share of employment in agriculture is independent of technological change. With 
homothetic preferences technological change has no effect on the sectoral composition 
of output, as consumers are willing to absorb any increase in food supply. Homothetic 
preferences are never used in models of agricultural transformation, and they are shown 
here only to illustrate an extreme case. Demand equations derived from homothetic 
preferences however, are sometimes used in general equilibrium models, probably 
ignoring the strong implications that they impose on the working of the economy. 
 
The hierarchic case 
In the case of hierarchical preferences the derivative 
aB
a


with respect to total factor 
productivity in agriculture is:
6
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        (2.20) 
 
The value of this derivative is with no doubt negative, because all the terms on the right-
hand-side are positive. Once all consumers have achieved the desired minimum level of 
                                                 
6 
See Appendix B for the derivation of (2.20). 
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food consumption ga, agricultural production remains fixed, and increases in total factor 
productivity in agriculture make agricultural employment immediately redundant, and 
the share of agricultural labour decreases. This function has been widely used in 
modelling the process of agricultural transformation (see for example Gollin et al., 
2002, Jorgenson, 1967, Laitner, 2000). 
 
The quasi-homothetic case 
In the case of quasi-homothetic preferences the solution to 
aB
a


 is rather complex and 
can be shown to be equal to: 
 
)1)(1()(
)1(








cNgAcc
B
cNag
B
a
a
a
a
a
     (2.21) 
 
This derivative is negative, and therefore the share of employment in agriculture 
decreases with technological change in agriculture, provided that the agricultural sector 
produces enough to satisfy the minimum requirement of food per capita.
7
 When per 
capita production in agriculture is small, the share of employment in agriculture may 
increase, as consumers demand larger quantities of the agricultural good until reaching 
the minimum requirement ga. Notice that the larger the propensity to consume food out 
of current income (c), the smaller is the value of the derivative, and hence the smaller is 
the effect of technological change on agricultural employment. Similarly the larger the 
minimum requirement of food ga, the smaller is the value of the derivative. Notice also 
that this derivative is in absolute value smaller that the derivative produced by 
hierarchic preferences. This can be shown by considering that by reducing the value of 
c, the size of the derivative decreases, and when c is reduced to its minimum value 
(zero), we are back to the hierarchic preferences case. 
 
The results of this theoretical review of the effects of consumer preferences on 
agricultural employment can be summarised in the following way. Homothetic 
preferences and unitary elasticities of food consumption rule out any effect of 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix B for a derivation of this derivative, and for a proof that it is negative. 
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technological change on agricultural employment, and under these demand conditions 
the process of agricultural transformation cannot take place. Hierarchical preferences 
imply a faster process of transformation compared to quasi homothetic preferences, but 
they oversimplify economic behaviour. Quasi-homothetic preferences introduce more 
flexibility in the model, by allowing the income elasticity of food and the minimum 
food requirement to determine the size of the effect of technological progress on 
agricultural employment. 
2.3.6 Income distribution and food consumption 
One shortcoming of quasi-homothetic preferences is that, as already noted, the derived 
system of demand equations consists of Engel curves that are linear in expenditure. 
However, empirical studies of household budgets have found non-linear Engel curves 
for many commodities as well as for broad aggregates of commodities.  
 
In principle, the non-linearity of consumer demand is not problematic. First, linear 
demand equations can be a good approximation if what is investigated is the short-term 
behaviour of the model. Second, non-linear demand equations in cross sections do not 
necessarily contradict linear demands because budget studies observe consumption of 
different households, while what is needed is observing consumption of the same 
households over time. As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980c) point out, it is not obvious 
that Engel curves should be non-linear in panel data and for broad categories of goods 
like food. Finally, consumption aggregates can become larger over time, as new items 
are introduced in the groups. Therefore the change in demand brought about by a 
change in income over time may differ from the change in demand brought about by the 
same change in income over a cross section of households. 
 
The non-linearity of Engel curves however is problematic in one respect, which is 
known in demand theory as the aggregation problem (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980c). 
Demand theory models consumption of individuals or households, and in order to 
obtain the market demand for a commodity, individual demands are aggregated into a 
single demand function. Certainly there are differences between the individual 
consumption functions, but it is assumed that these differences average out and that 
final demand only depends on prices and income. The procedure of summing up all 
individual demands in order to calculate market demand is correct if individual demand 
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equations are linear, but it may produce unexpected results if demand equations are non-
linear. 
 
Consider for example the linear demand equation of a single household implied by 
quasi homothetic preferences: 
 
iaiai cYgcC  )1(           (2.22) 
 
Summing over all households in the economy the market food demand is: 
 
cYNgcC aa  )1(           (2.23) 
 
where 
N
g
g i
ai
a

  and 
i
iYY . The marginal propensity to consume food (c) is the 
same for all households, and the subscripts i for each household have disappeared. 
Suppose now of operating a transfer of income from a rich household to a poor one. 
With linear Engel curves nothing changes, as all households consume food in the same 
proportions. With non-linear Engel curves however food consumption increases because 
the poor spend a larger share of expenditure on food. 
 
Linear demand equations like (2.23) fail to detect distributional effects on food 
consumption. Changes in food consumption are not only determined by changes in 
aggregate income, but also by changes in income distribution. One simple way to 
incorporate distributional effect in the food demand equation is adding a term that 
summarises the inequality of the distribution. For example Chambers and Pope (1992) 
use the following specification: 
 
2
32
2
1 YbYbbNgC aa          (2.24) 
 
where ζ2 is the variance of income distribution. The quantity of food consumed varies 
with expenditure in a non-linear way and is linearly related to income distribution. The 
more equal is the distribution of income, the larger is the consumption of food, and the 
more unequal is the distribution the smaller is the market demand for food. 
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A demand function like the one in (2.24) could be incorporated in the model outlined 
above. With its inclusion, the demand for food and the effect of technological progress 
on agricultural employment would also depend on changes in income distribution. An 
increase in inequality would reduce food demand and accelerate the agricultural 
transformation, while a reduction in inequality would have the opposite effect. One 
additional complication is that the distribution of income is endogenous to the model 
and therefore the direction of the change cannot be determined a priori. Before doing 
further modelling, the effect of a change in income distribution on food consumption is 
assessed empirically in order to establish its relevance (see Section 2.6). 
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
This section presents some stylised facts about the process of agricultural 
transformation in Andhra Pradesh. It draws on national level data to show changes over 
time in agricultural production as a percentage of total GDP, agricultural employment as 
a share of total employment, technological progress and productivity in agriculture, 
food demand and income inequality. The extent to which these facts fit with the model 
of agricultural transformation outlined above is discussed at the end of this section. 
2.4.1 Agricultural production and employment 
The size of the agricultural sector in Andhra Pradesh has considerably decreased over 
the last 45 years. Figure 2.3 shows the trend in the share of agricultural output over total 
GDP for the period between 1961 and 2006, using data collected by the DES (2005). 
Figures are calculated at 1993-94 constant prices and reflect the output of the primary 
sector, which according to the DES definition includes agriculture, forestry and logging, 
fishing, and mining and quarrying. Disaggregated data for the period 1981-1993 show 
that more than 90% of the primary sector output is generated in agriculture, and the data 
can therefore be considered representative of the agricultural sector.  
 
The chart in Figure 2.3 clearly shows that the share of agricultural output over total 
GDP has decreased over time, from above 60% in 1960 to less than 30% in more recent 
times. Though the common perception is that Andhra Pradesh is a predominantly 
agricultural state, it should be recognised that in terms of output produced, agriculture 
now represents less than one third of the total value of the economy.  
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Figure 2.3 Sectoral composition of GDP in Andhra Pradesh (1960-2005) 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
agricutlture manufacturing
services
 
Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
 
If Andhra Pradesh is not an agricultural state in terms of output produced, it certainly is 
in terms of employment of its workforce. Figure 2.4 shows the trends in the shares of 
rural population over total population and in the share of agricultural employment over 
total employment for the period from 1961 to 2001. The chart uses data collected by the 
last five rounds of the population census of India. The ratios were calculated for the 
years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001, and the lines between the data points were 
drawn by simple linear interpolation. Rural population in the state has declined only 
marginally over the period considered, from above 80% to 75% of total population. 
Similarly, the share of agricultural employment over total employment has decreased 
only slightly and has remained rather stable over the last 50 years. 
 
Some limitations of the population census data that have a bearing on these numbers 
need to be acknowledged. First, there is some degree of arbitrariness in the definition of 
rural and urban agglomerations. The Census of India classifies an agglomeration as 
urban if it satisfies three criteria: population is above 5,000 inhabitants, at least 75% of 
the population is employed in non-agricultural activities, and population density is at 
least 400 inhabitants per squared kilometre. Second, rural population is not a good 
indicator of employment in agriculture, because by the census own definition, up to 
25% of population in urban areas may be employed in agriculture, while population of 
villages below 5,000 inhabitants may well be employed in non-agricultural activities. 
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Third, the agricultural workforce was calculated using data on the numbers of 
cultivators, agricultural labourers, and livestock workers. The census definitions of 
economic activities are however problematic, because they have changed over time, and 
data on female employment have not always been collected or included in the data 
reported.  
 
Figure 2.4 Percentage of rural population and agricultural workforce (1961-2001) 
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Source: calculated from Census of India (2001). 
 
Figure 2.5 further disaggregates the share of agricultural workforce reported in Figure 
2.4 by farmers and agricultural labourers. The absolute number of farmers (ranging 
from seven to eight million) has not substantially changed over the period considered, 
though their relative number has decreased. On the other hand, the absolute number and 
the share of agricultural labourers have increased, and they now represent more than 
40% of total employment. At the same time, Andhra Pradesh, as the rest of India, has 
witnessed a process of feminisation of the agricultural labour force. The Indian census 
reports that the percentage of women classified as agricultural labourers has doubled 
from 25.6% to 49.6% over the period from 1961 to 1981 (Da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999). In 2001 women constituted 46.9% and 53.5% of the 
agricultural workforce in India and Andhra Pradesh respectively. This process of 
feminisation of the labour force has been differently explained by the neoliberal and the 
Marxists schools of thought (Garikipati, 2006). The neoclassical economic literature has 
stressed the operation of demand factors. According to this school, the increase in 
female employment is the result of an increase in labour demand for those tasks, like 
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rice weeding and harvesting, that are primarily performed by women (Walker and Ryan, 
1990). This interpretation is supported by the observed reduction in the male-female 
wage differential for agricultural labourers during the green revolution (Hazell and 
Ramaswamy, 1991). This interpretation is challenged by authors writing in the Marxist 
tradition. Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) conducted a series of interviews in 25 
villages of the Chittoor district in Andhra Pradesh and concluded that the increasing 
participation of women in the agricultural labour force was a result of farmers’ attempts 
to reduce labour costs at a time when male workers were increasingly engaged in off-
farm activities. Garikipati (2006) conducted extensive field studies in the 
Mahaboobnagar district of Andhra Pradesh in 2001 and 2002 and concluded that the 
feminisation of the agricultural labour force resulted in an increase in the women’s 
workload both within and outside the home, which was accompanied by little 
improvement of their living standards.  
 
Figure 2.5 Percentage of farmers and agricultural labourers (1961-2001) 
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Source: calculated from Census of India (2001). 
 
The large share of rural population is the result of limited migration from rural to urban 
areas. The agricultural labour force grew by an average of 1.6% per year compared to a 
rate of growth of 1.9% of total population. Assuming that fertility rates in rural and 
urban areas are similar, the difference between these two rates can be considered an 
indicator of the rate of migration from the agricultural to the non-agricultural sector, 
expressed as a percentage of the agricultural labour force. A rate of migration of 0.3% 
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per year compares rather poorly with the median value of 2% found over the period 
1959-1990 by Mundlak et al. (1997) for a sample of 130 countries. 
 
A low rate of migration is confirmed by census data of 2001 (Office of the Director of 
Census Operations, 2005), which show that 70 % of total population was born in the 
place of enumeration, and only 6% was enumerated in a district different from the 
district of birth. The percentage of people enumerated in a location different from the 
place of birth but within the same district was 22%. It is useful at this point to 
disaggregate the data on migrants by origin and destination, and by sex (see Table 2.2). 
A large component of female migration occurs within rural areas, and other data in the 
census indicate that the main reason for female migration is marriage. Male migration is 
mainly motivated by economic reasons, but only about 25% of this migration occurs 
from rural to urban areas.  
 
These data should be treated with caution because the 2001 census classified persons as 
migrants if they were enumerated at a place different from their place of birth or from 
their place of last residence. This definition of migration is problematic in several ways. 
First, this method measures migration as a stock rather than a flow. The flow of migrant 
over a given period of time cannot be calculated because respondents are defined as 
migrants if they ever migrated in the course of their life, irrespectively of when this 
happened. Secondly, this definition ignores temporal migration. People who migrated, 
even for long periods of time, and then returned to their place of origin are not classified 
as migrants. Finally, part of the migrant population will have died by the time of the 
interview, and if mortality rates of migrants and non-migrants differ, migration rates 
might be biased. 
 
Table 2.2 Percentage of migrants by area of origin and destination 
Migration flow Male migrants Female migrants 
Rural to rural 45.3 73.0 
Rural to urban 26.7 12.4 
Urban to urban 20.2 8.7 
Urban to rural 7.7 5.9 
Total  100.0 100.0 
Source: calculated from census migration data (Office of the Director of Census Operations, 2005). 
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2.4.2 Agricultural productivity 
The model outlined in Section 2.3 identified technological progress in agriculture as one 
of the two main drivers of the process of agricultural transformation. Descriptive 
evidence on the operation of technological progress in Andhra Pradesh will now be 
briefly discussed. 
 
Table 2.3 shows rates of growth of output in agriculture and in the modern sector 
between 1961 and 2006. It also reports per capita growth rates, measured over rural and 
urban populations, and productivity growth rates, measured over employment in 
agriculture and the modern sector. All indicators show that the performance of the 
agricultural sector was poorer than that of the modern sector over the period considered. 
These data however do not adequately capture productivity growth in agriculture for 
two reasons. First, the growth rates are aggregated over a long time period, and much of 
the productivity growth in agriculture occurred during the last three decades. Secondly, 
growth rates per capita and per worker are good indicators of productivity growth from 
a welfare point of view, as they show the output produced per person. However, from a 
technical point of view growth in output per unit of land is a better indicator of 
technological progress. 
 
Table 2.3 Growth rates in agriculture and in the modern sector (1961-2006) 
 Overall growth Per capita growth Growth per worker 
Agriculture 2.4 0.5 0.9 
Modern sector 6.3 4.4 3.9 
Total GDP 4.6 2.7 2.7 
Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the trends of agricultural output per hectare and per worker in Andhra 
Pradesh over the last 50 years measured at 1993-94 constant prices. Starting from the 
mid 1970s, output per hectare has more than doubled, while output per worker has only 
slightly increased over the same period. The different growth patterns of land and labour 
productivity result from the specific characteristics of the technological progress in 
agriculture. In the mid 1970s, improved hybrid seeds were introduced together with the 
expansion of irrigation and the use of fertiliser (the green revolution package). This 
technology is eminently land saving and produced a considerable increase in production 
per unit of land. Productivity per worker however, has lagged behind, and Andhra 
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Pradesh seems to have followed what Hayami and Ruttan (1971) call the Asian path to 
agricultural growth. Land productivity increased substantially after the start of the green 
revolution, but high rates of population growth and poor absorption of excess labour by 
the non-agricultural sector resulted in a large increase of the agricultural labour force, 
which in turn is reflected in low productivity per worker. 
 
Figure 2.6 Labour and land productivities in agriculture (1960-2005) 
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Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
 
It should also be emphasised that the technological progress was not even across all 
cultivated crops. Figure 2.7 shows the productivity indices of four main crops in Andhra 
Pradesh: rice, cotton, groundnut, and Bengal gram (a pulse). Rice is by far the most 
important crop in Andhra Pradesh, with 30% of cultivated land under this crop in 2005. 
Cotton has become an important commercial crop and is cultivated on nearly 10% of all 
cultivated land. Groundnut is produced in the dry land areas of the south of the state, 
and grows on some 15% of the cultivated area. The chart shows that while yields of rice 
and cotton have increased considerably, yields of groundnut have remained stable and 
even decreased in recent times. The chart also clearly shows that the early 1970s 
marked the beginning of agricultural productivity growth in Andhra Pradesh. 
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Figure 2.7 Productivity indices of main agricultural crops (1956-2005) 
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Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
 
There was also considerable unevenness across region in productivity growth, which 
was the result of differences in agro-ecological conditions and in irrigation 
infrastructure. As discussed in Section 1.2, Andhra Pradesh can be subdivided into three 
main macro-regions that are differently endowed in terms of soil characteristics, rainfall 
patterns and irrigation infrastructure. The Coastal region is served by good irrigation 
infrastructure and benefits from good soils and rainfall. Irrigation in the Telangana is 
poor, but the region enjoys relatively good soils and rainfall. The southern region of 
Rayalseema lacks both good soils and infrastructure and it is mainly rainfed. 
 
Figure 2.8 District level disparities in Andhra Pradesh: 1962-2003 
 
Source: Bhalla and Singh (2001) for the series up to 1992-95 and DES (2005) for the 2002-03 series. 
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The green revolution had a disequalising effect on the regions of Andhra Pradesh. 
Figure 2.8 shows the coefficients of variations of output per hectare and output per 
worker across districts and over time. The diffusion of the HYV (high yield variety) 
technology was confined to the production of wheat in Northern India over the period 
from 1962-73, but over the 1970s and the 1980s it spread to the cultivation of rice in 
Coastal Andhra Pradesh (Bhalla and Singh, 2001). This is reflected in the chart of 
Figure 2.8, which shows an increase in district level inequality in the value of 
agricultural output per hectare over the same period. 
 
The 1980s witnessed and expansion in the use of fertiliser in all areas of the State, an 
increase in the use of water-pump irrigation in areas not served by canal infrastructure, 
and a diversification of production patterns away from cereals to oilseed and cotton 
(Bhalla and Singh, 2001). In addition, the area irrigated by canals declined over the 
1990s (IEG, 2007). The simultaneous operation these factors resulted in a substantial 
decrease in the productivity differentials across districts. 
 
Substantial differences however persist between the three regions in terms of 
agricultural productivity and access to irrigation. Table 2.4 illustrates the historical 
patterns of growth of agricultural productivity and of irrigated areas by region. In Table 
2.4 the Coastal region is further subdivided into a North Coastal and a South Coastal 
region as the two are characterised by significant differences in soil and infrastructure 
characteristics - the South Coastal being the better endowed of the two. The figures in 
Table 2.4 show the large advantage of the Coastal areas over the rest of the state in 
terms of both agricultural productivity and access to irrigation. The Telangana region 
has made considerable progress over the period considered, while productivity growth 
in the Rayalseema region has been modest. The last two columns of Table 2.4 show the 
change occurred in the percentage of the area irrigated, and provide an indication of the 
link between water provision and agricultural productivity. Growth in agricultural 
productivity was highest in Telangana where the area irrigated doubled over the period. 
Only modest increases in productivity were observed in the Coastal region where the 
increase in the share of irrigated area was modest. The Rayalseema region experienced 
little productivity growth in spite of almost doubling the share of irrigated area, which 
could be explained by the increasing degradation of soils and the poverty of the 
production technology employed (Subrahmanyam, 2003). 
48 
 
  
 
Table 2.4 Regional breakdown of agricultural productivity and irrigated area in 
Andhra Pradesh: 1955-1999 
 
Crop output value per hectare Percentage of 
irrigated area 
Region 1955-58 1969-72 1979-82 1989-92 1996-99 1955-58 1996-99 
North Coastal 
Andhra 
148.7 121.0 94.9 99.2 87.5 50.1 44.8 
South Coastal 
Andhra 
194.0 149.7 154.1 144.6 149.1 46.2 62.6 
Telangana 49.0 58.6 61.8 71.5 77.9 15.8 36.0 
Rayalseema 58.7 81.0 73.4 81.3 70.9 12.6 23.3 
Source: Subrahmanyan (2003) 
 
Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003), have stressed the importance of initial conditions in 
determining the rate of agricultural growth in rural India. If agro-ecological conditions 
influenced the location of irrigation facilities in Andhra Pradesh, this would have 
resulted in an uneven pattern of agricultural growth at the regional level and much of 
the impact on agricultural growth attributed to irrigation would be in fact the 
consequence of an initial agro-ecological advantage. If this is true, then the success of 
irrigation policies in advantaged areas cannot be replicated in areas that are not 
favourably endowed. This in turn could explain the poor growth of Rayalseema in spite 
of the increase in the share of irrigated area. 
2.4.3 Food demand 
The second driver of the process of agricultural transformation according to the model 
outlined in Section 2.3 is the diminishing demand for food. Table 2.5 shows the shares 
of food expenditure over total expenditure calculated using household survey 
expenditure data collected by the NSSO over the period from 1987 to 2005. Average 
food shares were calculated in two ways. The household food shares are simple 
averages of households’ shares. The market food shares are weighted averages of 
households’ food shares, where the weights are households’ expenditure shares of total 
expenditure in the sample: 
 

i
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w           (2.25) 
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where yi is household expenditure and Y is total expenditure in the sample. Market food 
shares are less representative of household behaviours, but more representative of 
market behaviour.  
 
Table 2.5 Food expenditure shares (1987-2005) 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Household food shares     
all sample  61.9 61.2 54.5 53.9 
Rural 62.8 63.0 57.4 57.4 
Urban 58.5 56.0 47.2 43.1 
Market food share     
all sample 58.2 58.3 49.7 51.1 
rural 59.3 60.2 53.9 55.8 
urban 55.0 53.9 42.6 41.1 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The food shares shown in Table 2.5 are high even for a low income country. Seale et al. 
(2003), replicating a study conducted earlier by Theil et al. (1989), calculated food 
budget shares of 114 countries using data collected by the International Comparison 
Programme between 1993 and 1996. Food shares ranged from a minimum of 9%, in the 
United States, to a maximum of 73% in Tanzania. Low income countries, defined as 
countries with per capita expenditure less than 15% the expenditure in the United States, 
were found to have an average food share of 52%. In Andhra Pradesh around the same 
time (1993-94 survey) reported food shares were about 60%. 
 
Food shares have only slightly declined over the period from 1987 to 1993. They are 
smaller in urban areas, where incomes are higher, and decreased faster in urban areas 
than in rural areas. Table 2.5 shows a sizeable drop between the survey of 1993-94 and 
the survey of 1999-00. This might be the consequence of a bias in the measurement of 
household expenditure, which resulted from changes made to the survey questionnaire 
used in the 1999-00 round. The standard NSSO questionnaire uses a 30-day recall 
period for high-frequency expenditures, namely food, stimulants and intoxicants, and 
miscellaneous goods and services. In addition, the questionnaire uses both a 30-day and 
a 365-day recall period for low-frequency purchases of clothing and footwear, 
education, health, and durable goods. However, in 1999-00 the NSSO tested a new 
questionnaire in which food data were collected using both a 7-day and a 30-day recall 
period, whilst some low-frequency purchases used only the 365-day recall. These 
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modifications are believed to have biased the comparability of the data in two ways 
(Deaton and Kozel, 2005). The first source of bias derives from the fact that the 7-day 
recall has been shown in past experiments to produce larger expenditures than the 30-
day recall. In addition, the 7-day recall was conducted on the same page and 
simultaneously to the 30-day recall. Therefore it is likely that both the respondent and 
the interviewer would reconcile the amounts during the interview. The result is that the 
30-day food expenditure in the 1999-00 round is biased upward. The second source of 
bias is that from experiments with the ‘thin’ rounds have shown that the poor report 
larger expenditure on non-food items when using a 365-day recall, while the rich report 
a lower expenditure on a 365-day recall. Since the expenditure of the rich on non-food 
items is much higher than that of the poor, the general result is an underestimation of 
expenditure. Since these two biases increase both food and non-food expenditure, it is 
difficult to predict their effect on expenditure shares, as these can vary in both 
directions. However, given that in general the food share decreases as income per capita 
increases, and given that the food share of 2004-05 is only slightly smaller than the one 
of 1999-00, it is likely that the latter was underestimated, and that the decrease in the 
food share over the period was smoother than it appears in Table 2.5. 
 
The stability of food demand in Andhra Pradesh seems to be confirmed by trends in 
agricultural prices. If agricultural supply exceeds demand, then in the absence of state 
interventions in agricultural markets, prices of agricultural products should fall. Figure 
2.9 shows a price index constructed using DES data on prices of all agricultural 
commodities produced in the state for the period from 1975 to 2005. Nominal prices 
were deflated by the series of the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Labourers 
(CPIAL). The chart shows that prices of agricultural goods increased in real terms in the 
second half of the 1980s and remained stable thereafter. 
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Figure 2.9 Real price index of agricultural goods (1975-2005) 
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Source: calculated from indiastat. 
2.4.4 Income inequality 
Over the period from 1987 to 2005, Andhra Pradesh experienced an increase in per 
capita income and in the equality of income distribution both in urban and rural areas. 
Table 2.6 shows the value of median per capita expenditure in the four survey rounds. 
Medians were calculated taking into account probability sampling weights following the 
methodology outlined by Deaton (1997).
8
 In addition, medians of urban and rural areas 
were deflated by the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW) and by the 
CPIAL, in order to allow comparability across sectors and over time. Real per capita 
income increased by less than 20% over the period considered, at the rate of 1% per 
year. In urban areas, per capita income growth was nearly double that of rural areas. 
 
Two limitations of growth rates calculated from NSSO survey data need to be pointed 
out. First, data from the National Accounts report a much larger increase in per capita 
income over the same period. According to National Accounts data reported by the DES 
(2005), per capita income more than doubled in Andhra Pradesh between 1987-88 and 
2004-05. Given the size of the difference between the survey data and the National 
Accounts data, it is likely that the survey data underestimate per capita expenditure. 
Possible reasons for this underestimation are the introduction of new consumption 
goods not reported in the questionnaires, and the increasing rate of refusal in 
                                                 
8
 Household observations are sorted in ascending order of the value of per capita expenditure. The 
running sum of the individual sampling weights (household sampling weights times household size) is 
calculated. The per capita expenditure of the household occupying the central position of this running 
sum is then selected as the weighted median of the sample. 
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participating in the interview or in providing accurate answers as the population 
becomes richer or more urbanised (Bhalla, 2002). Second, figures were adjusted using 
the CPIAL and the CPIIW. These indices have a number of shortcomings, which are 
discussed at length in Deaton and Tarozzi (2000) and Deaton and Dreze (2002). The 
three main shortcomings of official price indices are: they are based on outdated 
household expenditure shares; they are not fully representative of all areas of the 
country; and they rely on the Laspeyres formula that tends to understate inflation over 
time.  
  
Table 2.6 Median per capita expenditure and inequality indices (1987-2005) 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Median per capita expenditure
a
     
All sample  44.1 48.0 54.1 51.3 
Rural  41.6 44.4 48.4 47.1 
Urban 55.9 62.5 77.8 68.8 
Gini coefficient     
All sample 0.284 0.262 0.294 0.256 
Rural  0.275 0.248 0.259 0.238 
Urban 0.295 0.276 0.313 0.259 
Standard deviation of the logarithm 
of per capita expenditure 
    
All sample 0.495 0.458 0.495 0.451 
Rural  0.480 0.437 0.443 0.417 
Urban 0.517 0.483 0.532 0.459 
 Notes: 
a
median per capita expenditure is in thousands of 2004-05 Rupees. 
 Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Table 2.6 also shows the values of two inequality indices: the Gini coefficient and the 
standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita expenditure. Both indices were 
calculated taking into account the survey sampling weights.
9
 Income inequality is not 
high in Andhra Pradesh, where the Gini coefficient is between 0.25 and 0.30. Data of 
                                                 
9
 The weighted Gini was calculated following the methodology outlined in Deaton (1997), while the 
standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita expenditure was calculated using the following formula: 
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The weights (weighti) are the probability sampling weights provided by NSSO. 
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the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 1990-2005), report Gini coefficients in 
a range from a minimum of 0.24 in Hungary (1997) to a maximum of 0.71 in Namibia 
(1993). Countries with inequality indices similar to those of Andhra Pradesh are 
Bangladesh (0.32 in 2000), and Pakistan (0.33 in 1999), while the Gini coefficient for 
the whole of India in 1999-00 was 0.33.  
 
Expenditure inequality has decreased in Andhra Pradesh in both rural and urban areas, 
but more so in rural areas. Notice that the survey data of 1999-00 report a surge in 
inequality. Some authors, Deaton and Dreze (2002) and Sen and Himanshu (2004), have 
interpreted this surge as part of a pattern of increasing inequality in India between rural 
and urban areas, and within urban areas. The latest round of 2004-05 however reports a 
Gini coefficient that is lower than the one calculated for the survey of 1993-94. This 
suggests that the surge in inequality in 1999-00 might be a consequence of the changes 
made to the survey questionnaire. Leaving aside the 1999-00 data, a pattern of 
decreasing inequality emerges, which is more pronounced in rural areas. 
2.4.5 Summary of the descriptive evidence 
The descriptive evidence presented in this section on the process of agricultural 
transformation in Andhra Pradesh can be summarised in the following way. During the 
last 50 years, agricultural output as a share of total GDP has decreased considerably. 
Employment in the agricultural sector however, has only slightly decreased, and there 
has been an increase in the share of agricultural labourers. Technological progress in 
agriculture has resulted in a significant increase in output per hectare beginning in the 
mid 1970s. The growth in productivity resulted in substantial increases in yields of rice 
and cotton. Despite a substantial increase in per capita income, the share of food 
demand in total consumption has only slightly decreased and it remains at a very high 
level even today. Inequality in the distribution of expenditure has decreased over the 
period, and this has potentially contributed to the high levels of food demand in the 
state. 
2.5 Econometric methods 
This section discusses the econometric methods used for the estimation of expenditure 
elasticities of food consumption, and for the simulation of the effect of a change in 
income distribution on food consumption. This section proceeds in three parts. The first 
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discusses the theoretical evolution over time in the econometric estimation of Engel 
curves. The second illustrates the semiparametric methods employed to estimate food 
Engel curves and to calculate expenditure elasticities. The third presents the strategy 
adopted to simulate changes in income distribution.  
2.5.1 Estimation of food Engel curves 
The Engel curve describes a functional relationship between consumption of a given 
commodity and income or household expenditure. Using q for the quantity consumed of 
a given commodity and y for income of the i household, the function can be written as: 
 
)( ii yfq             (2.26) 
 
The function was named after Ernst Engel, a German economist who in 19
th
 century 
studied the food consumption of the Belgian working class using a nonparametric 
method known today as a regressogram (Hardle, 1990). Engel plotted food consumption 
on household income, dividing the horizontal axis in intervals of equal size, and 
calculating the average food consumption of households with income falling in the same 
interval. This method generated a discontinuous step function which showed that 
consumption of food increases less than proportionally with income.  
 
After the original work of Engel, many other empirical observations of food expenditure 
patterns from household budget studies have found that food consumption increases less 
than proportionally with income, and that food consumption as a share of total 
consumption decreases as income increases. This observation has been found so 
frequently in empirical studies that it has acquired the status of law in the economic 
literature, and it is known as the Engel’s law. For a review of recent estimation of food 
Engel curves in more than 100 countries see the work of Seale et al. (2003). 
 
Since Engel’s original work, economists have estimated innumerable Engel functions 
for the most different purposes, normally employing parametric methods. Prais and 
Houthakker (1971) wrote a comprehensive review of these experiments, and performed 
their own estimations of the functional forms most commonly used up to their times. 
These forms were the linear, the hyperbolic, the semilogarithmic, the double 
logarithmic, and the logarithmic reciprocal. All these forms were showed to have some 
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advantages over the other forms for some of the goods or for part of the range of the 
relationship. Prais and Houthakker (1971) concluded that the widely used double 
logarithmic and the semilogarithmic forms performed better than the others in terms of 
goodness of fit.  
 
Prais and Houthakker (1971) however were also concerned with the functional 
relationship being consistent with observed consumer behaviour. Engel curves should 
be able to represent luxuries (commodities whose consumption increases more than 
proportionally with income), necessities (whose consumption increases less than 
proportionally with income), and inferior goods (commodities whose consumption 
decrease as income increases). In addition, Engel curves should allow the same 
commodity to be a luxury for the poor but a necessity for the rich. Based on these 
criteria, they concluded that the double logarithmic form was too restrictive, since it 
implied a constant income elasticity, and opted for the semilogarithmic form as the best 
functional form available. This form is able to represent necessities, luxuries, and 
inferior goods, and allows the income elasticity to vary with income levels: 
 
ii ybaq ln          (2.27) 
 
The choice of the functional form of the Engel curve has often been based on practical 
criteria of goodness of fit, sometimes disregarding basic principles of demand theory. 
One of these principles in particular, the adding-up condition, is violated by all the form 
listed above including the semilogarithmic. Adding-up requires that consumers do not 
spend more than their income. This principle places some restrictions on the demand 
elasticities of each goods, known as Engel’s and Cournot’s equations. Simply put, these 
equations state that changes in income and prices determine changes in the composition 
of the budget constraint but leave its value unchanged. One functional form that satisfies 
adding-up, and that is able to represent closely consumer behaviour was originally 
proposed by Working (1943), elaborated by Leser (1963), and widely used after Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980b). This form is known as the Working-Leser, and relates the 
commodity budget shares to the logarithm of per capita expenditure: 
 
ybaw iii ln          (2.28) 
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This form satisfies the adding-up condition provided that the sum of the parameters a 
estimated over all commodities in the household budget is equal to one, and that the 
sum of the parameters b is equal to zero. It allows for luxuries, necessities and inferior 
goods, and for elasticities to vary with income. Finally, the form is linear in the 
logarithm of expenditure, and is easily estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) 
equation by equation, with the adding-up restrictions being automatically satisfied.  
 
One disadvantage of the Working-Leser form is that necessities and luxuries are 
represented by different curves, which means that the same good, for example food, 
cannot be a luxury for some household and a necessity for another. Each commodity 
can only have an elasticity which is either above or below one. A second shortcoming of 
this form is that though it allows for varying elasticities, these are bound to vary always 
in the same direction. Elasticities can only decrease as income increase. If the good is a 
necessity, the elasticity decreases down to minus infinity as income increases, while if 
the good is a luxury the elasticity decreases down to 1+b. Finally, the Working-Leser 
form postulates that the change in elasticity is linear with income, which is not 
necessarily true. 
 
More recent research on Engel curves has focused on the estimation of the Working-
Leser equation using polynomials in the expenditure term (by adding quadratic or cubic 
terms), and nonparametric or semiparametric methods. Unlike the standard parametric 
Working-Leser form, these methods allow expenditure elasticities to vary in any 
direction for the same good over the entire range of household expenditure. Most 
studies have found evidence of non-linear budget shares and elasticities for a large 
number of goods.  
 
In the case of the estimation of food Engel curves, a difference appears to emerge in the 
empirical literature between studies conducted with data from developed countries, 
which find a linear relationship between the food share and the logarithm of household 
expenditure (Atkinson et al., 1990, Banks et al., 1997), and studies of developing 
countries, which find non-linear elasticities (Bhalotra and Attfield, 1998, Gong et al., 
2005, Kedir and Girma, 2007). Food expenditure elasticities increased with income at 
very low income levels in Pakistan (Bhalotra and Attfield, 1998), were higher than one 
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for very poor households in Ethiopia (Kedir and Girma, 2007), and decreased at 
different rates at different levels of household expenditure in China (Gong et al., 2005).  
2.5.2 Semiparametric estimation of Engel curves 
This section illustrates the econometric methods employed by the present study for 
estimating food elasticities and addresses the following issues: semiparametric 
estimation of Engel curves; measurement error and endogeneity in the estimation of 
Engel curves; specification test of functional forms; and calculation of expenditure 
elasticities from nonparametric curves. 
 
Semiparametric estimation of Engel curves 
The present study estimates food Engel curves both parametrically and 
semiparametrically. The parametric model is a polynomial in per capita expenditure up 
to the third grade: 
 
 
j
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This model is estimated in its linear, quadratic, and cubic form of per capita 
expenditure. The estimation is carried out using OLS corrected for the use of sampling 
weights. In addition to the logarithm of per capita expenditure, the model includes a 
large set of control variables (X). These include a set of demographic variables that 
describe the demographic composition of the household, which are normally found to 
explain a large part of the variation in food expenditure across households. Following 
Deaton (1997), the demographic variables include the age of the head of household, the 
logarithm of household size, and the ratios of six demographic groups over household 
size disaggregated by gender. The demographic groups consists of three child-age 
groups (zero to four, five to nine, and ten to 17), adults (individuals aged 18 to 59) and 
elderly (people aged 60 and above). 
 
Other variables in X control for the social class (scheduled castes and scheduled tribes) 
to which the household belongs, and its main occupation (whether farmers, agricultural 
labourers, or other). These variables capture different dietary habits and requirements. 
For example, members of unscheduled caste are largely vegetarian, while farmers 
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require more energy food for more demanding physical work, and a different type of 
clothing compared to urban workers.  
 
The model also includes a number of geographic variables. These consist of a dummy 
variable for urban areas, and four dummy variables for the regional subdivision of the 
state used by the NSSO. The NSSO subdivides each Indian state in macro regions by 
adjoining administrative districts that are homogeneous in terms of climate and 
socioeconomic characteristics.
10
 As in the case of social and occupational variables, 
location variables capture different expenditure habits that vary with climate or custom. 
 
The semiparametric model combines the advantages of parametric and nonparametric 
estimation. Engel curves may be non-linear, and a nonparametric smoother has the 
advantage of not imposing any specific functional form, like the logarithmic or the 
quadratic, to the data. In a nonparametric model, the data define the functional form. On 
the other hand, a nonparametric smoother cannot control for determinants of food 
consumption other than per capita expenditure, which is the advantage of a parametric 
model. The semiparametric model expresses the relationship between food consumption 
and per capita expenditure nonparametrically, controlling at the same time for other 
determinants of food consumption. The semiparametric model used has the form: 
 
 
j
iijji eXcymaw )(ln        (2.30) 
 
where mi is the non parametric smoother calculated over per capita expenditure, and the 
X variables are those already included in the parametric model. In other words, this 
model allows the estimation of a different coefficient of per capita expenditure (mi) for 
each household in the sample, and it estimates coefficients (cj ) of the other explanatory 
variables that are common to all households in the sample.  
 
                                                 
10
 The four macro regions used by NSSO in Andhra Pradesh group the following districts together: 1) 
Srikakulam, Vizianagaram, Vishakhapatnam, East Godavari, West Godavari, Krishna, Guntur, Prakasam, 
Nellore; 2) Chittor, Cuddapah; 3) Anantapur, Kurnool; 4) Mahaboobnagar, Rangareddy, Hyderabad, 
Medak, Nizamabad, Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khamman, Nalgonda. 
 
59 
 
  
Equation (2.30) is estimated using the method of first differencing, which was chosen 
for its simplicity and ease of computation. First differencing is clearly described in 
Johnston and Dinardo (1997), and discussed in detail by Yatchew (2003). The model 
aims to remove from the dependent variable the portion that is determined by 
explanatory variables whose coefficients are estimated parametrically. Once the 
parametric component has been removed, the dependent variable can be regressed over 
per capita expenditure using a nonparametric method of choice. The nonparametric 
function estimated is: 
 
iiidiffii eymbXw  )(
ˆ          (2.31) 
 
where the food share of equation (2.30) is replaced by the food share minus its 
parametric component. First differencing finds estimates of the coefficients diffbˆ  in three 
simple steps. First, the observations in the sample are sorted in ascending order of the 
logarithm of per capita expenditure. Second, the following first differences are 
computed for all observations in the sample: 
 
1 iii wwdw      and  1 iii xxdx               (2.32) 
 
Third, the differenced variables are used to run the OLS regression: 
 
iidiffi udXbdw            (2.33) 
 
The estimated coefficients obtained from this regression are then multiplied by the 
original values of the explanatory variables, and their product is subtracted from the 
dependent variable as in equation (2.31). The advantage of this method over the more 
commonly used one developed by Robinson (1988), is its ease of computation. While 
Robinson’s method requires the estimation of a different nonparametric regression for 
each explanatory variable, the method of first differencing only requires the estimation 
of one nonparametric regression (2.31). 
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Values of mi in (2.31) are obtained using a nonparametric smoother. The present 
analysis uses the Cleveland’s Locally Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (LOWESS), 
which was preferred to the more common kernel estimators. A full description of the 
LOWESS algorithm can be found in Hardle (1990) and Fan and Gijbels (1996). Perhaps 
the simplest way to think of this method is that of performing a polynomial regression at 
each data point of the dependent variable giving lower weight to observations that are 
more distant from the point and that produce large residuals. Putting together the lines 
estimated at each point generates the line estimated by LOWESS.  
 
This method is computationally intensive but has a series of advantages over kernel 
smoothers. The latter are potentially affected by two sources of bias, a curvature bias, 
and a boundary problem bias, which are discussed by Deaton (1997) and Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005). The curvature bias arises when the function to estimate is concave. 
Kernel estimators evaluate the function at each point applying decreasing weights to 
more distant values. Suppose that the true function is concave down and that the kernel 
estimator uses at each point two other equally spaced points to evaluate the function. By 
Jensen inequality, the evaluation will be biased downwards.
11
 This bias increases the 
slope of the true function. The second source of bias arises from the fact that at the two 
end points of the distribution of the explanatory variable, the kernel smoother uses 
values that are either mostly decreasing or increasing depending on the slope of the 
function at the endpoint. If the dependent variable is negatively sloped, as is likely to be 
the case for the food share, the function will be underestimated to the left of the 
distribution and overestimated to its right. This bias results in a flattening of the curve at 
the extremes points.  
 
The LOWESS estimator is not affected by either the curvature bias or the boundary 
problem bias. In addition, it uses a robustified method that makes it less sensitive to 
outliers compared to other nonparametric smoothers. This is a great advantage in the use 
of survey data that are affected by considerable measurement error.  
 
                                                 
11
 The Jensen inequality states that for a concave down function: 
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Measurement error and endogeneity 
Expenditure data are often measured with error, and measurement error generates a bias 
in the parameter estimates. In this particular case, the bias arises because the error in the 
measurement of per capita expenditure (the independent variable) is correlated with the 
error in the measurement of the budget food share (the dependent variable). The sign of 
this bias cannot be determined a priori, because measurement error can appear either in 
the numerator or in the denominator of the food share or in both.  
 
This problem can be addressed by using instrumental variables. In order to do so, one or 
more instruments are needed that are correlated with per capita expenditure, but 
uncorrelated with the measurement error. Once one or more plausible instruments have 
been found, different instrumental variables approaches can be followed. The approach 
followed here is the estimation of an augmented regression of the Hausman type. In this 
approach the variable measured with error (per capita expenditure) is regressed using 
OLS on the instruments. After estimation, the estimated residual are calculated and 
included in the semiparametric model (see Gong et al., 2005, Yatchew, 2003). The 
parameter estimate of the estimated residual tests for the endogeneity of per capita 
expenditure, and provides a correction for the measurement error bias in the estimated 
regression.  
 
Specification test  
Parametric estimation can provide a good representation of food Engel curves, and a 
statistical test is needed to assess whether the semiparametric estimation differs from 
parametric functional forms. One way of comparing the shapes of parametric and 
semiparametric Engel curves relies on the estimation of confidence intervals. However, 
the computation of confidence interval for the LOWESS smoother is not 
straightforward. In principle, confidence intervals could be obtained using bootstrapping 
methods, but LOWESS is already computationally intensive, and the bootstrapping of 
confidence intervals would require a large amount of computer time. 
 
The present study uses a specification test in order to compare the parametric and 
semiparametric estimation of the Engel curves. The semiparametric technique of first 
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differences offers a straightforward method of testing among alternative functional 
forms. This test is described by Yatchew (2003) and has the following form: 
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where n is the number of observations, and the terms 2
res and 
2
diff are the residual 
variances of the parametric and the semiparametric model respectively: 
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This test is normally distributed, and one-sided.  
 
Calculation of elasticities 
The ultimate purpose of the estimating Engel curves is to calculate expenditure 
elasticities. Computation of expenditure elasticities is a relatively simple matter in the 
case of parametric models, but is rather more complicated in the case of semiparametric 
models, and the topic requires some discussion.  
 
The parametric elasticities for the linear, quadratic, and cubic Working-Leser forms are: 
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where the bs are the coefficient estimates of higher order terms of the logarithm of per 
capita expenditure, and w is the share of food expenditure over total expenditure. 
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Elasticities are normally calculated using the sample mean of households’ food shares, 
but they can also be calculated for food share values corresponding to different 
percentiles of the expenditure distribution. 
 
A nonparametric equivalent to the parametric food elasticity is: 
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where the denominator is the food share predicted by the semiparametric model, and the 
numerator is the derivative of the nonparametric function estimated by LOWESS. There 
are several methods to calculate the derivative in the numerator of (2.37). The method 
chosen for this study is the finite difference approach described in Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005): 
 
)ln/(ln)ˆˆ(ˆ 11   iiiii xxmmm        (2.38) 
 
This derivative can be described as a difference quotient, and is calculated at each data 
point. It is the ratio between the change in the fitted value of the dependent variable and 
the change in the explanatory variable. Before taking the first differences the data need 
to be sorted in ascending order of the explanatory variable (the logarithm of per capita 
expenditure). It is also advisable, in order to avoid very large values of the derivative, to 
produce oversmoothed nonparametric predictions of food shares.  
 
Notice that both the derivatives and the elasticities are indexed by i, which means that a 
different value of the derivative and of the elasticity is calculated for every household. 
There are several ways in which these household elasticities can be summarised in order 
to compare them with those estimated by parametric models. Two approaches were 
followed here. The first consists of calculating the weighted mean of all the elasticities 
in the sample, where the weights are the probability sampling weights. This estimator 
provides the average household response to changes in expenditure. A second approach 
consists of calculating a market elasticity, which is the response of the sample data to an 
increase in per capita expenditure of 1%. This is simply the change in food consumption 
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for the entire sample resulting from a change in per capita expenditure by 1%. The 
change is simulated using observed food and total expenditure data, and the estimated 
individual elasticities. The computation of this elasticity is equivalent to calculating the 
average elasticity of the sample while applying the shares of household expenditures 
over total expenditure in the sample as weights. This second elasticity provides an 
estimate of the response of the market to a change in expenditure. 
2.5.3 Simulations of changes in income distribution 
As discussed in Section 2.3.6, the aggregation problem poses serious difficulties to the 
modelling of food demand as a function of total expenditure alone. If the food Engel 
curve is non linear, an income transfer from a rich household to a poor one will increase 
the aggregate consumption of food. One way of tackling this problem is formulating an 
analytical model that relates food consumption to both total expenditure and to the 
inequality of the expenditure distribution. The present study follows a simpler approach. 
Changes in the expenditure distribution will be simulated, and market elasticity and 
food consumption will be calculated at different levels of expenditure inequality using 
the household elasticities estimated semiparametrically. 
 
The simulations performed consist of mean-preserving changes in the expenditure 
distribution of one of the survey rounds. In order to achieve higher and lower inequality, 
while preserving average and total expenditure in the sample, money is transferred from 
one household to another. For example, in order to increase inequality, a sum is taken 
from a poor household and given to a rich household. Households are selected randomly 
for this transfer, after assigning a probability of selection that is proportional to 
household per capita expenditure. 
 
In practice the simulation of transfers operates in the following way. Household per 
capita expenditure is expressed as a share of total expenditure in the sample: 
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These shares are then sorted in ascending order and the cumulated sum is calculated, so 
that the value of the running sum for the richest household in the sample is one. Two 
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random numbers between zero and one are then drawn from a uniform distribution. The 
first number identifies the beneficiary household, while the second number identifies the 
household that is affected by the transfer. A beneficiary is selected when the random 
number is between the household probability of selection and the probability of 
selection of the household that is ranked one position below in terms of per capita 
expenditure. At each draw, households are reordered in terms of per capita expenditure, 
the selection probabilities are recalculated and new random numbers are drawn.  
 
The simulation performed more than 200,000 transfers, each of a value of 1,000 
Rupees. The sum of all transfers corresponds to the redistribution of 30% of total 
household expenditure in the sample. Inequality indices, market elasticities, food shares, 
and food consumption were calculated at each 1% redistribution step in one direction or 
the other. 
2.6 Empirical results 
This section assesses the operation of Engel’s law in Andhra Pradesh using four large 
nationally representative household surveys conducted by the NSSO between 1987 and 
2005. The aim is to quantify the responsiveness of food consumption to changes in 
living standards and income distribution. This will shed some light on the slow pace of 
agricultural transformation in the state. 
 
This section proceeds in three parts. The first presents results of the estimation of 
semiparametric food shares and elasticities. The second repeats the same analysis for 
seven food categories, in order to explain some puzzling characteristics of the estimated 
Engel curves. The third simulates changes in income distribution in order to assess the 
extent to which food consumption changes as income inequality increases or decreases. 
2.6.1 Estimated food shares and elasticities 
The results of the estimation of models (2.29) and (2.32) for the four survey rounds are 
shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. Model (2.29) estimates the following parametric Engel 
curves: linear, quadratic, and cubic. Table 2.8 only shows the results of the cubic form 
because it fitted the data better than the other forms. The dependent variable is the 
household food share, while the explanatory variables consist of the control variables 
described in Section 2.5.2. Model (2.32) runs a regression of the food share on the 
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explanatory variables both expressed in first differences. Per capita expenditure is not 
included in this model because it will be estimated nonparametrically after the removal 
of its parametric component following the methodology outlined in Section 2.5.2. 
Observations with food shares equal to zero or one were dropped, because these values 
were considered non-admissible. Observations with per capita expenditure values four 
standard deviations above the mean were also dropped in order to remove outliers. Both 
regressions were run correcting the standard errors for the probability sampling weights. 
 
The significance and the sign of each estimated coefficient will not be discussed here, as 
the main objective of this exercise is to assess the relationship between the food share 
and per capita expenditure. Overall, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs, 
and the statistical significance is high, particularly in the case of the cubic model. 
Demographic and geographic variables explain the largest part of the variance in 
household food expenditure, while occupation and social class play a minor role. The 
share of the total variance explained by the cubic model is rather high for a cross-
sectional study, with R-squares ranging between 0.35 and 0.51. Statistical significance 
of the estimated parameters and the R-squares are much lower in the case of the model 
estimated in first differences, as can be expected. 
 
As explained in Section 2.5.2, errors in the measurement of households’ expenditure 
may generate a spurious correlation between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables. In order to test, and at the same time correct for this potential bias, a 
regression of per capita expenditure on a series of instruments was run, and the 
estimated residuals were included among the explanatory variables of models (2.29) and 
(2.32).The results of this regression are presented in Table 2.7. The variables included 
in the instrumenting regression consist of the demographic composition of the 
households (number of adults and children by sex, and the age of the reported head of 
the household), the education of the male and female head of household, the size of land 
owned, household belonging to a scheduled caste or tribe, and location variables for 
urban areas and macro-regions. The residuals from these regressions were calculated 
and then included in the estimation of the food expenditure models. The parameter 
estimates of the residuals provide a test for endogeneity of per capita expenditure, and at 
the same time provide a correction for the measurement error bias in the estimation of 
the food share models (Yatchew, 2003).  
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Table 2.7 Hausman instrumenting regression for the food share model 
Variables 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Education of male head of household 0.116*** 0.098*** 0.112*** 0.093*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Education of female head of 
household 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.062*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
Land owned (acres) 0.027*** 0.021*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ratio of male children (0 to 4) -0.025 -0.097 -0.104 -0.122* 
 (0.066) (0.070) (0.073) (0.076) 
Ratio of male children (5 to 9) 0.183*** 0.057 0.146** -0.004 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) 
Ratio of male children (10 to 14) 0.507*** 0.313*** 0.425*** 0.235** 
 (0.064) (0.065) (0.068) (0.076) 
Ratio of female children (0 to 4) -0.022 -0.206** -0.067 -0.270*** 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.077) (0.082) 
Ratio of female children (5 to 9) 0.098* 0.106* 0.119** 0.014 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.066) 
Ratio of female children (10 to 14) 0.405*** 0.214** 0.334*** 0.129* 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) 
Ratio of male adults 0.615*** 0.463*** 0.533*** 0.358*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) 
Ratio of female adults 0.278*** 0.239*** 0.364*** 0.227*** 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) 
Ratio of male elderly 0.227** 0.260*** 0.174** 0.107 
 (0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.076) 
Household size (log) -0.341*** -0.281*** -0.323*** -0.301*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Age of head of household 0.002*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Scheduled caste -0.058*** -0.076*** -0.094*** -0.107*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Scheduled tribe -0.169*** -0.116*** -0.065** -0.185*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Macro-region two -0.124*** -0.120*** -0.093*** -0.148*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Macro-region three 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.049** -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
Urban area 0.037** 0.051*** 0.136*** 0.209*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant 9.577*** 10.196*** 10.559*** 10.775*** 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.056) (0.057) 
     
Observations 9111 8164 8765 8106 
R-square 0.351 0.355 0.444 0.434 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%; 
estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The estimated residuals were found significant in all regressions, except the 1999-00 
survey in the case of the cubic model, and the 1999-00 and 2004-05 surveys in the case 
of the model in first differences. The size of the estimated coefficient on the residuals is 
always large and negative, pointing to the presence of measurement error and of a 
spurious correlation between the food share and total per capita expenditure. 
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Table 2.8 Food share regression: parametric cubic form 
Variables 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Logarithm of per capita expenditure 12.153*** 20.482*** 9.160*** 18.687*** 
 (1.597) (2.871) (1.804) (2.643) 
Logarithm
2
 of per capita expenditure -1.230*** -1.929*** -0.809*** -1.688*** 
 (0.164) (0.275) (0.162) (0.236) 
Logarithm
3
 of per capita expenditure 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.023*** 0.050*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) 
Male children (0 to 4) -0.023 -0.033* 0.038** -0.051** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) 
Male children (5 to 9) 0.039** 0.003 0.066*** -0.016 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Male children (10 to 14) 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.086*** 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) 
Female children (0 to 4) -0.017 -0.052** 0.029 -0.036 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.023) 
Female children (5 to 9) 0.030* -0.026 0.027 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) 
Female children (10 to 14) 0.036* 0.003 0.062*** 0.005 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Male adults 0.001 0.009 0.024* 0.023 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Female adults 0.014 0.030** 0.025* -0.006 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Male elderly -0.057** -0.004 0.008 -0.037** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) 
Logarithm of household size -0.019*** -0.011** -0.051*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Age of head of household 0.001*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Scheduled caste -0.005 0.003 0.006* -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Scheduled tribe -0.002 0.011* 0.012** 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Agricultural labour household 0.003 0.013*** 0.009** 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Farmer household 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NSSO region no. 2 -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.048*** -0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
NSSO region no. 3 -0.008 0.007 -0.037*** -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NSSO region no. 4 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.025*** -0.011** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Urban area -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.082*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Estimated residual -0.081*** -0.070*** 0.000 -0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant -38.949*** -71.238*** -33.237*** -67.618*** 
 (5.168) (9.985) (6.670) (9.838) 
     
Observations 9111 8164 8765 8106 
R-square 0.356 0.397 0.500 0.518 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%; 
estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 2.9 Food share regression: first differences 
Variables 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Male children (0 to 4) -0.019 -0.010 -0.011 -0.044* 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
Male children (5 to 9) 0.056*** 0.011 0.046*** -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) 
Male children (10 to 14) 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.061*** 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.023) 
Female children (0 to 4) -0.005 -0.036* 0.009 -0.029 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
Female children (5 to 9) 0.044** -0.018 0.016 -0.001 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) 
Female children (10 to 14) 0.044** 0.027 0.040** 0.022 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
Male adults 0.007 0.017 0.006 0.037** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Female adults 0.019 0.052*** 0.024* -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Male elderly -0.030 0.020 -0.009 -0.020 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) 
Logarithm of household size -0.030*** -0.012** -0.049*** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Age of head of household 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Scheduled caste -0.007* 0.009** 0.005 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Scheduled tribe -0.013* 0.011* 0.011* -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Agricultural labour household 0.000 0.005 0.010** 0.007 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Farmer household 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NSSO region no. 2 -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.046*** -0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
NSSO region no. 3 -0.000 0.013** -0.040*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NSSO region no. 4 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.025*** -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Urban area -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.088*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Estimated residual -0.056*** -0.069*** 0.001 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
     
Observations 9110 8163 8764 8105 
R-square 0.085 0.092 0.152 0.192 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%; 
estimated standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The three parametric forms estimated were tested against the semiparametric form using 
the specification test described in Section 2.5.2. Table 2.10 reports the value of the test 
statistic together with the probability value for a one-sided test. Stars represent different 
significance levels for the rejection of the hypothesis of the equality between the 
models. With the exception of the 1999-00 survey, the parametric specifications are 
strongly rejected by the tests. There is no clear superiority of the quadratic form over the 
linear and vice versa. The cubic form performs better than the other forms, with lower 
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statistics in all surveys, and could not be rejected in the 1993-94 and 1999-00 surveys. 
Even the cubic form however was strongly rejected in the 1987-88 and the 2004-05 
surveys, suggesting that the use of a nonparametric specification is preferable to its 
parametric approximations. 
 
Table 2.10 Specification test of parametric Engel curves 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Linear 5.48*** 
(0.000) 
3.96*** 
(0.000) 
1.58* 
(0.056) 
5.46*** 
(0.000) 
Quadratic 5.02*** 
(0.000) 
4.12*** 
(0.000) 
1.34* 
(0.091) 
5.57*** 
(0.000) 
Cubic  4.49*** 
(0.000) 
1.12 
(0.131) 
0.75 
(0.225) 
3.68*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%; 
probability values in parentheses. 
 
The parametric and semiparametric Engel curves were used to calculate food 
expenditure elasticities following the formulas described in Section 2.5.2. Table 2.11 
presents the set of estimated elasticities for the four survey rounds. Two versions of the 
semiparametric elasticities are shown: average elasticities, which represent the average 
sample response to changes in income, and market elasticities, which assess the 
response of total demand to a change in income.  
 
Semiparametric elasticities are larger than parametric ones and are very high, ranging 
from just below 0.8 to nearly 0.9. These elasticities are very high even for a low income 
country. For example, the study of Seale et al. (2003), using data of the early 1990s, 
finds an average food elasticity of 0.73 for low income countries, while the largest 
elasticity found is the one of Tanzania, equal to 0.8. Food elasticities are decreasing 
over time, which can be related to the increase in living standards. This pattern is 
interrupted by the elasticities of the 1999-00 survey, which stand out for their very low 
values compared to estimates for neighbouring years. This latter result however is 
probably due the changes introduced in the survey questionnaire for this round. 
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Table 2.11 Parametric and semiparametric expenditure elasticities of food 
Model 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Linear 0.819 0.766 0.654 0.717 
Quadratic 0.847 0.825 0.696 0.729 
Cubic  0.851 0.831 0.705 0.741 
Semiparametric 
(average) 
0.875 0.864 0.721 0.789 
Semiparametric 
(market average) 
0.846 0.832 0.678 0.769 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The food shares estimated semiparametrically were smoothed again using LOWESS, 
and plotted against per capita expenditure together with the estimated cubic shares (see 
Figure 2.10). There is a clear shift of the curves to the right over time, as per capita 
expenditure increases. Note that the variable reported on the x axis is nominal 
expenditure, and therefore part of this shift is simply the result of an increase in prices. 
There is also a downward shift of the curves, particularly in 2004-05, which is a result 
of the improvement in living standards, as households consume proportionally less food 
as income increases. With the exception of the curve of the 55
th
 round, all curves have 
similar shapes. The linear portions of the curves and their slope have not changed over 
time. Notice also that there was little change over time in the shape of the first upward 
sloping tract of the curves. 
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Figure 2.10 Semiparametric food shares and per capita expenditure 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The semiparametric elasticities were smoothed again using LOWESS and plotted 
against per capita expenditure in Figure 2.11. There is a visible shift of the curves to the 
right over time, which is simply the result of the increase in nominal income. The 
elasticity curves have similar shapes with the exception of the curve based on the 1999-
00 data. Food elasticities are above one over a large portion of the curve, they decrease 
rapidly up to nearly half of the expenditure distribution, and become nearly flat 
thereafter. Notice that the declining section of the curves are becoming steeper over 
time, suggesting that the relative reduction in consumption expenditure as income 
increases occurs at a faster rate when living standards are higher. 
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Figure 2.11 Semiparametric food elasticities and per capita expenditure 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
In order to show the size of the sample with a given value of food elasticity, Figure 2.12 
plots the cumulative distribution function of the individual eslasticities for three of the 
four survey rounds.
12
 The fraction of the population with the elasticity reported on the 
vertical axis can be read on the horizontal axis. The range of the estimated elasticities is 
relatively narrow, being between 0.7 and one for at least 90% of the sample. The 
majority of households show very high elasticities in all surveys. More than 30% of 
households have an elasticity above 0.9 until 1993-94, while nearly 40% have an 
elasticity above 0.8 in 2004-05. Notice that up to 1993-94, nearly 10% of the population 
has a food elasticity above one. This fraction declined to less than 5% in the survey of 
2004-05. 
 
                                                 
12
 The distribution function of the elasticities estimated for the 55
th
 round was omitted because its pattern 
is too different from those observed in the other survey rounds. 
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Figure 2.12 Food elasticities by population percentiles 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
2.6.2 Elasticities of different food categories 
The Engel curves in Figure 2.10 exhibit two rather puzzling features. The first is the 
upward sloping section of the food share on the left of the charts. Even in the latest 
survey of 2004-05, there is a considerable fraction of households for whom food is a 
luxury good. The second is the similarity of the shape of the curves, despite the 
considerable increase in per capita income over the period covered by the four surveys. 
In order to find an explanation to these unexpected characteristics of the Engel curves, 
food expenditure was further disaggregated in seven broad categories, and the exercise 
was repeated for each of them. 
 
The seven broad categories were identified through the standard procedure of grouping 
goods that are close substitutes in consumption. The expenditure shares and the 
semiparametric elasticities of each category for all survey rounds are reported in Table 
2.12 and 2.13. Cereals, the first category, includes rice, a staple food in Andhra Pradesh, 
wheat, which is scarcely consumed, plus a number of coarse cereals like jowar 
(sorghum), ragi (finger millet), and bajra (pearl millet). Pulses include beans and lentils 
like tur, moong, and gram. Dairy products mainly consist of milk, curd, ghee, and 
butter. Oils and fats includes margarine, coconut oil, groundnut oil, and other edible 
oils. Other food includes sugar, salt, spices, beverages and processed foods. The 
remaining two categories, meat egg and fish, and vegetables and fruit, are self-
explanatory. 
75 
 
  
 
Table 2.12 Expenditure shares of seven food categories  
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Cereals 28.3 27.2 23.7 20.9 
Pulses 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.5 
Dairy products 4.9 5.5 5.6 5.4 
Oils and fats 5.3 5.5 3.6 5.0 
Meat, egg, and fish 4.3 4.5 4.1 4.2 
Vegetable and fruit 6.8 7.3 7.1 8.1 
Other 8.5 10.7 7.4 7.6 
 
Table 2.13 Semiparametric elasticities of seven food categories  
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Cereals 0.199 0.166 0.399 0.495 
Pulses 1.074 0.889 0.764 0.718 
Dairy products 3.006 3.156 2.061 2.208 
Oils and fats 1.077 0.841 0.695 0.575 
Meat, egg, and fish 0.189 0.320 0.243 0.038 
Vegetable and fruit 1.018 1.032 0.702 0.769 
Other 1.131 0.885 0.525 0.780 
 
The semiparametric food shares of each category are plotted in Figures 2.13 and 2.14 
for the four survey rounds, while the plots of the semiparametric elasticitities are in 
Appendix C. Two categories, cereals and ‘meat, egg and fish’, are necessities for all 
households, and display declining expenditure shares. Dairy products are clearly luxury 
goods. Their consumption share increases with total expenditure and is near zero for 
poor households. Three categories, oils and fats, pulses, and vegetable and fruit, are 
luxuries for the poor but necessities for the rich. The shapes of the food category shares 
suggest that the upward sloping section of the food share curves in Figure 2.10 are 
determined by the upward sloping section of the expenditure shares of oils and fats, 
pulses, and vegetable and fruit. Dairy products do not contribute to turning the slope of 
the food expenditure curve upwards because they are not affordable for the poor. This 
offers a simple explanation to the fact that food is a luxury good for many poor 
households. The diet of the poor is largely composed of cheap cereals, particularly rice. 
As income increases, the poor diversify their diet by increasing their consumption of 
pulses, vegetables, and oils. The increase in the consumption of pulses reflects the need 
of increasing the energy contents of the diet, while the increase in the consumption of 
oils and fats, and vegetable and fruit is probably explained by taste and social status 
respectively.  
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Figure 2.13 Semiparametric food shares by food category (43
rd
 and 50
th
 rounds) 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
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Figure 2.14 Semiparametric food shares by food category (55
th
 and 61
st
 rounds) 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Explaining the invariance of the food share curves over time is more difficult. In theory, 
changes in the shape of the Engel curve over time should mirror changes over a single 
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cross section. For example, the change in food expenditure between a poor and a rich 
household in a cross section, should be equivalent to the change in food expenditure 
over time as the same poor household becomes as rich as the rich household. In practice 
this may not happen for at least two reasons. First, there are other determinants of food 
expenditure that change over time in addition to income. In particular, consumers’ tastes 
and the introduction of new food and non-food products may alter food consumption 
patterns. Second, consumers may be influenced by habits, and therefore adjust 
consumption over time more slowly than the change in income suggests. Nevertheless, 
if these two effects are not strong, the Engel curves over time should track the cross-
sectional Engel curves rather closely, and by observing Engel curves over different 
surveys, we should be able to see a movement of observations along the curve from the 
left to the right as consumers become richer. As income increases, food items that were 
luxuries should gradually become necessities for an increasing fraction of the 
population. The charts in Figures 2.13 and 2.14 seem to confirm this for some of the 
seven food categories. The Engel curves of pulses, fats, and vegetables and fruit seem to 
lose observations on the left and acquire observations on the right along the same curve 
as income increases over time. The estimated elasticities shown in Table 2.13 provide 
additional evidence that food items are becoming necessities. The size of all elasticities 
is decreasing over time. 
 
One important exception to this pattern of decreasing elasticity is the behaviour of 
cereals, whose elasticities have increased over the last two surveys. Cereals have 
become luxury good for a considerable fraction of the population in the latest survey 
round of 2004-05. Table 2.13 shows that expenditure elasticity of cereals nearly doubled 
over the last two surveys compared to the previous period. This can also be seen in the 
charts of Figures 2.13 and 2.14. The estimated cereals expenditure share was a 
downward sloping line in the 43
rd
 round, it became flat at the top in the 50
th
 round, and 
became upward sloping for the poor in the 61
st
 round. Note that since cereals still 
account for more than 25% of total expenditure of the poor, this drives the aggregate 
result that the food shares are invariant, and that food is a still a luxury good for a 
considerable fraction of the population in 2004-05. 
 
The fact that rice, millet and sorghum have become luxury goods in Andhra Pradesh for 
a considerable number of households is puzzling and deserves at least a tentative 
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explanation. The status of luxury for a commodity like rice suggests an increase in 
poverty levels. The data however exclude this, as per capita income increased and 
expenditure inequality decreased over this period. The explanation advanced here is that 
recent modifications in the public distribution system of food (PDS) have resulted in 
rice becoming a luxury good for some households for whom it was previously a 
necessity.  
 
India has a long tradition of food subsidies. In the late 1960s the government of 
Subramanian introduced a procurement system, whereby the state would by food, 
mainly wheat and rice, in times of shortage in order to stabilise prices and to redistribute 
the same food to the poor (Varshney, 1995). After the success of the green revolution, 
the procurement system has become a de facto support system for producers of cereals. 
The supply of cereals now exceeds demand, and surplus states generate large deficits by 
paying farmers procurement prices higher than market prices (Jha et al., 2007). 
 
In the early 1980s the government of Andhra Pradesh began selling to the poor procured 
rice at two Rupees per kilogram, well below the market price. In 1992, the government 
increased the price of rice distributed through the PDS to 3.5 Rupees per kilogram and 
introduced a ceiling of 20kg per household per month. Tarozzi (2005) using 
anthropometric data provided by the NFHS found no effects of this price increase on 
malnutrition rates of children. However, the flattening of the cereals expenditure share 
for the poor that is visible in the 50
th
 round of 1993-94 might be a consequence of this 
price change.  
 
Another important change in the PDS occurred in 1997, when the government of India 
introduced a new targeting system for all welfare programmes. Households below the 
poverty line (BPL) were issued a card that gave them access to most welfare 
programmes, including the PDS. The procedures for assigning the card were rather 
complex and changed repeatedly. Recent studies have found evidence of mistargeting in 
the BPL system. Dutta and Ramaswami (2001), using NSSO data of 1999-00, found a 
moderate targeting error in the PDS of Andhra Pradesh. The size of the type I error, the 
share of households who received the food and should not have, was 22%, while the 
type II error, the share of households that did not receive the food but should have, was 
20%. Jalan and Murgai (2007) using the latest NSSO survey of 2004-05 found a type I 
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error of 46% and a type II error of 63% among rural households of 16 major Indian 
states. In Andhra Pradesh, the errors were much higher: 74% and 87% respectively. 
According to this study, three out of four poor rural households in Andhra Pradesh are 
not classified as BPL and therefore do not have access to the rice distributed through the 
PDS. This might explain why cereals have become a luxury for the poor in 2004-05, 
after being a necessity for nearly all households during the previous 15 years. 
2.6.3 Food demand and income distribution 
This section assesses the extent to which changes in income distribution alter the 
aggregate consumption of food for the NSSO samples of households. This assessment is 
made by simulating changes in the expenditure distribution, and then calculating market 
elasticities and food shares at each step of the simulation. Figure 2.15 shows a kernel 
density plot of the expenditure distribution observed in the survey of 1987-88, together 
with two simulations performed by redistributing 30% of the existing expenditure using 
the method described in Section 2.5.3. A shift of the distribution to the right represents a 
decrease in income inequality, while a shift to the left is an increase in inequality. The 
Gini coefficient of the middle (initial) distribution is 0.281, while the Gini of the density 
on the right is 0.211 and the on the left is 0.336. Notice that in both cases, as income 
distribution changes, the sample mean and the total household expenditure in the sample 
remain the same. 
 
Figure 2.15 Simulated changes in the expenditure distribution 
lower inequality higher inequality
initial distribution
 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
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The simulated food elasticities and food shares for varying levels of income inequality 
are reported in Figure 2.16 (left and right chart respectively). The solid vertical lines in 
the middle of the charts indicate the value of the standard deviation of the logarithm of 
per capita expenditure of the initial distribution. The two curves show that a more 
egalitarian income distribution, while leaving income unchanged, has the effect of 
increasing aggregate food elasticity, aggregate food share, and total food consumption. 
This follows from the fact that food Engel curves in Andhra Pradesh are non-linear and 
that the poor spend proportionally more on food than the rich. The curves in Figure 2.16 
are linear, though their slopes are slightly steeper on left-hand-side of the vertical line 
representing the initial expenditure distribution, which implies that food consumption 
changes more rapidly after a decrease in inequality than after an increase inequality. 
 
Figure 2.16 Simulated changes in food elasticity and food share 
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In order to quantify the effect of a change in income distribution on food demand, the 
slope of the line of the chart on the right of Figure 2.16 and the elasticity of the food 
share with respect to the standard deviation of per capita expenditure were calculated. 
The first was estimated running a regression of the food share on the standard deviation 
of expenditure and was found to be equal to -0.075. The second was estimated by 
regressing the logarithm of the food share on the logarithm of the standard deviation of 
per capita expenditure, and was found to be equal -0.13. This implies that a 10% 
decrease in the standard deviation of expenditure would increase market food 
consumption by 1.3%. As an example, consider that the effect of the reduction in 
inequality observed over the 43
rd
 and the 50
th
 round would have resulted in an increase 
in the market food share from 58.2 to 58.8 The observed food share in the 50
th
 round 
was 58.3 which is the result of the combined effect of the reduction of inequality and of 
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an increase of per capita income. This means that over the period from 1987-88 to 1993-
94 the income effect almost entirely compensated the income distribution effect thus 
leaving the food shares unchanged. This suggests that the income distribution effect can 
produce changes in food consumption that are similar to those produced by changes in 
mean income.  
2.7 Conclusions 
This chapter provided an account of the process of agricultural transformation in 
Andhra Pradesh. The theoretical part focused on the implications of different 
assumptions regarding the consumption function for the size of agricultural 
employment. It was shown in equation 2.21 that the rate of change in the share of 
employment in the agricultural sector is a function of the income elasticity of food 
demand, and that the larger this elasticity the slower is the pace of the agricultural 
transformation. The empirical analysis tested the hypothesis that the pace of the process 
of transformation of the structure of the labour force is shaped by the characteristics of 
the aggregate demand for agricultural goods and by the inequality of income 
distribution. Expenditure elasticities of food, and of seven food categories, were 
estimated using semiparametric Engel curves, and simulations of changes in food 
consumption produced by changes in income distribution were performed. The main 
results of the empirical analysis are as follows: 
 
 Food expenditure elasticities are very high in Andhra Pradesh both in 
absolute terms and compared to other countries. Despite a considerable 
increase in per capita income over the last 20 years, elasticities and food 
expenditure shares have only slowly declined, from 0.85 in 1987-88 to 0.77 
in 2004-05, and from 0.65 in 1987-88 to 0.54 in 2004-05 respectively. For a 
large part of the population food is a luxury good or close to be a luxury 
good. 
 Food elasticities are very high for many households due to the poor quality 
of their diet. Cereals, and rice in particular, occupy the largest portion of 
food expenditure of poor households. As households become richer, they 
tend to purchase more of pulses, oils, vegetables, and eventually dairy 
products, for reasons of taste, social status, and energy requirements.  
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 An increase in the equality of the income distribution has the effect of 
increasing the aggregate consumption of food, as poor households, who 
spend proportionally more on food, have more resources. Conversely, an 
increase in income inequality reduces the aggregate demand for food. The 
income distribution elasticity of food demand (the change in the 
consumption of food for a change in the variance of the expenditure 
distribution), was found to be equal to 0.13. This effect is considerable since 
a simple simulation exercise over the period from 1987-88 to 1993-94 shows 
that the income distribution effect produced by a decrease in inequality 
almost entirely compensated the income effect produced by an increase in 
per capita incomes. 
 Despite the considerable increase in per capita income and the reduction in 
income inequality during the period under study, cereals have become a 
luxury good for many poor households. Weaknesses in the new BPL 
targeting system may have precluded the poor from accessing food 
distributed through the PDS. Given that the share of expenditure on cereals 
among the poor is very high, this also explains why in 2004-05 food is still a 
luxury good for more than 5% of households. 
 
In order to better analyse the effects of food demand on structural change, the 
theoretical model was built on two rather strong assumptions: the closeness of the 
economy, and the absence of government interventions in agricultural markets. These 
two assumptions will now be discussed in turn as they may affect the validity of the 
model.  
 
The theoretical model of Section 2.3 was designed assuming a closed economy. This 
assumption is common in the literature modelling the agricultural transformation that 
was reviewed in Section 2.2.  However, Andhra Pradesh trades with the rest of India, 
and with the rest of the world, and the close-economy assumption is rather unrealistic, 
unless it is shown that the size of openness is relatively small. As illustrated by 
Matsuyama (1992), when the dual economic model is considered in the context of an 
open economy, its results can be quite different. If the economy is open to trade, the 
prices of manufactured goods and of agricultural goods are no longer domestically 
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determined. The model no longer reaches its equilibrium by setting the equality between 
the agricultural wage and the manufacturing wage, but by setting the equality between 
the ratio of the domestic wages in the two sectors and the ratio of the international 
wages in the same sectors. To see this, consider a country that has a comparative 
advantage in agriculture. This country will specialise in agriculture and will import 
manufactured goods from the rest of the world until the domestic ratio of the 
productivities in the two sectors is equal to the ratio in the productivities in the rest of 
the world. However, in order to achieve this equilibrium the country will have to 
transfer labour from the modern sector to the rural sector. In other words, in an open 
economy the demand for agricultural goods includes, in addition to domestic demand, 
international demand by countries that specialise in manufacturing. If the country has a 
comparative advantage in agriculture, its process of industrialisation may be delayed. 
The lack of data on the openness of the Andhra Pradesh economy makes a test of this 
hypothesis impossible. 
 
State interventions in agricultural markets are another significant omission of the model. 
The state of Andhra Pradesh subsidises agricultural producers in three major ways 
(Gulati and Narayan, 2003). First, farmers can purchase fertiliser at a subsidised price. 
Second, they obtain electricity free of charge in order to operate water pumps. Finally, 
they can sell their produce, particularly rice, to state agencies at a minimum support 
price (MSP). The state runs large deficits in order to purchase rice that is then either 
stockpiled or sold through the PDS (Jha et al., 2007). Since rice production is labour 
intensive, these interventions keep labour demand artificially high. State interventions 
therefore result in an increase in the production of staple food and labour demand in 
agriculture that, according to the model of Section 2.3, contribute to the slow pace of the 
agricultural transformation in the state.  
 
A number of competing explanations of the process of agricultural transformation in 
India can be found in the literature. Because the present analysis is conducted within a 
single state and because detailed data are not available at the regional level, it is not 
possible to assess the comparative relevance of each factor as done, for example, by 
Besley et al. for all India (2007). Some competing explanations of the process however 
have been extensively investigated in the literature and deserve to be mentioned here. 
These include: the impact of land reform policies and of tenancy institutions; the role 
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played by the public education of the labour force in rural areas; and the impact of 
economic growth in the non-agricultural sector of the economy.  
 
Since there is considerable evidence of an inverse relationship between farm size and 
productivity (see for example Berry and Cline, 1979, Binswanger et al., 1995, Carter, 
1984), land reform policies are often recommended for their productivity enhancing 
effect. Indeed, the first Indian governments after independence largely relied on land 
reforms and other institutional measures in order to increase productivity in rural areas 
(Varshney, 1995). Besley and Burgess (2000) analyse the impact of redistributive policy 
in Indian states and find that land reforms were associated with poverty reduction but 
not with agricultural output growth. The index of land reform calculated by Besley and 
Burgess (2000) for Andhra Pradesh is only half the value of the all-India index. In 
addition, land reform in Andhra Pradesh consisted of tenancy reform and of the 
abolition of intermediaries. These policies are shown to have a significant impact on 
poverty reduction, but none on agricultural productivity. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) 
analyse the relationship between agricultural growth and the land tenancy structure that 
Indian states inherited from the British rule. They find that landlord-based areas grew 
more slowly during the period after the independence compared to non-landlord based 
areas. Most of the difference depends on the different adoption of new technologies and 
public investments in infrastructure, which in turn depends on the prevailing political 
environment. Landlord-based states like Andhra Pradesh are highly conflictive, and this 
prevents state governments from adopting policies promoting agricultural growth. The 
conclusions reached by these studies suggest that the poor pace of land reform in 
Andhra Pradesh, and the resulting high political conflict in rural areas, may have 
contributed to the poor rates of agricultural growth.  
 
One of the main elements of the model proposed in this chapter is that the growth in 
agricultural productivity helps the expansion of the non-farm sector of the economy. 
This hypothesis was validated for India by Ravallion and Datt (1996), who used time 
series data of Indian states from 1950 to 1991 to test the impact of sectoral economic 
growth on poverty reduction. These results have been challenged by Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2004) who, using panel data over the period 1971-1999, show that growth 
in the non-farm sector was highest in areas where agricultural yields were the lowest. 
Conversely, areas of high agricultural productivity saw little growth of the non-farm 
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sector. These findings are consistent with a model in which capital is free to move 
among areas and is invested in those areas where wages are lowest because of low 
agricultural productivity. The conclusion reached by Foster and Rosenzweig is that the 
growth of the agricultural sector did not promote growth of the non-farm sector. 
Burgess and Pande (2005) analysed the effect of changes in geographic coverage of 
Indian banks on economic growth over the period from 1977 to 1990. They found that 
economic growth was largely a result of an increase in non-agricultural output, while 
the agricultural output remained unaffected. They also found and increase in rural 
wages resulting from a contraction of labour supply following the increasing demand 
for labour in the secondary and tertiary sectors. These findings of these studies suggest 
that the non farm sector, rather than the agricultural sector, could be the driver of 
economic development in India.  
 
Another factor that may contribute to explain the slow process of structural change in 
Andhra Pradesh is the poor qualification of the labour force. As shown in Section 1.2, 
literacy rates in rural Andhra Pradesh are very low and skilled labour is scarce. Castelli 
and Coleman (2001) investigate the role of the education of the labour force in the 
process of economic development and find that the rural labour force decreased more 
rapidly in the southern states of the United States than what the operation of the Engel 
law would predict. They attribute this result to a reduction in education costs and to the 
migration of rural population to the skilled sector of the economy. In Andhra Pradesh 
poor educational levels prevent the rural labour force from finding employment outside 
agriculture. Trivedi (2006) analyses the relationship between secondary school 
enrolment and economic growth in India using state level data for the period from 1965 
to 1992. He finds that there is a positive correlation between male and female secondary 
enrolment rates and economic growth, and that improving female education in rural 
areas would have a large impact on economic growth. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) 
investigate the relationship between technological change and schooling in India using 
panel data of NCAER covering the period 1968-1981. They find that technological 
change positively affects returns to schooling, either because better educated people are 
more able to manage new technologies, or because they become aware of new 
technologies more quickly. In either case, technical change is more effective and 
successful among an educated rural population. The relationship between economic 
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development and education in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh will be further investigated 
in Chapter 4. 
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3 The stabilising effect of irrigation on household 
expenditure 
3.1 Introduction 
More than 30% of the GDP of Andhra Pradesh is generated in the agricultural sector, 
and more than 70% of the workers are employed in agriculture, either as farmers or 
agricultural labourers. The majority of the population living in poverty and extreme 
poverty resides in rural areas and, as shown in Chapter 2, the prospects of increasing 
living standards and reducing poverty are strongly related to developing the agricultural 
sector. Improvements in farms’ productivity are critical to this end. Over the last 30 
years, substantial technical innovation has taken place in agriculture in India. 
Technological progress has included the introduction of new seeds and modern inputs, 
and increased access to irrigation. The latter in particular has proved crucial for the 
adoption of new crop varieties and the use of fertiliser. It is now well documented that 
the adoption of a package consisting of new crop varieties, fertiliser, and irrigation – the 
green revolution – has determined a considerable improvement in living standards of 
farmers and agricultural labourers.  
 
Not all areas and farmers benefit equally from access to irrigation. First, there are 
geographic areas that for their location and soil characteristics cannot be reached by 
canal infrastructure. Second, even in irrigated areas, not all farms have equal access to 
irrigation. Finally, the equitable operation of irrigation infrastructure, particularly with 
respect to the timing and the frequency of waterings, has proved difficult. All these 
arguments have been investigated at length in the literature and they will not be repeated 
here. Instead, this chapter focuses on a rather neglected aspect of irrigation: its 
stabilising effect on the income of rural households. 
 
The benefits of income stabilisation are twofold. First, a reduction in income uncertainty 
and a more stable consumption pattern constitute welfare gains in themselves. Secondly, 
a reduction in income uncertainty may release household resources that can be invested 
in more productive enterprises. Potential benefits of income stabilisation over the years 
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and over the seasonal cycle will be separately investigated for farmers and agricultural 
labourers.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature on poverty and 
seasonality in developing countries; on the strategies rural households adopt to stabilise 
consumption; and on the impact of irrigation on agricultural income. Section 3.4 builds 
a theoretical model of optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption for households 
that are poor, face substantial income uncertainty, and have little access to credit. 
Section 3.5 describes the data used in the empirical analysis and the necessary 
adjustments made to expenditure figures. Section 3.6 presents some descriptive statistic 
regarding access to irrigation in the state, rainfall patterns, and household classification. 
Section 3.7 describes the econometric methods used in order to identify the causal effect 
of irrigation on household expenditure. Section 3.8 presents the results of the empirical 
analysis for farmers and agricultural labourers separately. Section 3.9 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Poverty and seasonality  
India has a highly seasonal pattern of rainfall, with 50% of total precipitation falling in 
just 15 days, and 90% of river flows running in just four months (World Bank, 2005). 
Seasonality of climate and agricultural production has a strong impact on social and 
economic life of rural households. A typical life scenario for a southern Indian state can 
be depicted in the following way (Chambers et al., 1981, Devereux et al., 2008). Rural 
households are employed as small farmers or agricultural labourers in an environment 
where a dry season follows a wet season. Food and income produced in the wet season 
are stored for the lean season. Toward the end of the dry season food becomes scarcer 
and more expensive as stocks are running down. In the pre-harvest period, when rains 
begin, land must be prepared and crop sown. Households are burdened by exceptional 
work at this time of the year which coincides with highest food prices. Labourer 
households migrate to areas where labour is demanded. This is the time when food is 
most needed for hard physical work and families are malnourished. This is also the time 
in which diseases are more common, particularly diarrhoea and malaria, which further 
debilitates poor households. With the new harvest, food becomes available again and a 
new cycle begins. 
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Historically, people have responded to this seasonal cycle of income and hunger by 
adapting their modes of life or by storing food. Adaptation to seasonality however can 
be very costly. There are a number of strategies that households can adopt in order to 
smooth income and consumption over the seasons, each of which bears a cost 
(Fafchamps, 2003). Households may store grains, thus incurring in post-harvest losses. 
They can borrow from local moneylenders, thus paying high interest rates. They can 
withhold spending for the next season, thus having their savings reduced by inflation. 
They can grow crops that are more resistant to water scarcity, like millets, but that yield 
lower income on average. 
 
When the seasonal cycle hits particularly hard and interacts with health shocks, like a 
sudden death or illness, households’ responses may generate vicious cycles of poverty 
(Gill, 1991). The families more vulnerable to economic and health seasonal shocks are 
also those least able to respond to shocks, and if negative seasonal shocks recurr year 
after year the result may be dramatic. Households affected may be forced to sell their 
land or livestock, thus impairing their future ability to generate income. Alternatively, 
they may negotiate new loans, thus falling in vicious circles of indebtedness. In extreme 
cases, a combination of repeated seasonal shocks, distress sales and indebtedness may 
lead to family dissolution, migration and destitution. 
 
Gill (1991) draws on anthropological and medical literature from a large number of 
countries to show how disadvantaged households and individuals may be dragged into 
destitution after series of seasonal shocks. Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) show for a 
sample of Indian households, that if seasonal calories deficits are particularly severe the 
labour productivity of labour may fall to such an extent that households fall in a poverty 
trap. Devereux et al. (2008) describe how a series of seasonal shocks destroyed labour 
markets in rural Malawi, thus setting the stage for the famine of 2002. 
 
Even if households are able to escape poverty traps, seasonal fluctuations are likely to 
persist. These fluctuations bear a cost, as risk-averse households prefer a stable 
consumption stream to an unstable one. The size of the cost will depend on initial 
household wealth, on the size of fluctuations, and on the degree of risk aversion.  
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In spite of the considerable welfare cost of seasonality, seasonal poverty analysis has 
been neglected in the development literature. There are two main reasons for this 
neglect. The first, underlined by Chambers (1981) is a general bias against seasonal 
analysis. The second, put forward by Sahn (1989) is the irrelevance of seasonality in the 
wider process of agricultural development. These two explanations are now discussed in 
turn. 
 
Chambers (1981) attributes the neglect of seasonal analysis to a number of researchers’ 
biases. First, poverty analysis is mostly conducted in urban areas with infrequent travels 
to rural areas and is based on a very limited knowledge of rural life. Second, all-year-
round data are difficult to collect and process. Finally, the specialisation of researchers 
prevents seasonal analysis, because an understanding of seasonality requires knowledge 
in the fields of economics, anthropology, health, nutrition and demography. Gill (1991) 
maintains that the neglect of seasonality in the social sciences has been particularly 
strong among economists, because of a macroeconomics focus of development 
economics and because of economic curricula based on the study of developed 
economies. While the researchers’ specialisation bias may still be present today, data 
availability is no longer a constraint to seasonal analysis. Many institutes like the NSSO 
and the Living Standard Measurement Surveys of the World Bank collect 
socioeconomic data over the agricultural year and pay attention to seasonal cycles of 
consumption and production.  
 
Sahn (1989) maintains that a seasonal analysis of poverty is to some extent irrelevant. 
He observes that there is no seasonality of expenditure in developed countries, in spite 
of strong seasonal agricultural production patterns. According to Sahn, seasonal poverty 
in developing countries is likely to disappear through the processes of agricultural 
growth and market development. There is some truism in this argument because clearly 
seasonal poverty will disappear if rural poverty disappears. The effects of economic 
development on seasonality will now be analysed in more detail. 
 
First, economic development and the rise in incomes reduce the welfare cost of 
consumption fluctuations. This happens because, assuming the concavity of utility 
functions, richer households are less affected by income fluctuations. India has indeed 
witnessed a considerable increase of rural incomes over the last two decades. However, 
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there is a large share of the population living in extreme poverty, for which fluctuations 
still have a welfare cost.  
 
Second, as income increases, the share of income produced in agriculture decreases. 
Therefore the income component that is sensitive to seasonal fluctuations decreases 
over time during the process of economic development. However, it has been shown in 
Chapter 2 that the process of agricultural transformation has been rather slow in India, 
and that a large share of income and employment is still generated in the agricultural 
sector. There are also signs that climate change is increasing the size of fluctuations, by 
making rains more erratic and unpredictable (Devereux et al., 2008). 
 
Third, as markets develop in rural areas, thanks to the development of infrastructure, the 
cost of coping with seasonal fluctuations decreases. Much of the cost of seasonality 
derives from the inability to transport agricultural products from surplus areas to deficit 
areas; from the inability to store production efficiently; and from household inability to 
insure production or borrow. While there has been considerable progress in road 
infrastructure in India, financial markets and agricultural technologies are still rather 
underdeveloped. 
 
For the reasons outlined above, Indian households still bear a considerable cost for 
seasonality. While market development forces are in operation, there are two main 
policies that can be adopted to help households smoothing the seasonal cycle: social 
protection interventions and technological development of agricultural production. This 
chapter is concerned with the second type of policies. In particular it investigates to 
what extent improvements in water storage systems reduce seasonal welfare 
fluctuations.  
3.2.2 Seasonality and irrigation 
Irrigation has an obvious positive impact on agricultural production. First, irrigation 
determines an expansion of the area cropped. This expansion occurs both spatially, by 
bringing under cultivation previously uncultivated soils, and temporally, by allowing the 
same area to be cultivated more than once during the same agricultural year. Secondly, 
irrigation increases farm yields, because the availability of water encourages the 
adoption of more productive crop varieties and production technologies. Lipton et al. 
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(2003) offer an exhaustive review of the evidence gathered to date on the links between 
irrigation, income, and poverty reduction.  
 
There is also a considerable body of research on the impact of irrigation on the income 
of all sectors of rural society, not just farmers, as well as on the wider economy. By 
increasing agricultural production, irrigation determines changes in prices, wages, and 
in the structure of the labour force. These changes affect the income of all sectors of the 
economy in a way that is not easily predictable. Studies analysing irrigation within the 
agricultural sector, or the entire economy, include Quizon and Binswanger (1986), Datt 
and Ravallion (1998), Fan and Hazell (2001), and Palmer-Jones and Sen (2003). All 
these studies found important effects of investments in irrigation on poverty reduction.  
 
Much less attention has been devoted to the stabilising effect of irrigation on rural 
income. Farmers can gain considerably from a greater stability of income. First, a more 
stable income is in itself a welfare gain. Second, income stabilisation helps farmers to 
make more investments, by releasing resources previously held as precautionary 
savings, or by allowing the undertaking of riskier and more profitable enterprises. This 
point was originally made by Lipton (1989) when considering the combined effect of 
irrigation, new varieties and technologies (the green revolution) on poor farmers. The 
subject however was no further investigated, and the present study is the first attempt to 
empirically assess the stabilising effect of irrigation on farmers’ income. 
 
Strictly related to the issue of income volatility is the volatility of consumption, which is 
the subject of a vast literature on poverty dynamics, thoroughly reviewed by Baulch and 
Hoddinott (2000), and by the World Development Report 2000/2001 Attacking poverty 
(2001). This literature analyses the variability of income, consumption and poverty in 
developing countries, often using panel data. The methods most commonly used are 
transition matrices of income and of poverty distributions, and regression analysis of 
changes in income, expenditure, and poverty status. The remainder of this section 
summarises the main findings of this body of research.  
 
Transition matrices show that income and expenditure volatility in developing countries 
are extremely high, especially in the lower and middle part of the income distribution 
(see for example Carter and May, 2001, McCulloch and Baulch, 2000). Early studies of 
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income and consumption variability (Townsend, 1994, Wolpin, 1982) found evidence in 
support of the permanent income hypothesis and of perfect consumption smoothing. 
However, the large fluctuations in consumption found by more recent research indicate 
that households are much less able to insulate expenditure from income fluctuations 
than previously thought. 
 
Many determinants of income and consumption variability have been identified with the 
use of regression analysis. Among these, a distinction is usually made between 
covariant factors, which affect a large number of households at the same time, and 
idiosyncratic factors, which affect a single household. Factors of the covariant type 
include droughts (see for example the studies by Fafchamps et al., 1998, Hoddinott and 
Kinsey, 2001) and macroeconomic shocks (see for example Glewwe and Hall, 1998, 
McKenzie, 2003). Factors of the idiosyncratic type include individual shocks, like 
health shocks (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000a), and composite indices of multiple shocks 
(Carter and May, 2001). In regression analysis, covariant and idiosyncratic factors often 
explain a large part of total variation in household expenditure. 
 
It has also been found that different households have different ability to insure against 
income shocks. Models normally assume households’ inability to borrow, and look at 
the use of liquid assets as buffer stocks. Assets are broadly defined and include 
livestock (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Fafchamps, Udry, Czukas, 1998), risk 
sharing through social networks (Udry 1994), and social capital (Carter and Maluccio, 
2003). The results of these studies vary with the context and the specification of the 
models, but some general conclusions can be drawn. First, households are more 
efficiently protected from idiosyncratic shocks than from covariant ones. Second, 
households that are differently endowed in terms of assets used as buffer stocks show 
different consumption patterns in response to income shocks. Third, if the assets used as 
buffer stocks are also used for productive purposes, poverty traps can emerge. This last 
theme has been the subject of a series of studies reviewed in a special issue of the 
Journal of Development Studies by Carter and Barrett (2006). Finally, it was found that 
households can reduce consumption volatility by smoothing income fluctuations 
directly. The theoretical background to this type of research has been provided by 
Morduch (1994). Examples of income smoothing include: the use of household labour 
supply against idiosyncratic shocks (Kochar, 1999); the choice of a less risky crop mix 
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(Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002), and the choice of less risky livelihood strategies 
(Barrett et al., 2001). As in the case of consumption smoothing, the ability to smooth 
income varies with households’ assets, and poverty traps can emerge if income 
smoothing choices determine lower, though more stable, future income streams.  
 
The present chapter is concerned with the analysis of seasonal fluctuations in income 
and consumption, rather than year-to-year fluctuations. This choice is partly dictated by 
practical reasons and partly by theoretical ones. The NSSO data used in this study are 
collected every year, but never on a scale sufficiently large to build time series. On the 
other hand, the surveys are composed of seasonal sub-rounds, which lend themselves 
well to a seasonal analysis. The last section of this chapter attempts to assess year-to-
year fluctuations in consumption of irrigated and non-irrigated farmers and labourers. 
This however should be considered as a descriptive exercise, and its limitations will be 
carefully outlined. 
 
There are also some theoretical advantages in analysing expenditure over the seasonal 
cycle. First, seasonal variations in economic quantities, even dramatic ones, are a 
common characteristic of rural areas in developing countries, and households responses 
to seasonal changes are themselves of interest. Secondly, it is possible that the 
determinants of income and consumption fluctuations are more easily observed and 
identified over the seasonal cycle than over the years. To see this, consider the large 
number of factors that have to be taken into account in order to analyse year-to-year 
fluctuations: weather, government policies (introduction and withdrawal of support to 
producers and consumers, insurance schemes, and income support policies), and trends 
in national and international prices. When focusing on seasonal series, many of these 
factors lose importance, assuming their impact is distributed over all seasons and is not 
concentrated on any particular one. As a consequence, the seasonal series can offer a 
clearer picture of the links between weather, income and consumption in isolation from 
the influence of other factors. Finally, the impact of irrigation on rural incomes has an 
obvious seasonal component, as irrigation allows the cultivation of the same area in 
more than one season. 
 
Consumption seasonality in developing countries has been the subject of a small 
number of studies, which include Paxson (1993), Jacoby and Skoufias (1998), Dercon 
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and Krishnan (2000b), and Pitt and Khandker (2002). The main aim of the first two 
studies is testing the validity of the permanent income model of consumption over the 
seasonal cycle. Paxson (1993) compares seasonal consumption patterns of household 
groups with different income patterns in Thailand, and finds that consumption is 
independent of seasonal income fluctuations. Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) use panel data 
of Indian households and cannot reject the hypothesis that households are able to 
smooth consumption. They attribute households’ perfect smoothing ability to the 
working of credit markets, and the exchange of gifts. The other two studies formulate 
and test behavioural assumptions regarding seasonal consumption. Dercon and Krishan 
(2000) test the dependence of seasonal consumption on income shocks of Ethiopian 
households and find that households are unable to insulate consumption from income 
shocks. Pitt and Khander (2002) find that the participation in micro-credit programmes 
in Bangladesh is strongly motivated by their effectiveness in reducing seasonal 
consumption fluctuations. The present study is closer in spirit to these latter two studies, 
as it pursues an alternative analysis to testing the permanent income hypothesis. 
 
There is virtually no research on income and consumption seasonality in developed 
countries. The only exception is Miron (1996) who points out that after an initial strong 
interest in seasonal fluctuations, economists working after the great depression of the 
1930s have ignored the study of seasonality in favour of year-to-year fluctuations. 
Seasonality is seen as a nuisance to be removed from the data, rather than a subject of 
research in itself. This is so despite the fact that the seasonal variations in production 
and consumption in developed countries are very large. Diewert (2004) reports that 
seasonal expenditure accounts for one-fifth to one-third of total expenditure of a typical 
developed country. Climate explains seasonal expenditure on many food and non-food 
items, including clothing, beverages, electricity, recreational transport and others, while 
custom explains the concentration of expenditures in certain times of the year, 
particularly Christmas. The reason seasonal variations have been neglected in developed 
countries is probably that they are considered a matter of choice (preferences) rather 
than of necessity. Output seasonality in developed countries is not believed to have an 
effect on seasonal consumption, and certainly not to the extent that it does in countries 
where incomes are strongly dependent on the vagaries of the weather. 
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3.3 A model of irrigation and consumption variability 
This section discusses the theoretical relationship between irrigation and income 
variability and presents a model of the impact of irrigation on seasonal consumption 
variability. 
3.3.1 Irrigation and income variability 
The positive effects of irrigation on income derive from its ability to insulate production 
from weather variability. A brief description of the sources of weather variability is 
therefore required. Andhra Pradesh, as much of the rest of India, has two rainy seasons 
(see Chatterji, 1992). The first and most important occurs from June to October, with 
winds blowing inland from the sea (southwest monsoon), while the second, of less 
importance, occurs from November to April, with winds blowing from inland towards 
the sea (northeast monsoon). In the agricultural calendar these are known as the Kharif 
and the Rabi seasons. For the most part, the timing and duration of monsoon is 
unpredictable, and no clear correlation is known between Kharif and Rabi rains. 
Drought conditions may result from the late onset, early withdrawal, or prolonged 
breaks during the monsoon. Recently cyclical pattern of drought have been discovered. 
Gadgil et al. (2002) report that during the period 1918-1998 there were 23 El Niño 
years, which considerably affected seasonal rainfall and yields in southern Andhra 
Pradesh. 
 
By providing water to areas and at times when it is scarce, irrigation has a stabilising 
effect on agricultural production. Dhawan (1988), using a considerable amount of 
Indian data, defines two stabilising roles of irrigation: the protective role and the 
stabilisation role. The protective role is the smoothing of year-to-year fluctuations. 
Irrigation reduces the impact of droughts by recharging the water-table and by giving 
access to reliable sources of water, either through canal or ground water. In any poor 
year and season the output of irrigated areas is higher than that of dry areas. The 
stabilisation role is the smoothing of seasonal rainfall variations: irrigation allows one or 
two additional cropping seasons. Typically dry areas have a good Kharif season and a 
poor and uncertain Rabi season, while irrigated areas have two fairly reliable seasons 
plus a potential third season (the summer season). It should be noted that the 
stabilisation power of irrigation also depends on the source of irrigation. At one extreme 
there is drought-proof irrigation, in areas that have permanent access to canal water 
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from a safe reservoir, while at the other extreme there is the traditional village reservoir 
(the tank), which is highly dependent on local rains.  
 
The positive effects of irrigation on income are not limited to farmers. Irrigated farms 
demand more labour because they cultivate larger areas and crops that require more 
labour. Rice, in particular, is very labour intensive at the time of transplanting and 
harvesting. In addition, because agricultural production is more stable, labour demand 
and agricultural labour wages over the seasons and over the years are also more stable. 
Irrigation therefore has also a positive impact on employment and wages. A discussion 
of these effects, including an exhaustive list of references, can be found in Lipton et a. 
(2003).  
3.3.2 Income variability and consumption variability 
Hypotheses on the impact of irrigation on consumption variability depend on the 
postulated relationship between consumption and income. This is one of the oldest, and 
not yet resolved, issues in economics. In this section the standard intertemporal 
consumption model that has remained popular until the mid 1990s will be described. 
More recent developments in consumption theory will then be discussed, and the 
precautionary saving model of consumption will be introduced. Finally, the implications 
of this latter model for the analysis of the effect of irrigation on consumption decisions 
will be outlined. 
 
In the classical intertemporal model, consumption in the current period is not related to 
current income but to a permanent or lifetime income. In the simplest version of the 
model given by Modigliani (1966), individuals save for their retirement during their 
working life and choose to consume every year a nearly constant fraction of their 
lifetime income. Friedman’s (1957) version of the model is simply based on the 
behavioural hypothesis that people prefer a stable consumption stream to a variable one, 
but the conclusions reached in terms of the relationship between consumption and 
income are the same as those of Modigliani’s model. Formally, it is assumed that 
individuals maximise a utility function made of the sum of utilities from consumption in 
all t years from one to T: 
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where ρ is the rate of time preference. Maximisation of household utility (U) is subject 
to the constraint that consumption (ct) in each period cannot exceed income in the same 
period (yt) plus the current period assets (At) minus the assets carried over the second 
period and discounted by the interest rate (i):  
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Assets carried over in the second period are discounted by the interest rate, because the 
consumer earns an interest over the accumulated assets which can be spent in the 
current period. Assets in the future period 1tA  can also be negative if the consumer is 
allowed to borrow. The simplest version of this model considers only two periods and 
assumes that assets will be zero at the end of the second period. Given that everything is 
consumed in the second period, consumption in the second period is c2=A2+y1 and the 
intertemporal budget constraint over the two periods is: 
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This easily generalises to many periods in the form: 
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The solution to the maximisation problem in (3.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.4) 
can be found by setting the Lagrangean: 
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From the first order condition for ct and ct+1, the so-called Euler equation can be 
obtained: 
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This equation states that the consumer is indifferent between consumption in the current 
period and consumption in any other period, because both alternatives, given the values 
of the interest rate and of the time preference, provide the same utility.  
 
In this formulation income is known with certainty. A permanent increase in income 
determined by the access to irrigation has the effect of increasing consumption over all 
periods. The consumption pattern over time however, is entirely determined by the ratio 
between the interest rate (1+i) and the individual time preference (1+ρ). Irrigation has 
no effect on this pattern, simply because it is assumed that income variability has no 
effect on consumption or that consumers know income variability with certainty. 
 
The extension of this model to seasons rather than years is straightforward. It is 
sufficient to substitute seasons for years in the utility function and in the budget 
constraint, and to add seasonal consumption preferences in the utility function.
13
 The 
expressions (3.1), (3.4), and (3.6) can be indexed over seasons rather than years without 
producing any change in the functional relationship between income and consumption. 
The ability of consumers to allocate consumption over time is unaffected by the change 
in the spacing of time. Irrigation has no more impact on seasonal expenditure than it has 
on yearly expenditure, and seasonal consumption fluctuations, if any, are the result of 
consumers’ choices independently of incomes.  
 
The assumptions of the classical intertemporal consumption model have been rejected 
by many empirical studies and its theoretical plausibility has often been put into 
question (Frederick et al., 2002). The poor applicability of this model to developing 
countries is discussed in Deaton (1997). The failure of the model to account for 
fluctuations in consumption has often been attributed to the neglect of borrowing 
                                                 
13
 The inclusion of preferences in the utility function is required if consumption is higher in some seasons 
compared to others, because for example individuals spend more during festivities.  
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constraints and uncertainty. If consumers are unable to borrow against income 
fluctuations, as it is often the case in rural economies, the conclusion of the model are 
unwarranted. If households cannot borrow, there will be times when more consumption 
in needed than the one provided by current income and assets, and consumers will not 
be able to equalise the marginal utilities across time as in (3.6).  
 
More recently, the basic behavioural assumptions of the intertemporal consumption 
model have also been questioned and this has led to the formulation of what is known as 
the precautionary savings model of consumption. The precautionary model of 
consumption departs from the standard intertemporal consumption model in two ways. 
First, it assumes that individuals cannot predict future incomes with precision and that 
they are risk-averse. Second, it postulates that poor people are impatient, in the sense 
that they prefer consumption now to higher consumption in the future. This is because 
their current level of consumption is so low that they cannot reduce it even if this 
implies an even lower consumption in the future. These two behavioural assumptions 
will now be discussed in turn. 
 
Income uncertainty is a reasonable assumption in rural areas of developing countries, 
where production is strongly linked to weather conditions. One way of introducing 
income uncertainty in the model is to use a multiplicative risk (Newbery and Stiglitz, 
1981). For example, consider an income that each year, or each season, is multiplied by 
a risk factor  with expectation 1E , and variance 2 Var : 
 
qy             (3.7) 
 
The expected agricultural income is equal to y because 1E , but the certainty 
equivalent income (which is the expected utility for that level of income) varies with the 
risk variance 2 . Assuming risk-averse consumers with utility functions that are 
concave down, the certainty equivalent income, denoted by a circumflex accent, is 
lower than expected income ( Eyy ˆ ) for any variance that is larger than zero, and more 
so the larger the variance of expected income. In the present formulation the income 
risk consists of rainfall variability, which affects both farmers’ output and agricultural 
labourers’ wages via demand effects. 
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As it was discussed in Section 3.2, irrigation has a double effect on income. The first 
effect is increasing agricultural output and labour demand so that income increases by a 
scalar δ. The second effect is reducing income variability, so that the risk variance and 
the certainty equivalent income become functions of irrigation (I): )(
2 IVar    and 
)(ˆ Iy . With the expansion of access to irrigation, expected income increases by the 
factor δ, and the certainty equivalent income also increases via a reduction in the risk 
variance. Note that it is assumed that the income process is entirely exogenous to the 
decisions of farmers and agricultural labourers. This is only partly true, because farmers 
can reduce the variability of income by growing drought resistant crops and by 
purchasing water pumps that extract water from the water table. Similarly, agricultural 
labourers can reduce the variability of wages, over seasons or years, by migrating to 
irrigated areas. The assumption of the exogeneity of the income process is made in 
order to simplify the exposition of the model, and it will be dealt with in Section 3.6, 
where the econometric specification of the model is discussed. 
 
The combined result of income uncertainty and aversion to risk is that people save in 
good times for fear of the occurrence of hard times. Formally, this assumption implies a 
concave utility function and a convex derivative function of the utility function (the 
marginal utility of consumption )(cu ). Income uncertainty is introduced in the model 
by adding the expectation operator (E) to future utilities, and maximisation of utility 
with respect to the budget constraint gives the Euler equation with the expectation 
operator: 
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According to this expression, an increase in uncertainty of future consumption reduces 
consumption in the present time. To see how this happens, consider an increase in the 
variance of future consumption that leaves the future mean unchanged. Because 
marginal utility is convex this has the effect of increasing the utility of future 
consumption compared to present utility. To the consumer, future consumption is now 
more valuable, and he will equate the marginal utilities by consuming less at the present 
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time. In other words, consumers respond to an increase in the expected income 
variability by saving more. 
 
Models of precautionary saving have often rested on the hypothesis of liquidity 
constraints (see for example Deaton, 1991). If consumers were able to borrow, they 
would not need this sort of saving. More recently Carroll (2001) has shown that 
liquidity constraints are not strictly necessary in order to have precautionary behaviour 
and that people may adopt this form of saving even if able to borrow. Intuitively this 
happens because consumers self-impose a reluctance to borrow for fear of not being 
able to repay in the future. Formally, this is again implied by the convexity of the 
derivative of the utility function and it is illustrated by Carrol (2001) using dynamic 
programming methods. 
 
The estimation of time preferences and discount factors in developing countries is a 
lively area of research and the evidence gathered so far, and summarised in Cardenas 
and Carpenter (2008), is mixed. The hypothesis that poor people are impatient was first 
formulated by Fisher (1930) and it is seems a rather plausible one. People who cannot 
afford to buy a basic basket of goods or cannot afford what is considered a minimum 
socially acceptable amount of items have very little incentive to save. Formally this 
means that the value of ρ, the time preference discounting factor, is large. Unlike 
permanent income models, which assume the equality between the interest rate and the 
rate of time preference, it is here assumed that the ratio 


1
1 i
 is less than one. 
Everything else equal, individuals with a time preference of this sort show a decreasing 
pattern of consumption over time.  
 
The combination of impatience and uncertainty drives the results of the precautionary 
saving model (Deaton, 1997). On the one hand, poor people want to spend all their 
money in order to satisfy their immediate needs. On the other hand, they fear the 
consequences of very bad times and therefore save some of the money earned in good 
times. There are two interesting results of this model for the present study. First, though 
individuals are partially able to smooth consumption fluctuations, consumption tracks 
income rather closely. The consumption function derived by the model is of the 
Keynesian type. At low levels of income and assets consumers spend all they have. 
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When income and assets reach their mean level, consumers begin saving and do so 
increasingly as income increases. Second, an increase in uncertainty shifts the 
consumption function downwards, because consumers need to save more for 
precautionary reasons. 
 
Within the precautionary savings model, irrigation not only increases consumption in 
response to the increase in expected future income, but also stabilises consumption over 
the years. The first effect is rather obvious, while the second needs some additional 
explanation. The reduction of income fluctuations allows farmers to keep the same 
smoothed consumption pattern at a lower level of precautionary savings. In principle, 
farmers might decide to invest rather than consume all extra precautionary savings, but 
some of these savings will indeed be used to stabilise consumption. This can be seen 
again from the Euler equation. A decrease in the variance of expected consumption, 
brought about by a decrease of income variability, has the effect of decreasing the value 
of future marginal utility of consumption. The consumer equates the marginal utilities 
by increasing current consumption, which happens at the expenses of precautionary 
savings.  
3.3.3 A model of seasonal consumption smoothing 
This section presents an intertemporal consumption model with a precautionary saving 
motive over the seasonal cycle. The model is solved analytically over a period of three 
seasons using dynamic programming methods and the implications of the model for a 
rural economy composed of irrigated and non-irrigated farms are discussed. 
 
The precautionary savings model can be extended to incorporate different seasons by 
exploiting the additivity and separability of the intertemporal utility function. Additivity 
and separability are routinely assumed in the solution of intertemporal consumption 
models and are maintained here. Separability means that overall utility from 
consumption can be considered as a function of sub-utilities ui, where the aggregate 
consumption ci represents bundles of similar goods (like food, housing and 
entertainment) or goods consumed in different years: 
 
 )(,),(),( 2211 nn cucucuFU          (3.9) 
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Additivity means that the consumption groups enter the utility function additively, so 
that the additive and separable utility function takes the form: 
 
 )()()( 2211 nn cucucuFU          (3.10) 
 
which is the form normally used in the classical intertemporal consumption model. The 
separation of utility in a number of sub-utilities implies that consumers make spending 
decisions in stages. In the first stage they decide how to allocate expenditure between 
groups of goods, and in the second stage they allocate expenditure within each group. 
Decisions taken at each stage can be considered as solutions to different maximisation 
problems. The implication is that a change in prices in one group will affect the 
distribution of expenditure within that group and between groups, but will have no 
effect on the distribution of expenditure within the other groups.  
 
In the intertemporal consumption model, the consumer first maximises utility between 
years and then maximises utility within each year. The introduction of seasons is 
equivalent to the introduction of another layer in the decision process. Utility in each 
year can be thought of being composed of seasonal sub-utility functions usi (with a 
number of s seasons running from one to N) so that the separable utility function 
becomes:  
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while the additively separable utility function is: 
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The consumer first maximises utility over years, then maximises utility over seasons 
and finally maximises utility within each season. The implication is that the allocation 
of expenditure over seasons is independent of the allocation of expenditure over the 
years. A change in the distribution of consumption over the years does not change the 
way consumption is distributed over the seasons in each year. This simplifying 
assumption allows the consideration of the utility maximisation problem over the 
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seasons independently of the maximisation problem over the years. If there are three 
seasons the seasonal utility function will take the form: 
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where the arguments are now indexed over seasons rather than over years, and the 
discount and the interest rates are now seasonal rates. Similarly, the seasonal Euler 
equation will take the form: 
 
)(
1
1
)( 1







 ss
seas
seas
s cuE
i
cu

         (3.14) 
  
This equation states that consumption in each season is related to the level and the 
variance of consumption in the next season. Higher future consumption reduces the 
marginal utility of consumption in the future, and the consumer equates present and 
future marginal utilities by increasing consumption in the present. A larger variance of 
future consumption, with expected consumption invariant, increases the marginal utility 
of future consumption, and the consumer equates marginal utilities by decreasing 
consumption in the present. Irrigation has the effect of increasing the expected value of 
consumption in future seasons and reducing the variance of future consumption. 
Therefore, irrigation increases and stabilises seasonal consumption. This will be further 
illustrated with a dynamic programming example. 
 
Dynamic programming is a technique based on the principle of backward induction, 
which is used in the solution of multistage intertemporal decision problems. The method 
first finds the optimum choice in the last period considered, and then works backwards 
to find the optimal choices in previous periods that have the final optimum choice as 
their outcome. Dynamic programming is meant here to model consumer behaviour 
rather than mimic the way individuals make rational decisions. However, given the very 
small time frame considered (three seasons) and with some reasonable assumptions, the 
solution might well approximate the farmers’ decision process. 
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Consider a farmer that maximises utility over three seasons: Kharif, Rabi and the lean 
season. In order to model risk-averse farmers, the constant relative risk aversion utility 
function (CRRA) is used:
14
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Utility is maximised with respect to the following budget constraint: 
 
))(1(1 sssseass cyAiA          (3.16) 
 
where As are assets at the beginning of the season, ys is income earned during season s, 
and cs is consumption during the same season. The first season of the decision process is 
Kharif, when the larger fraction of annual income is made. It is assumed that in Kharif 
the consumer has no assets inherited from the previous seasons, and income is known 
with certainty, because already realised. The second season is Rabi, when an uncertain 
income is made and assets are those saved in Kharif. The third season is the lean season, 
when we assume that no income is earned and consumers spend any asset they were 
able to save in the previous two seasons. Formally we have the following restrictions: 
01 A , 04 A , and 03 y . The model is solved for the values of consumption in the 
three seasons, and of assets in the second and the third season. The application of 
dynamic programming to the problem yields the following consumption values for the 
three seasons: 
15
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 The characteristics of this utility function are illustrated in Appendix D.  
15
 These solutions were obtained following a similar worked dynamic programming example in Leonard 
and Long (1992).  See Appendix E for a step-by-step derivation of the consumption equations in (3.17). 
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In the lean season (c3) the solution is obtained by assumption. Nothing is saved for the 
following season and nothing is earned, and the consumer spends all assets previously 
saved plus the interest rate. In the Rabi season (c2) income is known and is distributed 
between Rabi and the following lean season depending on the values of the parameters 
iseas, ρseas, and  that are contained in d. In the Kharif season (c1), the farmer decides the 
expenditure level based on his expectation of income in the Rabi season. This result 
could be presented in the form of an Euler equation showing that given the convexity of 
the marginal utility function, consumption in the current period is determined by the 
expectation and by the variance of expected consumption in the following season. This 
result can be shown equivalently by substituting expected income in the next season by 
its certainty equivalent ( 2yˆ ). In this way, the dynamic problem under uncertainty is 
transformed into a problem under equivalent certainty. An increase in the variance of 
Rabi expected income reduces its certainty equivalent value in Kharif, thus reducing 
consumption in Kharif in order to build precautionary savings. Conversely, a decrease 
in the variance of Rabi expected income, brought about by easier access to irrigation, 
increases its certainty equivalent and hence consumption in Kharif. In this example all 
precautionary saving occurs in Kharif. Irrigated farmers can spend more in Kharif as 
they need less precautionary savings.  
 
The model was solved without imposing a borrowing constraint, but liquidity 
constraints are not strictly necessary if consumers self-impose restrictions to borrowing 
out of fear of disastrous events. This argument is based on Carroll (2001) and proceeds 
in the following way. In the third season consumers spend everything. As income in the 
third season is zero, consumers need to make positive savings in the second season in 
order to be able to spend in the third season. In order to consume less than income and 
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assets in the second season, farmers need to make sure that they arrive to the second 
season with positive assets. If income is zero in the second season, farmers will not be 
able to consume anything. The same reasoning applies to disastrous events that produce 
an income larger than zero but still very low in the Rabi season. If income is always 
positive in the Rabi season, the farmer can borrow in Kharif, but he will not borrow 
more than what he would be able to repay in the case of the worst income outcome in 
Rabi. In these circumstances farmers will borrow, but never beyond a certain amount 
that it is limited by their ability to repay in the future. This seems to offer another 
argument in favour of the stabilising effect of irrigation on consumption. To the extent 
that irrigation reduces the variance of future income, it makes farmers less reluctant to 
borrow and therefore more able to smooth consumption.  
3.4 Data 
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis and discusses the 
limitations of the expenditure data. In three separate subsections it details the type of 
adjustments made in order to correct for seasonal, demographic and price variability.  
3.4.1 NSSO data 
India has been a world pioneer in conducting household budget studies. Since the 1940s 
the NSSO has been collecting information on consumption of Indian households with 
the purpose of monitoring living standards and guiding the policies of the Planning 
Commission of the Government of India. The design of these surveys has changed very 
little over time. Every five years the NSSO runs very large survey rounds (‘thick’ 
rounds), while surveys of smaller size are implemented every year (‘thin’ rounds). 
During the large rounds, between 100,000 and 200,000 households are interviewed 
throughout the country.  
 
The sample of the large rounds is drawn from several strata that allow the analysis of 
the data at a highly disaggregate level. Separate surveys are conducted in each state and 
in each state the sample is stratified by season, urban-rural location and district. In rural 
areas ten households are surveyed in each of the selected villages. Within these ten 
households, a sub-stratum is composed of affluent households in order to ensure that 
these are sufficiently represented in the sample. The present study uses rural data of the 
latest four large survey rounds for the state of Andhra Pradesh. Table 3.1 shows the 
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break-down of the number of observations by survey round and urban-rural location. 
Given that the state is divided in 23 administrative districts, there are on average 
between 200 and 250 observations per district in rural areas. 
 
Table 3.1 Number of observations by NSSO survey round 
Observations 43
rd
 (1987-88) 50
th
 (1993-94) 55
th
 (1999-00) 61
st
 (2004-05) 
Rural households 6,016 4,908 5,181 5,555 
Villages 602 492 432 556 
Urban households 3,423 3,644 3,806 2,876 
All households 9,439 8,552 8,987 8,431 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The survey rounds follow a common design that has its core in the expenditures 
modules. An introductory module collects information on household characteristics, 
which include the social group to which the household belongs, religion, cultivated and 
irrigated land, main occupation, source of energy for cooking and lighting, and a 
number of other characteristics that vary by round like: income sources, crop produced, 
housing conditions, participation in public works and others. A second module (the 
household roster) collects demographic and education data on all members of the 
household. A varying number of modules collect extremely detailed expenditure data 
grouped by broad categories including food, education, health, and durable goods 
among others. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.4.3, changes made to the survey questionnaire of the 55
th
 
round (1999-00) have biased the comparability of the data in two ways. The 30-day 
food expenditure is biased upward, whilst annual expenditure on non-food items is 
underestimated. In the rounds following the 55
th
, the disputed changes were removed 
and the problem of comparability is therefore limited to the data collected in 1999-00. 
These affect the results of the analysis conducted in this chapter only marginally, as will 
be discussed in the next section. 
3.4.2 Household expenditure adjustments 
The NSSO surveys collect very detailed expenditure data. Quantities and values of 
purchases of hundreds of food and non-food items are reported, and estimated values of 
home produced goods are included. This section describes the series of adjustments 
made in order to carry out the analysis of seasonal consumption patterns. First, 
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household expenditure is divided by the number of adult equivalents rather than by 
household size. Second, items that are purchased at particular times of the year due to 
climate or custom are dropped from the computation of household expenditure. Third, 
household expenditure is divided by household specific price indices in order to correct 
for spatial and temporal price variation and for differences in consumer preferences. 
 
Comparability of NSSO expenditure surveys 
Expenditure data collected by NSSO surveys can be grouped in eight broad categories: 
food; stimulants and intoxicant; clothing and footwear; miscellaneous goods and 
services; education; health; and durable goods. Table 3.2 shows the availability of 
expenditure data for these eight broad categories by recall period in each of the survey 
rounds.
16
 A tick in the table means the data were collected.  
 
Table 3.2 Expenditure categories by recall period and survey round 
 43
rd
 round 50
th
 round 55
th
 round
a
 61
st
 round 
 month year month year month year Month year 
Food         
Stimulants & intoxicants         
Clothing and footwear         
Misc. goods and services         
Education         
Health         
Durables         
 
 
All expenditure categories are reported over a 30-day recall period that is comparable 
across surveys, with the exception of the 55
th
 round. During the 55
th
 round, expenditure 
on clothing and footwear, education, and durables were collected only on an annual 
basis. However, expenditure on education and durable goods will be dropped from the 
computation of total household expenditure for reasons that will be clarified later, while 
expenditure on clothing and footwear represent only a small percentage of total 
expenditure (see Table 3.3). Expenditure on food and clothing was overestimated in the 
55
th
 round (as discussed in Section 2.4.3). This will not affect the present analysis, 
which compares expenditure across groups rather than across surveys. 
                                                 
16
 Only comparable recall periods are reported. In the 55th round data on consumption of food, and 
stimulants and intoxicant were collected using both a 7-day and a 30-day recall period. As this is the only 
case in which a 7-day recall period was used, it is not reported in the table. 
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Table 3.3 Expenditure shares of rural households by broad category 
 43
rd
 round 50
th
 round 55
th 
round 61
st
 round 
Food 62.1 63.0 57.4 53.9 
Stimulant and intoxicants 7.6 7.6 6.2 6.2 
Clothing and footwear 6.3 4.3 6.7 3.4 
Misc. goods and services 17.5 18.0 20.0 29.4 
Education 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.4 
Health 4.6 5.5 4.9 4.5 
Durables 1.4 1.0 5.8 1.2 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Demographic adjustments 
Several factors affect the demographic composition of households including migration, 
the cost of raising children, life expectancy and cultural norms. Households of different 
income, social group or geographical location have different demographic composition, 
which makes comparisons based on per capita expenditure across different groups of 
households not appropriate. The reason is that children consume less than adults and 
that there are economies of scale inside the household for goods that are collectively 
used. (See Deaton (1997) for a detailed discussion of this topic, and White and Masset 
(2003) for a discussion of the methods used to adjust household expenditure.) 
 
Table 3.4 Demographic characteristics of farmers and agricultural labourers 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Farmers Agricultural Labourers 
 Irrigated Non-irr. Irrigated Non-irr. 
Size 5.0 4.8** 4.0 4.3*** 
Children under 5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5** 
Children from 5 to 10 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9*** 
Children from 10 to 15 0.4 0.4** 0.3 0.3 
Adults 3.1 2.9*** 2.4 2.5* 
Elderly adults 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Age of head of household 46.2 45.2** 41.7 42.0 
Sex ratio 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The present analysis focuses on four household groups, namely farmers and agricultural 
labourers of irrigated and non-irrigated areas. Table 3.4 shows the main demographic 
characteristics of these four groups. Average age and household size are smaller among 
labourers compared to farmers. Within farmers, households with irrigated farms are 
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larger in size, have more adult members and the head of household is on average older. 
Labourers living in irrigated villages tend to have smaller families and fewer children 
compared to labourers living in non-irrigated areas. Ignoring these different 
demographic characteristics would lead to making wrong inferences on the welfare 
differences between groups of households. 
 
In order to compare expenditure data of households of different demographic 
composition two adjustments were made. First, expenditure is divided by adult 
equivalent members rather than by household size. The equivalence scale used to 
calculate the number of adult equivalents is arbitrary and assigns the value of 0.4 to the 
expenditure of children under age five, 0.7 to children between five and ten, and 0.8 to 
children between the age of ten and 15. Second, a small arbitrary adjustment for 
economies of scale is included by raising the number of adult equivalent members of the 
household to the power of 0.9.  
 
Seasonal adjustments 
The NSSO data are particularly effective for the analysis of seasonal expenditure for 
two reasons. First, the survey is conducted over a 12-month agricultural year starting on 
the 1
st
 of July and ending on the 30
th
 of June of the following year. The data are 
stratified by three-month sub-rounds, each composed of an equal amount of households 
and clusters. Each sub-round is statistically representative of the population at the state 
level and can be analysed separately from the others. Second, the NSSO questionnaire 
uses a 30-day recall period for all expenditure items, with the exception of the 55
th
 
round, and hence household expenditure can be easily assigned to a particular season.  
 
Seasonal expenditure analysis is better performed after subtracting from total 
expenditure those items whose fluctuations are not related to income. There are two 
main sources of non-income related seasonal fluctuations in the quantities demanded of 
goods: climate and custom (ILO, 2004). Seasonal changes in climate affect, for 
example, the demand for clothing and health care, while custom determines the times at 
which certain payments are made, for example school fees, ceremonies and holidays.  
 
In order to assess the extent to which each expenditure category is sensitive to seasonal 
patterns that are not related to income variations, a series of regressions were run of 
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household expenditure by category on seasonal dummies. The dependent variable in the 
regressions is the logarithm of household expenditure on each broad category, while the 
explanatory variables consist of three seasonal dummies and a set of control variables, 
which include demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status and total household 
expenditure. The coefficient estimates of the three seasonal dummies are reported in 
Table 3.5, and represent the percentage change in consumption of each category with 
respect to the omitted season (July to September). Seasonal coefficients are particularly 
large and statistically significant for education, health, and durables. Seasonal variation 
in the consumption of stimulants and clothing is not statistically significant, while the 
variation in consumption of food and miscellaneous items is very small. In order to 
avoid using expenditure data that reflect seasonal consumption patterns related to 
climate and custom, rather than seasonal variation in income, expenses on education, 
health and durables were excluded from the computation of total household expenditure. 
 
Table 3.5 Seasonal consumption by expenditure category 
 Food Stimulants Clothing Misc. Education Health Durables 
Oct-Dec -0.012** -0.021 0.282 0.038*** -0.625*** -0.451** 1.149*** 
Jan-Mar -0.017** 0.056** 0.382 0.026** -1.642*** -1.328*** 1.944*** 
Apr-Jun -0.004 0.031 -0.514 0.062*** -3.367*** -1.054*** 1.925*** 
R-square 0.91 0.37 0.13 0.86 0.11 0.04 0.11 
Observations 21271       
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Indian households spend considerable sums for marriages and other festivities. Table 
3.6 shows the percentage of households that reported celebrating a ceremony during the 
month preceding the interview. There is no discernible seasonal pattern in the 
ceremonies performed. No statistically significant difference was found between groups 
of households with and without access to irrigation. Ceremonies expenditure was 
nevertheless excluded from the computation of total expenditure for two reasons. First, 
this expenditure item was not included in the 55
th
 survey round. Second, the inclusion of 
ceremonies is a potential source of outliers, because large outlays can be made 
particularly for marriages.  
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Table 3.6 Percentage of household celebrating a ceremony by season 
Season 43
rd
 round 50
th
 round 61
st
 round 
Jul-Sep 3.5 0.7 0.8 
Oct-Dec 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Jan-Mar 1.7 0.6 1.9 
Apr-Jun 1.3 0.8 2.7 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Price adjustments 
In order to analyse seasonal consumption patterns, seasonal price variations have to be 
removed from the expenditure data. This is performed dividing households expenditure 
by a price index, which can be obtained in two ways. The first is using the official 
consumer price index of Andhra Pradesh; the second is calculating the price index using 
the survey data. In this section advantages and disadvantages of the two indices are 
discussed and the reasons for choosing the second method instead of the first are 
explained. 
 
The consumer price index adopted by Indian statistical authorities is based on the 
Laspeyres formula. The Laspeyres index (L) estimates the change in the cost of living 
between two time periods (zero and one) by calculating the ratio of the cost of acquiring 
the same quantities of goods (q
R
) in two periods at different prices (p
0 
and p
1 
). The 
reference basket of quantities is that in period zero, and the index is:
 
 
R
R
qp
qp
L
0
1
            (3.18)  
 
There are two problems with using this index. First, it ignores substitution effects, thus 
correcting prices in excess of the true change in the cost of living. When relative prices 
change, consumers shift demand from the good that increased in price to its closer 
substitute. For example, an increase in the price of coffee will induce an increase in the 
demand for tea and other stimulants whose price has not changed. This means that part 
of the negative effect on utility of an increase in price is absorbed by the consumer 
through a change in consumption patterns. This is the substitution effect of a price 
change. The Laspeyres index calculates the income effect of a price change, but ignores 
the substitution effect. As a result, the use of the Laspeyres index overcompensate 
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consumers for the change in utility caused by a price increase. The index however is a 
very good approximation in cases where all prices change proportionally and therefore 
changes in relative prices and substitution effects are limited. Similarly, when 
substitution possibilities are limited, for example because goods are consumed in fixed 
proportions, the index works perfectly well. In general however, substitution effects are 
strong, and division of expenditure by this index overestimates the reduction in utility 
brought about by an increase in prices. 
 
The second shortcoming of the Laspeyres index is that it adjusts the cost of living in 
different ways for households of different income levels. Consumers’ preferences vary 
with income, and household budget composition varies with total household 
expenditure. Typically, poorer households consume more food, while richer ones 
consume a variety of non-food items. The implication is that changes in relative prices 
affect households in different ways depending on the composition of their budgets. The 
Laspeyres index calculates budget shares using the average consumption of all 
households, thus assuming that all households are equal. Note that since expenditures of 
rich households have more weight in the calculation of the overall budget shares, these 
shares tend to over-represent the budget composition of richer households. For example, 
an increase in food prices might have little consequence on the value of the index 
because at the country level the food share is rather small, though the negative impact 
on the utility of the poor is large. It follows that the Laspeyres index compensates for 
the reduction in utility determined by changes in prices by giving more weight to 
changes in prices of goods consumed by the rich. Dividing household expenditure by 
this index may therefore overestimate or underestimate the change in utility depending 
on which prices are increasing and which household is considered. 
 
The Government of India publishes monthly series of the consumer price index for the 
whole of India and for each Indian state separately. Two different series are published, 
one for the industrial workers (the CPIIW), and a second for the agricultural labourers 
(the CPIAL). The CPIAL is representative of price variations in rural areas, and is 
therefore more relevant for the present study. 
 
The CPIAL is obtained using the following methodology. First, prices of a well 
specified set of food and non-food items are collected at the village level. Second, 
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village prices for each item are averaged within the same enquiry zone thus producing a 
zonal price for each item. A zone consists of a number of contiguous villages. Third, the 
zonal prices are aggregated at the state level to produce a state price for each item. 
Zonal prices are weighted by the expenditure share of each zone in the state. Finally, a 
monthly state index is calculated using the Laspeyres formula. 
 
Until 1995, data for the index were collected by the Field Operation Division of the 
NSSO on the 1
st
 week of every month. Prices were always collected from the same 
shops and markets and for the same items. The sample was composed of 15 states, 39 
Agricultural Labour Enquiry Zones, and 422 fixed sample villages. The items surveyed 
ranged from 27 to 38, including food, pan and tobacco, fuel, clothing and 
miscellaneous. The weights used in the calculation of the index were obtained in the 
Second Agricultural Labour Enquiry of 1956-57 and were never revised since. The 
index base was fixed at the agricultural year 1960-61. 
 
Since 1995, the Ministry of Labour has published series of the CPIAL calculated using 
a substantially revised methodology. Data collection is still carried out by the Field 
Operation Division of the NSSO every month, but prices are now collected over a 
period of four weeks, rather than in the 1
st
 week of the month, and the sample size has 
been expanded. Data are now collected in 20 states, divided in 66 enquiry zones, and 
600 villages (of which 54 are in Andhra Pradesh). Prices are now taken for a larger 
number of items (up to a maximum of 106). The weights for the calculation of the 
Laspeyres index have been updated using data of the NSSO expenditure survey of 
1983-84. The index base has been reset to the agricultural year 1985-86. The two series 
can now be linked using a multiplier provided by the Ministry of Labour and published 
on the Indian Labour Journal (MOL, several issues).
17
 
 
The new series of the CPIAL obviate some of the problems of the old series, but the use 
of this index is still problematic in some respects. First, series prior to 1995 are still 
based on outdated expenditure weights calculated in the 1950s. Second, although the 
new series have updated the weights using more recent survey data, these are not 
periodically modified to account for changes in consumers’ preferences. Third, the 
                                                 
17
 The value of the multiplier for Andhra Pradesh is 4.84. In order to obtain figures of the CPIAL after 
1995 using the old base of 1960-61, the data need to be multiplied by this factor.  
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ability of the CPIAL to represent regional price variation is questionable. Finally and 
most importantly, the CPIAL relies on the Laspeyres formula.  
 
 Table 3.7 Variations in food prices by district and season 
Districts Paddy PDS rice Jowar
a
 Ragi
a
 Dal Milk Tomato 
Nizamabad -0.07*** 0.00 0.30***  0.05*** 0.05** 0.05* 
Karimnagar -0.01 0.00 0.24***  0.05*** 0.09*** 0.22*** 
Medak -0.05*** 0.00 0.22***  0.08*** 0.12*** -0.01 
Rangareddy -0.01 -0.01** 0.34*** 0.68*** 0.08*** 0.23*** -0.16*** 
Mahaboobnagar -0.06*** -0.01** 0.27*** 0.18 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.05** 
Nalgonda -0.06*** -0.01 0.16***  0.03*** 0.18*** -0.03 
Warangal 0.00 -0.01** 0.07*  0.13*** 0.15*** 0.25*** 
Khamman 0.01 -0.01 0.46***  0.09*** 0.20*** 0.33*** 
Srikakulam -0.13*** 0.00  -0.35* 0.08*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 
Vizianagaram -0.12*** 0.00  -0.40** 0.07*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 
Vishakhapatnam -0.04** -0.01  -0.23 0.08*** 0.29*** 0.08*** 
East Godavari 0.03* -0.01* 0.36*** 0.38** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
West Godavari 0.07*** -0.01**  0.50** 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 
Krishna 0.08*** 0.00 -0.02 0.29 0.14*** 0.42*** 0.12*** 
Guntur 0.16*** 0.01**   0.05*** 0.49*** 0.15*** 
Prakasam 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.24*** 0.15 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.07*** 
Nellore 0.03 0.01**  0.40** 0.15*** 0.24*** -0.12*** 
Cuddapah 0.03 0.00 0.31*** 0.34* 0.06*** 0.00 -0.09*** 
Kurnool 0.00 -0.01*** 0.33***  0.05*** 0.08*** -0.26*** 
Anantapur -0.13*** 0.01** 0.19*** 0.07 0.03*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 
Chittor 0.02 0.00 0.27* 0.27 0.08*** -0.02 -0.26*** 
        
Coefficient of 
variation 
0.06 0.01 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.10 0.15 
        
Oct-Dec 0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04*** 0.01 -0.21*** 
Jan-Mar 0.02*** 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 -0.53*** 
Apr-Jun 0.05*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.03* -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.31*** 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
Coefficient estimates are not available for those districts where the commodity is not consumed. 
 
Poor spatial integration of markets and high transport costs determine large price 
differences across locations. This puts into question the representativeness of the sample 
of 54 villages used for the calculation of the CPIAL in Andhra Pradesh. Table 3.7 
shows the results of regressions of the logarithm of price for some essential food items 
in Andhra Pradesh against district and seasonal dummies. The regressions use data of 
556 villages, with ten price observations per village, from the NSSO survey of 2004-
05.
18
 The estimated coefficients measure the percent price difference in each district and 
season. The coefficients of variation of the estimated parameters of the district dummies 
                                                 
18 
The methodology for the analysis of spatial variation of prices draws on Deaton (1997). 
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reported at the bottom of the table range from 0.05 to 0.25, which point to substantial 
variation in food prices across districts. The coefficients of seasonal dummies are 
smaller than district coefficients, meaning that the spatial variation in prices is larger 
than the temporal variation. The analysis of price variation by item reveals that the 
variation in the price of rice is modest compared to other goods. This is particularly true 
for the rice sold through the PDS, whose price is controlled by the state government. 
Spatial price variations are quite large for jowar (Sorghum), ragi (Millet), milk and 
tomatoes. The first two are goods that are traditionally marketed locally, while the other 
two are perishable and their transportation is difficult. 
 
In order to avoid the shortcomings outlined above and those related to using a price 
index based on the Laspeyres formula, the present study uses a price index calculated 
for each survey round, rather than the CPIAL. Household specific price indices were 
calculated using the methodology described in Deaton and Zaidi (2002). There are two 
main advantages in using household specific price indices. The first is that they adjust 
expenditure for temporal and spatial price variation simultaneously. This is particularly 
important given that the spatial variation was found to be larger than the temporal 
variation. The second advantage is that household specific indices are tailored to each 
household, thus reflecting individual household’s income and preferences, and do not 
overstate or understate changes in the cost of living in the way that the Laspeyres index 
does.  
 
The starting point for the calculation of household price indices is the calculation of a 
household Paasche price index (P
h
):
19
 
 
h
hh
h
qp
qp
P
0
            (3.19) 
 
The superscripts indicate that prices and quantities are measured at the household level 
(h). This index can be rewritten in the form: 
 
                                                 
19
 Paasche price indices are analogous to Laspeyres indices, but unlike the latter they refer to a basket of 
goods in the present rather than in the past. 
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where wi are the shares of household’s budget spent on the i item. For the purpose of 
practical computation, the index can be approximated by:  
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In practice household indices were calculated in the following way. First, all goods that 
could be included in the index where selected. For example, in the case of the 61
st
 
survey round, 97 items were selected and subdivided in the following categories: food 
(76); tobacco and pan (6); intoxicants (3); fuel and light (7); clothing and bedding (4); 
footwear (1). Items whose prices could not be calculated were dropped. This was the 
case where quantities consumed were not uniquely defined, or not comparable, or did 
not represent a homogeneous category. Several items that were rarely purchased, and 
those whose consumption is highly seasonal, were also dropped from the computation. 
Secondly, the unit values were derived by dividing the value of household consumption 
on an item by the quantity consumed of the same item. The shares of the expenditure of 
each item on total expenditure at the household level were also calculated. When unit 
values took unreasonable values (+/- 2.576 standard deviations from the mean), they 
were substituted with the mean unit value in the district where the observation was 
collected. Third, and finally, the median price in the cluster was taken as the price paid 
by the household. This rests on the assumption that prices for the same item do not vary 
substantially within the same village. The mean price over the sample of all households 
was taken as the base price. These two prices were inserted in formula (3.21), and the 
price indices were calculated for all household in the survey. 
 
This method of calculating price indices is not without drawbacks. First, for practical 
reasons, the index can be calculated only over a limited number of goods, like food, 
clothing and miscellaneous, leaving out several non-food items. As household 
expenditure is geared towards the consumption of more non-food items over time, the 
index becomes increasingly less representative of the true cost of living. Second, the 
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index is not based on true prices, but on unit values obtained by dividing the value of 
consumption by the quantity consumed by each household. Unit values do not take into 
account variations in quality. Rich household pay more for the same items because buy 
higher quality products, and richer villages buy better quality products than poorer ones. 
Consequently, price differences between households and villages are partly due to 
differences in the quality of the purchased goods. Using deflators based on unit values 
and interpreting differences in quality as differences in prices reduces the expenditure 
value of the rich and increases that of the poor. This happens because the expenditure of 
rich households is deflated by a high price index, which mistakenly takes the difference 
in the quality of the good purchased as a difference in the price paid by the consumer. 
Conversely the expenditure of the poor is deflated by a price index that is too low, 
because it mistakenly confuses low quality with low prices. 
 
The official CPIAL of Andhra Pradesh and the household specific price indices 
calculated from survey data are compared in the charts of Figure 3.1. The CPIAL was 
averaged by trimester and normalised to one in order to make the two indices 
comparable. The household specific price indices were also normalised to one and 
averaged by season. There is a good deal of similarity in the seasonal patterns of the two 
indices: prices increase in the second season, decrease in the third, and increase again in 
the fourth. The main difference between the indices emerges in the last season, where 
the two give very different prices for two of the four rounds. 
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Figure 3.1 Seasonal price indices calculated from NSSO data and CPIAL  
 
 
 
 
Source: solid line calculated from NSSO data, dotted line obtained from indiastat. 
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3.5 Descriptive statistics 
This chapter assesses the impact of irrigation on the consumption of farmers and 
agricultural labourers with and without access to irrigation. Classifying households in 
these four categories is not a straightforward exercise and this section discusses in detail 
the methodology used to produce the household classifications used in the empirical 
analysis. This section also presents some descriptive statistics on irrigation, rainfall 
patterns, and agricultural seasons in Andhra Pradesh. 
3.5.1 Irrigation in Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh is well endowed with water sources having four large rivers: Godavari, 
Krishna, Pennar and Vamsadhara. Despite large investments in the construction of 
canals and minor irrigation structures however, the irrigated area has reached less than 
50% of the irrigation potential of the state (Reddy, 2003). According to DES data (DES, 
2005), the percentage of net cropped area under irrigation has slowly increased from 
25% in 1956 to nearly 40% in 1989. Since then, the amount of irrigated land has 
remained more or less stable at just below 40%. Percentages of irrigated area calculated 
using NSSO data are very similar to those reported by the DES: 36% in 1987-88; 42% 
in 1993-94; 43% in 1999-00; and 36% in 2004-05 (see Figure 3.2). 
 
 Figure 3.2 Percentage of cultivated area under irrigation (1956-2005) 
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Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
 
Since the mid 1950s, important changes have occurred in the types of irrigation used 
(see Figure 3.3). The use of traditional tanks has decreased steadily since the mid 1960s, 
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while the use of canal water has diminished during the last 15 years. This reduction has 
been entirely compensated by the expansion in the use of ground water. Irrigation by 
means of water pumps is now as important as canal irrigation.  
 
The area covered by canal irrigation over the period 1956-2005 reflects state 
investments in irrigation infrastructure. These increased largely in the 1970s, remained 
stable during the 1980s, and dropped in the 1990s (Reddy, 2003). Interestingly, the area 
irrigated by canals actually decreased in absolute terms over the last ten years, probably 
due to poor operation and maintenance. In the late 1990s, new institutional 
arrangements (Water Users Associations) were introduced in order to promote a better 
operation and maintenance of canals, but these do not seem to have prevented the 
deterioration of the existing infrastructure.  
 
Three main factors explain the diffusion of ground water extraction. First, in the 1980s a 
new generation of water pumps that were both simple to operate and relatively 
inexpensive became available. Second, rising living standard in rural areas made this 
technology affordable even to very small farmers. Finally, the state government granted 
electricity free of charge to a large portion of rural areas in the state, thus subsidising the 
operation of water pumps. 
 
Figure 3.3 Irrigated area by irrigation source (1956-2005) 
 
 
Source: calculated from DES (2005). 
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There are two important consequences of the changes in the main sources of irrigation. 
First, the shift from tanks and canals to private wells has decreased farmers’ dependence 
on total rainfall for irrigation. Tank irrigation consists of water collected in reservoirs 
that range from less than one acre to several hectares in size, and is entirely dependent 
on local rains. The availability of canal water depends on total rainfall in the area of the 
main reservoir and is not assured in times of drought. In contrast, ground water is 
always available, at least until the water table is exhausted, which requires prolonged or 
consecutive droughts. The shift towards the use of ground water against more traditional 
sources of irrigation has therefore in principle increased the stabilisation role of 
irrigation. It should be emphasised however that although ground water is a more 
reliable source than canals, this is strictly true only in areas were rainfall is abundant, 
though irregular. In dry land areas, ground water extraction reaches its maximum 
potential in a limited time, and is not a reliable source of irrigation. In addition, ground 
water extraction has benefited so far from the access to large water reservoirs. However, 
the extraction of ground water in the long term might be hampered by the extinction of 
these reservoirs or by their deterioration due to soil erosion. In conclusion, while ground 
water extraction has provided a good short-term solution to the shortage of water for a 
large number of farmers in Andhra Pradesh, it cannot be considered a reliable source of 
irrigation in dry land areas nor a sustainable source of irrigation in any area. 
 
A second implication of the shift in irrigation sources is a potential change in the 
distribution of irrigation over geographic regions and farm classes. Private wells might 
have brought irrigation to areas not served by canals and to farmers that can afford the 
purchase of water pumps. The analysis of NSSO data however indicates that this was 
not the case. Table 3.8 shows the fraction of net irrigated area by district across the four 
surveys. It appears that in the districts of the coastal belt traditionally irrigated by canals 
(East and West Godavari, Krishna and Guntur), the share of irrigated area has not 
decreased but possibly increased over the 20 years considered. On the other hand, 
districts traditionally not served by canal water in the south of the state (like Anantapur, 
Kurnool, and Mahaboobnagar) do not show any significant increase in the share of net 
irrigated area. 
 
126 
 
  
Table 3.8 Percentage of irrigated area by district (1987-2005) 
District 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Srikakulam 63.2 50.5 47.3 62.2 
Vizianagam 54.1 42.7 56.2 44.1 
Vishakhapatnam 24.7 32.7 27.6 25.5 
East Godavari 65.8 54.0 69.8 76.6 
West Godavari 79.1 79.4 78.4 86.2 
Krishna 83.9 76.7 98.0 94.9 
Guntur 56.0 51.9 77.9 57.5 
Prakasam 30.3 22.0 38.8 53.0 
Nellore 69.0 74.0 70.4 57.3 
Chittor 42.6 40.2 40.5 26.9 
Cuddapah 25.9 28.7 57.1 48.0 
Anantapur 15.1 20.0 25.2 11.1 
Kurnool 11.6 20.4 13.6 11.8 
Mahaboobnagar 18.2 16.4 13.3 11.3 
Rangareddy 21.7 35.0 17.9 52.1 
Medak 29.8 56.9 55.7 34.0 
Nizamabad 51.8 53.0 75.5 59.0 
Adilabad 11.2 11.2 22.1 9.3 
Karimnagar 50.8 60.8 70.8 40.3 
Warangal 45.8 42.5 47.7 30.7 
Khamman 34.0 35.2 31.5 69.5 
Nalgonda 33.7 26.8 28.2 21.7 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Similarly, the shares of irrigated land by land holding classes indicate that the expansion 
of the use of ground water and the reduction in the use of canal and tank water has not 
brought about substantial changes (see Table 3.9). 
 
Table 3.9 Percentage of irrigated area by farm size 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Marginal farms 54.7 54.5 52.9 45.4 
Medium farms 41.6 40.8 46.8 39.2 
Large farms 30.2 30.3 37.7 31.7 
Note: marginal farmers cultivate less than one acre; small farmers cultivate between one and five acres; 
large farmers cultivate five acres or more. 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
3.5.2 Household classification 
This study focuses on two types of rural households, farmers and agricultural labourers, 
because they are the ones more directly affected by weather related income fluctuations. 
Abstracting from prices, farmers’ income is affected by fluctuations in agricultural 
output, while income of agricultural labourers is affected by fluctuations in labour 
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demand by farmers. Fluctuations in output and labour demand are clearly related, but do 
not necessarily happen at the same time and season. For example a poor output for 
farmers in the harvesting season may be preceded by a poor labour demand in the 
sowing season. This requires a separate analysis of the two household classes. 
 
Any subdivision by social classes is an oversimplification of rural society. In reality, 
many farmers do some paid work for other farms, while many labourers cultivate small 
plots of land. This section describes the methodology used by the NSSO to differentiate 
rural classes, highlighting its shortcomings, and outlines the methodology used in this 
study.  
 
The NSSO subdivides households in five categories by main economic activity (see 
Table 3.10). The methodology used is rather complex and has been modified since the 
55
th
 round (NSSO, 1999). Up to the 50
th
 round the classification was produced in two 
stages (NSSO, 1993): first at the level of household listing, and then at the stage of the 
household interview. At the time of listing the enumerator would take note of net 
household income under four categories: self-employment non-agriculture (y1), self-
employment agriculture (y2), wage manual labour (y3), and wage non-manual labour 
(y4). The enumerator would then classify households in the following way: rural labour 
household (code two) if y3>(y1+y2), and y3> y4; self-employed non-agriculture (code 
one) if y1>y3, and y1>(y2+y4); other households (code nine) all households not otherwise 
classified. At the time of the survey interview the enumerator would code one the 
households classified self-employed non-agriculture during the listing, and would 
further split the remaining two categories. Rural labour would become agricultural 
labour (code 2) if more than 50% of income was obtained from wages earned in 
agriculture, and would become other labour (code 3) otherwise. Other households 
would become self-employed agriculture (code 4) if more than 50% of income was 
obtained from self-employment in agriculture, and simply ‘other’ (code 5) otherwise. 
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Table 3.10 NSSO classification of rural households 
NSSO household category 43
rd
 round 
(%)
 
50
th
 round
 
(%) 
55
th
 round
 
(%) 
61
st
 round
 
(%) 
(1) Self-employed non-agriculture 13.8 12.8 12.7 18.3 
(2) Agricultural labour 39.6 37.8 45.2 37.1 
(3) Other labour 8.6 5.8 5.7 8.5 
(4) Self-employed agriculture 27.3 24.2 24.6 27.4 
(5) Other 10.7 6.9 11.8 8.7 
      Unclassified  12.5   
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Since the 55
th
 round, the process of classification has been reduced to one stage and 
households are assigned to the classes of Table 3.10 at the time of the interview. Each 
household is assigned to any one category if it earns 50% or more of its income from 
the corresponding economic activity. If the household cannot be classified based on 
these criteria, the enumerator revises the household income sources and classifies 
households in the following way: self-employed non-agriculture if y1>y2, and 
y1>(y3+y4+y5); other labour if y2>y1, and y2>(y3+ y4+y5); and ‘other’ in all other cases, 
including households that do not report any income. 
 
The NSSO household classification has several limitations. First, the methodology used 
has changed between rounds, and the household types defined are not strictly the same. 
Second, this classification method is based on income, which is a complex estimate – 
more so than consumption – and its calculation is a fairly lengthy process. It is 
unrealistic that households can provide reliable income estimates in the short time 
available for the interview. Third, the methodology used by NSSO can lead to 
inconsistencies, and the same household may end up in more than one category. Finally, 
in the 50
th
 round the households coding for Andhra Pradesh contains many missing 
values, and 12% of the rural sample is unclassified. 
 
In order to overcome these limitations this study uses the households classification 
based on the National Classification of Occupation codes (NCO) instead of that of the 
NSSO. For the NCO classification, the enumerator assigns to each household one 
occupation code out of more than 100 available. In order to do so, the enumerator lists 
all the occupations of all household members during the year preceding the interview. 
The respondent is then invited to indicate the occupation, among those listed, that 
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provided the largest amount of income during the previous year. In the case where two 
or more occupations were equally important in terms of income, the occupation of the 
most senior member of the household is chosen as the household occupation. This 
classification is preferable to that of the NSSO for its simplicity, and because it allows 
the respondent to indicate the class to which the household belongs. 
 
Another important classification employed by this study is the distinction between 
irrigated and non-irrigated farms, and between labour employed in irrigated and non-
irrigated areas. In building separate samples of irrigated and non-irrigated farms, a 
complication arises from the fact that the land of irrigated farms is irrigated in different 
proportions. While land is entirely irrigated in some farms, the majority of farms are 
only partially irrigated. Restricting the category of irrigated farms only to those with 
100% of the land irrigated is not appropriate, because large farms with only a fraction of 
their land irrigated may have, in absolute terms, larger areas of irrigated land than small 
farms that are 100% irrigated. Therefore all farms with irrigated land, however small, 
are considered as irrigated for the purpose of this study. In order to build separate 
samples of labourers in irrigated and non-irrigated areas, villages with 100% of 
cultivated land irrigated are defined as irrigated villages. This definition is arbitrary 
because, as in the case of the identification of irrigated farms, villages with a smaller 
share of irrigated land might have a larger absolute irrigated land. However, if all 
villages with any share of irrigated land were considered irrigated areas, almost all 
villages in the survey would be classified as such. Therefore a more conservative 
definition of irrigated areas has been adopted for the purpose of this study. 
 
In the empirical part of the chapter a distinction will be made between irrigated and non 
irrigated farms and between agricultural labourers from irrigated and non irrigated 
villages. Farms are considered as irrigated if any share of any size of cultivated land is 
irrigated by any means at the time of the survey interview. Agricultural labourers are 
considered as living in irrigated villages if 100% of cultivated land reported in the 
survey is irrigated in the cluster of residence. Table 3.11 shows the percentages of 
farmers and of agricultural labourers in the sample, and the share of each category that 
has access to irrigation. Farmers account for about 25% of the rural population, and 
between 65% and 75% of the farms are irrigated. These figures are only apparently in 
contradiction with the much smaller share of total irrigated land in the state (40%), 
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because this is a sub-sample of farmers who have chosen farming as their main 
economic activity, and because the share of farms with some irrigation in a given area 
may exceed the share of total irrigated land in the same area.  
 
Table 3.11 Percentages of farmers and agricultural labourers  
 43
rd
 
round 
50
th
 
round 
55
th
 
round 
61
st
 
round 
Farmers 25.8 26.7 24.4 26.9 
of which with irrigation  77.6 70.2 66.4 66.2 
Labourers 40.8 43.3 45.6 37.6 
of which in irrigated villages 18.0 20.8 29.9 25.8 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
3.5.3 Rainfall and agricultural seasons 
Dividing the calendar year in agricultural seasons is not a simple task. First, the 
different regions of Andhra Pradesh are affected by the two monsoons at different times 
and with varying intensity. Second, households cultivate a multiplicity of crops that 
have different production cycles. Possibly, the best way to define agricultural seasons is 
considering the most important rains in the majority of the state and the cropping pattern 
of paddy rice, the dominant crop, along with some other important crops. This leads to 
the identification of three agricultural seasons (Kharif, Rabi and summer). This section 
discusses how these three seasons fit in the four-season classification adopted by the 
NSSO. 
 
The southwest monsoon is the most important source of rainfall for Andhra Pradesh, 
bringing more than 75% of total annual rainfall. Rains of the northeast monsoon are not 
only less abundant, but also more erratic. As already mentioned, the two monsoons give 
rise to the two cropping season of Kharif and Rabi. The amount of rainfall in each 
season determines the area sown by farmers and the agricultural yields. Therefore, 
Kharif is the most important agricultural season in all areas of Andhra Pradesh. 
 
Rice is mostly planted in the period between May and June, and harvested between 
November and December. Depending on rains, and on the availability of irrigation, a 
second crop is possible in Rabi, with sowing in the months of December and January, 
and harvesting between April and May. Harvesting of main cash crops like groundnut, 
castor, cotton, sugarcane and chilli takes place in the months between November and 
131 
 
  
March. Occasionally a summer season is possible, in which jowar (sorghum), 
vegetables, and summer pulses are produced between March and June. The NSSO data 
subdivide the agricultural year in four trimesters from July to June of the following 
calendar year. The first trimester of the NSSO data is exclusively sowing time. No 
income is generated by farmers during this time, while agricultural labourers earn wages 
for planting operations. In the second trimester harvesting begins for rice and other cash 
crops, while Rabi sowing takes place with the arrival of the northeast monsoon. In the 
third trimester, the harvesting of Kharif rice continues and the harvesting of Rabi rice 
and of the most important cash crops take place. The fourth trimester may see the 
continuation of harvesting of Rabi rice and cash crops, and possibly of summer crops. 
Table 3.12 shows the distribution of seasonal agricultural activities according to the 
seasonal classification of the NSSO. 
 
Table 3.12 Agricultural activities by season and main crop 
 Rice Cash crops Other crops 
Jul-Sep Sowing Sowing Sowing 
Oct-Dec Kharif harvesting 
begins/ Rabi sowing 
Harvesting 
begins/Rabi sowing 
Harvesting 
Jan-Mar Kharif harvesting 
continues/ Rabi 
harvesting 
Kharif harvesting 
continues/ Rabi 
harvesting 
Harvesting 
Apr-Jun Rabi harvesting 
continues 
Rabi harvesting 
continues 
Summer harvesting 
for irrigated dry 
crops and summer 
pulses 
 
Since agricultural incomes are shaped by agricultural seasons, and since household 
consumption tracks income to some extent, the passing of seasons is discernible in 
household consumption patterns. Figure 3.4 shows the average value of the logarithm of 
per adult equivalent expenditure of rural households by season. The charts were 
produced using data from all four survey rounds, normalising sampling weights to one 
within each survey and adjusting expenditure values across survey rounds using the 
official CPIAL of Andhra Pradesh. The expenditure values within each survey were 
adjusted for temporal and regional price differences using the methodology described in 
Section 3.4.2. Averages are shown separately for agricultural labourers and farmers. 
The following can be observed. First, seasonal expenditure fluctuations are rather small. 
The lines on the graph are in logarithmic scale, so that the numerical difference between 
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two points is a percentage difference. The maximum variation over the year does not 
exceed 10%, and the difference between contiguous seasons never exceeds 7%. Second, 
there are some visible seasonal patterns. Expenditure is larger in the second half of the 
year when most of the harvesting is taking place. Third, farmers have much higher 
average expenditures than labourers (up to 30-40% higher). Fourth, labourers’ 
expenditure fluctuations are slightly flatter than those of farmers.  
 
Figure 3.4 Seasonal consumption of agricultural labourers and farmers 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
3.6 Econometric methods 
The empirical analysis for this study estimates the difference in seasonal consumption 
between households (farmers and agricultural labourers) with and without access to 
irrigation. After adjusting for regional and temporal variation in prices, estimates of the 
seasonal difference in consumption patterns can be obtained in the following way: 
 
iirrirrirr
j
jiji essssssZbac   432432       (3.22) 
 
Household’ consumption (ci) is a function of a set of control variables (Zj), and dummy 
variables for three seasons (the first season is omitted) for the non-irrigated sample (s) 
and the irrigated sample (sirr). This specification is used to test the difference of seasonal 
consumption patterns of households with and without access to irrigation. 
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The empirical analysis also provides estimates of the effect of expected income 
variability on current consumption as it was modelled in Section 3.3.3 (equation 3.17). 
Assuming that seasonal preferences, time preferences, and interest rates are the same for 
irrigated and non-irrigated farms, the difference in consumption between households 
with and without irrigation in any season will depend on income in that season and the 
expectation of income in the following season. The empirical analysis uses current 
rainfall (r) to approximate current and expected income, and the historical variation in 
rainfall (ζr) in order to approximate the variability of expected income. The model 
estimated is: 
 
i
j
irrsrirrirrirrsrjijs egrdgdrZbac    )1()1(      (3.23) 
 
where cs is household expenditure in the current season, while )1( sr  is expected 
income variability in the following season. The subscript irr tells whether the household 
has access to irrigation. The choice of the seasons in the empirical implementation of 
the model, and the construction of the rainfall variables is described in Section 3.7.1. 
 
Both specifications of the model (3.22 and 3.23) suffer from two endogeneity problems. 
There is endogeneity in the availability or access to irrigation, and in the occupational 
choice of farming or working as wage labour. The first form of endogeneity overstates 
the impact of irrigation on consumption, while the second tends to understate the impact 
of irrigation. These two endogeneity issues are now discussed in turn for farmers and 
agricultural labourers separately. 
 
Whether a farm is irrigated or not is largely endogenous. Irrigation might be considered 
exogenous if it were provided to farms by area only, as in the case of canal irrigation. 
Even in this case however, it could be regarded as endogenous to the extent that some 
farmers, with specific characteristics, might choose to buy or might inherit land in 
irrigated areas. Moreover, some farmers, for example the most influential and powerful, 
might have access to irrigation in irrigated areas while others in the same areas do not. 
Even allocation of irrigation by area could be endogenous, if irrigation investments are 
made in areas where incomes are already more stable than elsewhere. This might be the 
case if canal irrigation is provided to areas that are already better off in terms of 
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geographic characteristics and infrastructure (Palmer-Jones and Sen, 2003). More 
serious endogeneity problems arise if farmers irrigate their farms using water pumps, 
because farmers investing in water pumps are likely to be different from other poorer 
farmers with respect to many other characteristics. In particular, farmers with water 
pumps might not be liquidity constrained. Although the results of the theoretical model 
of Section 3.3 hold even in the absence of borrowing constraints, it might be argued that 
these farmers have more assets that can be sold in bad times, such as seasonal 
downturns.
20
 In all these cases, the endogeneity of irrigation implies an overestimation 
of the impact of irrigation on consumption stability, as the stabilising role of other 
factors is erroneously attributed to irrigation. 
 
The occupational choice of farming is largely endogenous. Seasonal consumption is a 
function of expected income and of its variance. The variance of future income 
however, is not fully independent of water availability. This is true both in dry and wet 
areas. In dry areas households make production choices to reduce income instability. 
They may have multiple income sources, and grow a more diversified range of crops in 
order to reduce total output variability. Conversely, households in wet areas may 
specialise in farming and in the production of a limited number of crops. Indeed, earlier 
studies on the impact of the green revolution pointed to a potential increase in income 
instability rather than a decrease (Hazell, 1984). In this case the impact of irrigation on 
income and consumption stability is underestimated, because households in irrigated 
areas may specialise in more risky enterprises, while dry farms diversify their mix of 
activities and crops in order to reduce the variance of future income.  
 
Agricultural labourers’ choices of residence and occupation are also endogenous 
because they are associated to characteristics that are correlated with per capita 
expenditure patterns. Household location in irrigated or non-irrigated villages was 
nevertheless considered exogenous. This implies that the village of residence of an 
agricultural labour household is independent of that village being irrigated. This in turns 
                                                 
20
 On the other hand, the theoretical model of Section 3.3.3 shows that irrigation makes farmers less self-
liquidity constrained, in the sense that having higher expectations about future income, allows them to 
more easily borrow without fearing inability to repay. An example of this behaviour is a farmer who 
borrows money from a trader in Kharif with the assurance of returning rice in Rabi, an option that is not 
so easily available to a non-irrigated farm. In this way irrigation makes farmers less credit constrained. 
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rules out migration from non-irrigated villages to irrigated ones, or postulates that 
migrants are not substantially different in characteristics from non-migrants. Though 
both hypotheses are rather untenable, they were nevertheless maintained for two main 
reasons. First, migration from irrigated to non-irrigated areas is limited. As mentioned 
in Section 2.4.1, data from the population census of Andhra Pradesh (Office of the 
Director of Census Operations, 2005) show that only 6% of the total population lives in 
a district different from the district of birth. It might be objected that this does not 
prevent labourers from migrating from dry to irrigated villages within districts. The 
truth is that very little is known about rural to rural migration in Andhra Pradesh. The 
qualitative evidence available supports the hypothesis that this type of migration is 
limited, though seasonal migration to irrigated areas can be substantial (Gopal, 2004). 
The second reason for maintaining this hypothesis is that the choice of residence is very 
hard to model with the limited number of variables available in the NSSO data. The 
consumption model of agricultural labourers therefore is only adjusted for the selection 
bias produced by the choice of occupation, but not for the choice of residence. 
 
In order to overcome these endogeneity problems, a variation of the Roy model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) was used for the econometric analysis. In the classical 
Heckman selection model the dependent variable is observed only for a sub-sample of 
the total number of observations, for example wages among the female labour force. In 
our model however, the dependent variable (household expenditure) is observed for all 
the observations, but under two states that are mutually exclusive: the irrigated and the 
non-irrigated farms. A selection bias arises because the choice of the state (irrigation) is 
correlated with the outcome (consumption pattern). The same household cannot be 
observed under the two states and the selection bias needs to be corrected in order to be 
able to compare the two groups. 
 
The version of the Roy model adopted here is the one Maddala (1983) defines ‘the 
switching regression model with endogenous switching’. The sample of irrigated and 
non-irrigated farmers will provide an illustrative example. A latent variable Ii
*
 
determines whether the farm is irrigated (Ii=1) or non-irrigated (Ii=0) depending on 
certain Z characteristics: 
 
136 
 
  
1iI   if   ii uZ           (3.24) 
0iI   if   ii uZ   
 
The consumption model for the irrigated and non-irrigated farms takes the following 
form: 
 
Irrigated farms:  iii uXc 111    if and only if  ii uZ    (3.25) 
Non-irrigated farms:  iii uXc 222    if and only if  ii uZ   
 
What is needed is the estimation of the expected values of the residuals u1i and u2i, 
which can be obtained in the following way: 
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The expected residuals are then substituted in the original equations. In order to simplify 
the substitution two new variables are defined (the inverse Mill’s ratios): 
 
 
 i
i
i
Z
Z
W



1            (3.27) 
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Then the original equations can be rewritten including the inverse Mill’s ratios and be 
estimated using OLS: 
 
iiuii WXc 111111    for 1iI        (3.28) 
iiuii WXc 222222    for 0iI  
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The estimation can be performed in two steps. First an estimate of the parameters  is 
obtained using a probit model on all observations. The parameters  are used to 
calculate the values of W1i and W2i, for each group of observations separately. Second, 
two equations, one for each group, are estimated separately by OLS including the 
inverse Mill’s ratios. 
 
An additional complication arises in the estimation of the iZ  in the farmers’ model, 
because the irrigated farms are a sub-sample of the total number of farms, and the 
sample of farms is the result of an occupational decision that is correlated with the 
outcome. Therefore, two selection equations were formulated; one for households that 
have farming as their main income generating activity, and the other for the sub-sample 
of irrigated farmers within the sample of farmers. 
 
11 I   if   111 uZ    for the irrigated farms    (3.29) 
12 I   if   222 uZ    for the farmers 
 
The probability of being a farm and of being irrigated is therefore the product of two 
probabilities: 
 
     221121 0,0Pr ZZIIob          (3.30) 
 
This is a sequential choice model, where first households choose their main occupation 
(farming or other), and then choose whether to irrigate their farms or not. The likelihood 
function of the sequential decision model takes the form (see Maddala, 1983, p 280): 
 
          
 

1 0
22112211
21 21
1
II II
ZZZZL       (3.31) 
 
The simultaneous estimation of the two probit equations above (3.29) with maximum 
likelihood provides the parameters values required for the calculation of W1i and W2i. 
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3.7 Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the estimation of the causal effects of irrigation on 
consumption patterns of rural households. Two models are estimated. The first 
compares consumption patterns of households with and without access to irrigation. The 
second assesses the effect of income variability, measured by rainfall variability, on 
consumption decisions of households with and without irrigation. The econometric 
methods used to address issues of endogeneity and selection bias are presented in detail. 
The analysis is conducted both over seasons and years, and for farmers and agricultural 
labourers separately. 
3.7.1 Seasonal consumption of farmers and agricultural labourers 
There are substantial differences between expenditure of irrigated and non-irrigated 
farms, and between labourers of irrigated and non-irrigated villages, both in terms of the 
levels and seasonal patterns. Figure 3.5 shows per capita equivalent expenditure of 
farmers and agricultural labourers by season. Expenditure of households with access to 
irrigation is higher in all seasons, and the difference is particularly large between 
irrigated and non-irrigated farmers. For both farmers and agricultural labourers, 
expenditure is higher in the second part of the year. Expenditure of farmers seems to 
follow agricultural output, with consumption picking up in the second season and 
reaching its maximum in the third season. The seasonal pattern of agricultural labour 
households is less clear. Overall, the seasonal expenditure pattern of irrigated farms and 
labourers living in irrigated villages appears smoother. The consumption patterns of 
farmers and labourers with and without access to irrigation will now be analysed with 
regression analysis, and the statistical significance of these differences will be tested. 
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Figure 3.5 Seasonal consumption of agricultural labourers and farmers with and 
without irrigation 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Farmers 
Using the econometric model described in Section 3.6, separate regressions of equation 
3.22, where run for samples of households operating irrigated and non-irrigated farms. 
The dependent variable in the regressions is the logarithm of per capita expenditure. 
Demographic effects are accounted for by including, among the regressors, the 
logarithm of household size and the ratios of five age groups by sex. The age groups 
are: children under five, children between the age of five and 13, children between the 
age of 14 and 17, adults from 18 to 59 years of age, and elderly of 60 years of age and 
over. Education of the head of household and spouse are included. When either of the 
two was not part of the household, the education of the person closest in age and of the 
same sex was used. The education level was divided in the following categories: 
illiterate, up to primary, middle, up to secondary, and higher education (graduate, post-
graduate and equivalent). Other regressors include the logarithm of the size of land 
cultivated during the agricultural year in acres, dummy variables for each of the 23 
administrative districts, and dummy variables for the four survey rounds. The different 
seasons of the agricultural year are included in the form of dummy variables. Each 
regression is adjusted by a selection term obtained in the way described in Section 3.6. 
The selection term is used to adjust the selection bias produced by the endogeneity of 
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sub-sampling farmers within the rural sample of households, and further sub-sampling 
irrigated farms within the sub-sample of farmers. Both the choice of operating a farm 
and the opportunity to irrigate a farm are associated to characteristics that are correlated 
with per capita expenditure. The selection term is obtained by the simultaneous 
estimation with maximum likelihood of two probit models. Tables 3.13 and 3.14, show 
the probit selection equations for the farming choice, and the irrigation choice 
separately.  
 
In the selection equation for the farming choice, the dependent variable is equal to one if 
farming is the most important production activity for the household. The selection 
equation must explain the household’s decision to farm, using at least some variables 
that are not included in the final equation to be estimated. As the NSSO surveys are not 
particularly rich in non-expenditure data, the scope for building strong choice models is 
limited. The selection equation includes land owned by the household measured in acres 
among the regressors. The land may or may not be cultivated, as there is a sizeable lease 
market for land in rural Andhra Pradesh. Belonging to a scheduled caste or tribe is 
included because occupation in Andhra Pradesh is largely determined by caste. In 
particular, there is a strong correlation between agricultural labour work and scheduled 
caste. The historical average rainfall in the two cropping seasons (Kharif and Rabi) at 
the district level is included to account for environmental conditions more favourable to 
farming. Finally, the regression includes dummies for the four survey rounds. 
 
Table 3.13 First selection equation: farming choice 
Variable Coefficient St. error 
Land owned 0.716*** 0.012 
Age of head of household 0.005*** 0.001 
Scheduled caste -0.499*** 0.039 
Scheduled tribe 0.180*** 0.052 
Mean Kharif rainfall 0.001*** 0.000 
Mean Rabi rainfall 0.001*** 0.000 
50
th
 round (1993-94) 0.099** 0.037 
55
th
 round (1999-00) 0.129** 0.039 
61
st
 round (2004-05) 0.081* 0.043 
Constant -1.963*** 0.137 
Observations 21302  
F-statistic 464.2  
P-value 0.000  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%,  
***statistical significance at 1%. 
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The second selection equation explains whether the farm is irrigated or not. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the farm is irrigated. Farm irrigation is largely 
explained by the geographical location of the households (district dummies), because 
there is a large variation among districts in terms of access to canal water. Second, 
irrigation is explained by the availability of electricity at the household level, because 
water pumps are normally powered by electricity and the government of Andhra 
Pradesh has for long subsidised water extraction providing electricity free of charge to 
rural households. Other explanatory variables include the size of land owned by the 
household, and four dummies for the survey rounds. The results of this probit regression 
are shown in Table 3.14. 
 
Table 3.14 Second selection equation: farm irrigation 
Variable Coefficient St. error 
Land owned 0.032*** 0.009 
Electricity 0.365*** 0.063 
Vizianagaram 0.444** 0.173 
East Godavari  0.453** 0.170 
West Godavari  0.854*** 0.179 
Krishna  0.950*** 0.223 
Guntur  0.229 0.169 
Prakasam -0.196 0.171 
Nellore  0.527** 0.190 
Chittor 0.189 0.157 
Cuddapah -0.026 0.204 
Anantapur -0.092 0.153 
Kurnool  -0.408** 0.171 
Mahaboobnagar -0.265* 0.148 
Rangareddy -0.091 0.169 
Medak 0.540** 0.196 
Nizamabad 0.616** 0.197 
Adilabad -0.999*** 0.180 
Karimnagar 0.629*** 0.176 
Warangal  0.510** 0.163 
Khamman 0.050 0.179 
Nalgonda 0.237 0.167 
50
th
 round (1993-94) -0.323*** 0.080 
55
th
 round (1999-00) -0.508*** 0.086 
61
st
 round (2004-05) -0.751*** 0.086 
Constant 0.388** 0.123 
Observations 6454  
F-statistic 13.0  
P-value 0.000  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%,  
***statistical significance at 1%. 
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The selection term obtained through the simultaneous estimation of the two selection 
equations is included in the estimation of equation (3.22), which tests the difference 
between seasonal consumption patterns of irrigated and non-irrigated farms. Table 3.15 
contains the estimated coefficients, including the seasonal coefficients that test the 
significance of the patterns observed in Figure 3.5. The R-squares of the regressions are 
large (more than 70% of the total variance is explained), and most variables are highly 
significant, including the selection terms obtained through the selection equations. None 
of the seasonal dummies is significant in the regression of the irrigated farms, while two 
largely significant values were found in the regression of the non-irrigated farms. A 
seasonal pattern of consumption seems to emerge among households operating non-
irrigated farms. Consumption is higher in the second and third seasons of the 
agricultural year. This conforms to theoretical expectations, as these are the seasons in 
which most of the agricultural output is realised through the Kharif and Rabi harvesting. 
The size of the consumption fluctuation however is not very large; its maximum 
fluctuation reaches the value of 11% between the first and the third seasons. 
 
According to the theoretical model outlined in Section 3.3.3 (equation 3.17), the 
difference in seasonal consumption between irrigated and non-irrigated farms depends 
on both current and expected income. Irrigation reduces the variability of expected 
income caused by rainfall variability and irrigated farmers consume more both because 
they have higher income and because they make less precautionary savings. This 
hypothesis is tested in the following empirical analysis using rainfall as a predictor of 
expected income. 
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Table 3.15 Seasonal effects on consumption of farmers 
Variables Irrigated farms Non-irrigated farms 
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Scheduled caste -0.145*** 0.026 -0.082* 0.045 
Scheduled tribe -0.138*** 0.041 -0.205*** 0.042 
Age of head of household 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001 
Female children from 0 to 5 -0.078 0.115 -0.056 0.132 
Male children from 5 to 10 0.120 0.086 0.155 0.133 
Female children from 5 to 10 0.191** 0.086 0.106 0.132 
Male children from 10 to 15 0.314*** 0.094 0.434*** 0.140 
Female children from 10 to 15 0.298*** 0.091 0.394** 0.157 
Adult male 0.498*** 0.091 0.394** 0.129 
Adult female 0.409*** 0.098 0.313** 0.148 
Elderly male 0.302*** 0.108 0.081 0.186 
Elderly female 0.155 0.104 0.241 0.153 
Logarithm of household size -0.338*** 0.021 -0.329*** 0.033 
Education of head of household 0.078*** 0.009 0.050*** 0.016 
Education of spouse of head of 
household 0.030** 0.013 0.087*** 0.028 
Logarithm of cultivated land 0.095*** 0.011 0.030* 0.018 
2
nd
 season (Oct-Dec) -0.020 0.021 0.060** 0.034 
3
rd
 season (Jan-Mar) 0.024 0.022 0.114*** 0.037 
4
th
 season (Apr-Jun) 0.020 0.021 0.032 0.037 
Vizianagaram -0.161*** 0.045 -0.034 0.095 
Vishakhapatnam -0.042 0.066 0.147* 0.084 
East Godavari -0.035 0.055 -0.079 0.097 
West Godavari -0.126** 0.049 -0.307** 0.128 
Krishna -0.234*** 0.051 -0.445*** 0.139 
Guntur -0.318*** 0.046 -0.273*** 0.074 
Prakasam -0.097* 0.054 0.059 0.076 
Nellore -0.278*** 0.060 -0.555*** 0.089 
Chittor -0.286*** 0.050 -0.389*** 0.091 
Cuddapah -0.272*** 0.052 -0.161** 0.072 
Anantapur -0.245*** 0.050 -0.241*** 0.076 
Kurnool -0.189** 0.061 0.048 0.074 
Mahaboobnagar -0.074 0.051 0.102 0.077 
Rangareddy -0.067 0.069 -0.016 0.069 
Medak -0.305*** 0.046 -0.349*** 0.079 
Nizamabad -0.181*** 0.051 -0.350*** 0.064 
Adilabad 0.350** 0.113 0.305** 0.103 
Karimnagar -0.194*** 0.047 -0.450*** 0.086 
Warangal -0.155** 0.049 -0.099 0.098 
Khamman 0.048 0.069 0.261** 0.091 
Nalgonda -0.203*** 0.047 -0.019 0.084 
Urban area 0.168*** 0.043 0.253* 0.139 
50
th
 round (1993-94) 0.644*** 0.024 0.837*** 0.045 
55
th
 round (1999-00) 1.301*** 0.036 1.639*** 0.063 
61
st
 round (2004-05) 1.235*** 0.022 1.380*** 0.038 
Selection term -0.501*** 0.092 0.510*** 0.077 
Constant 9.827*** 0.107 8.474*** 0.256 
Observations 4572  1654  
R-square 0.73  0.72  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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Figure 3.6 shows the rainfall deviations from the historical average of the southwest 
monsoon (Kharif season) and northeast monsoon (Rabi season) for the period from 
1960 to 2007. Rains of the northeast monsoon are more erratic than those of the 
southwest monsoon, showing higher and lower peaks in the series. Droughts, defined as 
deviations of more than 20% below the historical mean, are rather frequent. Drought 
conditions might also be concealed by these series, as the duration of dry spells and the 
arrival time of the monsoon also matter. Excessive rains may also have a negative 
impact on agricultural production, and a large positive deviation from the mean is not 
necessarily good. The marks on the series plotted in the chart correspond to the NSSO 
survey years used in this study. None of the four rounds was a particularly good year. 
The 55
th
 and 61
st
 rounds qualify as drought years, while the 43
rd
 and the 50
th
 rounds had 
bad Kharif rains, though these were partially compensated by good Rabi rains 
particularly in the 43
rd
 round. 
 
Figure 3.6 Rainfall deviations from the historical average in Andhra Pradesh 
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Note: marks on the series represent the four NSSO survey rounds used in this study. 
Source: indiastat. 
 
A version of the model in equation (3.23) was run separately for samples of irrigated 
and non-irrigated farmers in order to assess the effect of expected income variability on 
consumption patterns. Income expectations are modelled using the deviations of Kharif 
and Rabi rainfall from their historical average, the square of these deviations, and the 
historical variability of Rabi rains. Two models are estimated. The first includes only 
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observations recorded in the season from July to September during Kharif rains. This 
corresponds to the final part of the lean season for farmers when planting takes place. 
The second model restricts the sample to observations collected between October and 
December, which is the period corresponding to Kharif harvesting and Rabi rains. The 
rainfall variables used will now be described in more detail, before proceeding to 
discussing the results. 
 
The rainfall deviations are the percent deviations of total rainfall at the district level 
during the periods June-September (Kharif rains) and October-December (Rabi rains) 
over the average rainfall during the period from 1961 to 2005. Rainfall deviations affect 
the area sown by farmers in both Kharif and Rabi. In addition they help forming 
farmers’ expectations regarding income of the following season, and therefore also 
affect current consumption. The squares of rainfall deviations are included in the 
regressions for two reasons. First, the positive impact of rainfall on consumption may be 
non-linear. Second, excessive rains may damage crops. According to data provided by 
the Ministry of Agriculture of Andhra Pradesh, heavy rains affected large numbers of 
households and districts in all years between 1987 and 2000 with the exception of 
drought years. The historical variability of Rabi rains is the coefficient of variation of 
Rabi rainfall at the district level over the period from 1961 to 2005. In order to avoid 
collinearity with the district dummies included in the regression, the coefficient of 
variation is calculated in each survey rounds over the ten years preceding the survey. 
This variable provides an indicator of the variability of future income, and the larger 
this variability, the lower is consumption in the current period because farmers save for 
precautionary reasons. In other words, farmers operating in districts where rainfall 
variability is higher, are forced to set aside some of the current income to prevent the 
effects of shortfalls in future consumption. This variable provides an exogenous 
variation in the variability of agricultural output across districts. The within-district 
response to this variability by irrigated and non irrigated farms is the object of the 
investigation. Irrigated farmers exposed to the same rainfall variability as non-irrigated 
ones are expected to save less for precautionary reasons, because the same variability in 
rainfall represents different variability of agricultural output.   
 
Table 3.16 shows the coefficient values, and the standard errors of the rainfall variables 
included in the model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita household 
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expenditure, and the explanatory variables are the same included in the model of Table 
3.15, with the exception of the seasonal dummies, which were not included here. 
Rainfall deviations do not show an impact on current consumption in the period July-
October for neither farm category. When the model is run only for the observations 
collected in the period October-December, rainfall deviations have a positive coefficient 
because good rains predict higher future income thus stimulating current consumption, 
while the squares of the deviations have negative coefficients presumably because they 
reflect the negative impact of heavy rains on output. Expenditure by households in the 
non-irrigated sample show higher responsiveness to current rainfall, as the estimated 
coefficient is 50% larger than the coefficient estimated for the irrigated sample. Finally, 
Rabi rainfall variability has a slightly significant negative effect on expenditure of non-
irrigated farms, but no effect on expenditure of irrigated ones. 
 
Table 3.16 Rainfall effects on seasonal consumption of farmers 
Season July to September 
 Irrigated farms Non-irrigated farms 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation -0.169 0.231 -0.677 0.539 
Rainfall deviation squared -0.268 0.489 -1.941* 1.020 
Rabi rainfall variability 0.001 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 
Selection term -0.715*** 0.174 0.843*** 0.221 
Observations 1163  449  
R-square 0.51  0.44  
     
Season October to December 
 Irrigated farms Non-irrigated farms 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation 0.180** 0.059 0.269*** 0.076 
Rainfall deviation squared -0.132*** 0.034 -0.141* 0.066 
Selection term -0.871** 0.178 0.762** 0.213 
Observations 1132  389  
R-square 0.46  0.57  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
 
These results suggest that rainfall deviations do affect current consumption in Rabi but 
not in Kharif. The effect is larger in Rabi than in Kharif because historically Rabi rains 
are more erratic than Kharif rains, and therefore cause larger fluctuations in agricultural 
output from its expected value. The size of the rainfall effect in Rabi is larger for non-
irrigated farms than for irrigated farms, because expectations regarding future income 
are more related to current rainfall for non-irrigated farms than for irrigated ones. 
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Finally, the historical variability of Rabi rainfall has a modest negative effect on 
consumption of non-irrigated farms in the period July-September. Rabi rainfall 
variability has no effect on consumption of irrigated farms because irrigation reduces 
the variance of future expected income, and therefore reduces the precautionary motive 
for saving.  
 
Agricultural labourers 
The same empirical models used for farmers were used for agricultural labourers. 
Separate regressions of the model of equation (3.22) were run for agricultural labourers 
working in irrigated and non-irrigated villages. The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of per capita expenditure, while the explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 
3.15.
21
 The regression includes a selection term obtained by estimating a probit model 
of the choice of working as agricultural labourer against a set of explanatory variables. 
The standard two-step Heckman procedure was used. The inverse Mill’s ratio from the 
probit regression for the occupational choice was calculated and included in the OLS 
regression. Agricultural labourers’ location in irrigated or non-irrigated areas was 
considered exogenous.  
 
The agricultural labour occupation is strongly correlated with belonging to one of the 
scheduled castes, which reflects the high stratification of the workforce by social group 
in rural Andhra Pradesh (see Table 3.17). Education is negatively correlated to 
agricultural labour work, as is the size of cultivated land. Remoteness, represented by 
the absence of electricity and the use of traditional fuel for cooking, and location in 
highly irrigated districts explains a large part of the choice of joining the agricultural 
labour force. 
 
The results of the estimation of model 3.22 for agricultural labourers are presented in 
Table 3.18. Most variables in the regression are highly significant, including the 
selection terms obtained through the selection equation, and the R-squares are large. 
None of the seasonal dummies are significant for labourers working in irrigated 
villages, while two highly significant values are found for those living in non-irrigated 
villages. For these households, consumption is higher in the third and fourth season of 
                                                 
21
 Due to the large number of landless households among agricultural labourers, the size of cultivated land 
is expressed in acres, and not in logarithms, as was the case for farmers. 
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the agricultural year. The size of the consumption fluctuation however is quite small. 
Consumption in the second half of the year appears to be 5% higher than in the first 
half. 
 
Table 3.17 Selection equation: agricultural labour choice 
Explanatory variables Coefficient St. error 
Scheduled caste 0.609*** 0.030 
Scheduled tribe 0.002 0.044 
Age of head of household -0.010*** 0.001 
Household size 0.009 0.007 
Education of head of household -0.347*** 0.019 
Education of spouse of head of household -0.142*** 0.029 
Land owned -0.511*** 0.024 
Land owned squared 0.005*** 0.000 
Electricity -0.388*** 0.028 
Traditional fuel 0.865*** 0.061 
Vizianagaram -0.106 0.078 
Vishakhapatnam -0.194** 0.080 
East Godavari 0.259*** 0.069 
West Godavari 0.222** 0.074 
Krishna 0.319*** 0.080 
Guntur 0.132* 0.070 
Prakasam 0.009 0.076 
Nellore -0.055 0.078 
Chittor 0.192** 0.072 
Cuddapah -0.061 0.084 
Anantapur 0.201** 0.078 
Kurnool 0.373*** 0.082 
Mahaboobnagar 0.349*** 0.074 
Rangareddy 0.105 0.088 
Medak 0.197** 0.079 
Nizamabad 0.040 0.082 
Adilabad 0.035 0.088 
Karimnagar 0.115 0.075 
Warangal 0.027 0.079 
Khamman 0.020 0.083 
Nalgonda 0.337*** 0.079 
50
th
 round (1993-94) 0.098*** 0.031 
55
th
 round (1999-00) 0.263*** 0.034 
61
st
 round (2004-05) 0.241*** 0.038 
Constant -0.336*** 0.094 
Observations 21302  
F statistic 72.7  
P-value 0.000  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
 
The smoother consumption pattern of agricultural labour in irrigated areas is a 
consequence of the effect of irrigation on labour demand. Irrigation increases labour 
demand for a number of reasons. First, it expands the net area cropped, as more land is 
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brought under cultivation. Second, irrigation may determine a shift from less labour 
demanding to more labour demanding crops. This is certainly the case in Andhra 
Pradesh, where irrigation promotes the cultivation of rice, which is labour demanding. 
Third, as yields increase, labour requirements per acre of land increase in particular for 
transplanting and harvesting. Irrigation has a stabilising effect on labour demand for two 
reasons. First, the introduction of double and triple cropping during the same 
agricultural year generates a more stable demand in the course of the year. Second, 
multiple cropping may produce a shift in the demand of labour from casual to 
permanent labour. 
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Table 3.18 Seasonal effects on consumption of agricultural labourers 
Explanatory variables Irrigated villages Non-irrigated villages 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Age of head of household -0.002*** 0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 
Female children from 0 to 5 -0.020 0.110 -0.015 0.055 
Male children from 5 to 10 0.293 0.103 0.192*** 0.050 
Female children from 5 to 10 0.297* 0.096 0.191*** 0.051 
Male children from 10 to 15 0.727 0.113 0.524*** 0.073 
Female children from 10 to 15 0.401 0.120 0.399*** 0.064 
Adult male 0.680* 0.101 0.629*** 0.054 
Adult female 0.446* 0.105 0.400*** 0.060 
Elderly male 0.591 0.120 0.457*** 0.073 
Elderly female 0.329 0.115 0.177** 0.070 
Logarithm of household size -0.264** 0.025 -0.234*** 0.017 
Education of head of household -0.008 0.016 0.000 0.010 
Education of spouse of head of 
household -0.010 0.020 0.009 0.014 
Land cultivated 0.183*** 0.030 0.011 0.011 
2
nd
 season (Oct-Dec) -0.022 0.023 -0.006 0.012 
3
rd
 season (Jan-Mar) 0.008 0.024 0.051*** 0.013 
4
th
 season (Apr-Jun) -0.023 0.024 0.046*** 0.012 
Vizianagaram -0.046 0.079 -0.063** 0.028 
Vishakhapatnam -0.038 0.057 -0.093** 0.031 
East Godavari 0.028 0.049 0.046 0.033 
West Godavari -0.011 0.049 0.076** 0.031 
Krishna -0.065 0.051 0.075** 0.033 
Guntur -0.242*** 0.057 -0.083** 0.030 
Prakasam -0.070 0.067 -0.073** 0.032 
Nellore -0.197*** 0.053 -0.111*** 0.034 
Chittor -0.144* 0.082 -0.213*** 0.031 
Cuddapah -0.189** 0.079 -0.155*** 0.037 
Anantapur -0.333*** 0.054 -0.117*** 0.031 
Kurnool -0.166* 0.090 -0.107*** 0.030 
Mahaboobnagar 0.080 0.100 -0.052* 0.027 
Rangareddy -0.325*** 0.080 -0.051 0.032 
Medak -0.056 0.089 -0.052* 0.029 
Nizamabad -0.029 0.076 -0.074** 0.034 
Adilabad -0.105* 0.059 -0.168*** 0.032 
Karimnagar -0.100* 0.058 -0.009 0.030 
Warangal -0.051 0.071 -0.027 0.032 
Khamman -0.002 0.074 -0.025 0.034 
Nalgonda -0.082 0.068 0.035 0.029 
50
th
 round (1993-94) -0.060** 0.028 0.056*** 0.013 
55
th
 round (1999-00) 0.097*** 0.027 0.124*** 0.012 
61
st
 round (2004-05) 0.079*** 0.026 0.103*** 0.014 
Selection term 0.602*** 0.127 0.614*** 0.070 
Constant 10.369*** 0.119 10.283*** 0.062 
Observations 1592  5750  
R-square 0.35  0.28  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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In keeping with the analysis performed for farmers, rainfall variables were introduced in 
the model and two samples were constructed with observations of the first and the 
second trimester of the agricultural year. Rainfall deviations however, take on different 
meaning in the model for agricultural labourers compared to the farmers’ model. 
Rainfall deviations not only represent income expectations, but also current income, as 
labour demand varies with the amount of rainfall in the planting season. The coefficient 
of variation of Rabi rainfall variability represents, as it did for farmers, an 
approximation of the variability of future income, as districts where rainfall variability 
is higher show a higher variability in demand for labour in the harvesting season. 
 
Table 3.19 Rainfall effects on seasonal consumption of agricultural labourers 
Season July to September 
 Irrigated villages Non-irrigated villages 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation 0.552 0.568 0.648*** 0.207 
Rainfall deviation squared 0.841 1.078 1.189** 0.439 
Rabi rainfall variability -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Selection term 0.515* 0.267 0.631*** 0.117 
Observations 317  1497  
R-square 0.40  0.35  
     
Season October to December 
 Irrigated villages Non-irrigated villages 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation 0.035 0.086 0.083** 0.036 
Rainfall deviation squared -0.041 0.077 -0.045* 0.023 
Selection term 0.176 0.282 0.749*** 0.152 
Observations 439  1401  
R-square 0.48  0.29  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
 
The results from the estimation of these models are shown in Table 3.19. Rainfall 
deviations have a highly significant effect on consumption of labourers of non-irrigated 
villages, but no effects on labourers of irrigated villages in both periods considered. The 
size of the effect is larger in the months from July to September compared to the period 
from October to December. The square of the rainfall deviation is also positive and very 
large in non-irrigated villages. The square of the rainfall deviation has a large positive 
sign in the first trimester but a negative sign in the second. The latter is probably a 
reflection of the negative effect of heavy rains. No effect is found of the Rabi rainfall 
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variability on consumption in the first trimester by labourers in either irrigated or non-
irrigated villages. 
 
These results show that expenditure of labourers in non-irrigated villages is more 
responsive to current rainfall than consumption of labourers in irrigated villages. This 
response is either the result of higher current income or of higher expected income. 
Conversely, seasonal consumption of labourers of irrigated villages is not immediately 
affected by current and expected income. The absence of an effect of Rabi income 
variability on expenditure in the first trimester suggests that the precautionary motive 
for saving among both samples is not strong. 
3.7.2 Consumption of farmers and agricultural labourers over the years 
The impact of irrigation on consumption patterns of irrigated and non-irrigated farmers 
and agricultural labourers was also assessed over the four survey rounds. Expenditure is 
here measured in terms of annual expenditure using the data collected using the 365-day 
recall.
22
 Figure 3.7 presents average annual expenditure by occupational category and 
availability of irrigation over the four survey rounds. Expenditure of irrigated farms is 
higher in all survey rounds, and is also smoother than that of non-irrigated farms. 
Expenditure of labourers living in irrigated villages is higher than that of labourers 
living in non irrigated villages, with the exception of the second survey round, but it 
does not appear to be smoother. 
 
                                                 
22
 Food and high frequency non-food items are only reported using a 30-day recall. Monthly expenditure 
on these items was multiplied by 12, and therefore reflects in part the expenditure pattern of the season in 
which data were collected. 
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Figure 3.7 Average annual expenditure of agricultural labourers and farmers 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Tables 3.20 and 3.21 report the results of separate regressions of the logarithm of per 
capita expenditure for farmers and labourers with and without access to irrigation. The 
explanatory variables used in these regressions and the procedure adopted to correct the 
selection bias are the same used in the seasonal models. Instead of using seasonal 
dummies, these regressions estimate coefficients of dummies for the four survey rounds. 
Tables 3.20 and 3.21 report only the coefficients for the survey rounds and for the 
selection term. The sample of irrigated farmers seems to show a different consumption 
pattern, while the consumption pattern of labourers in irrigated and non-irrigated 
villages are very similar. 
 
  Table 3.20 Variation in farmers’ expenditure by survey round  
 Irrigated farms Non-irrigated farms 
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Agricultural year 1994-94 0.060*** 0.024 0.186*** 0.046 
Agricultural year 1999-00 0.112*** 0.045 0.265*** 0.046 
Agricultural year 2004-05 0.097*** 0.019 0.236*** 0.053 
Selection term -0.141** 0.069 0.064*** 0.018 
Observations 4416  1553  
R-square 0.41  0.43  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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Table 3.21 Variation in agricultural labourers’ expenditure by survey round 
 Irrigated villages Non-irrigated villages 
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Agricultural year 1994-94 -0.068** 0.033 0.048** 0.018 
Agricultural year 1999-00 0.075** 0.032 0.100*** 0.017 
Agricultural year 2004-05 0.060* 0.032 0.084*** 0.018 
Selection term 0.611*** 0.134 -0.387*** 0.051 
Observations 1592  5750  
R-square 0.35  0.28  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
 
Tables 3.22 and 3.23 report the results of regression models including rainfall variables. 
These models assess the effect of rainfall deviations on expenditure of households with 
and without irrigation. In order to do so, the samples are restricted to those households 
that were interviewed in the second half of the year (between January and June), and per 
capita expenditure is explained, among other variables, by rainfall deviations in the first 
half of the year (between July and December). Since most of the output is generated by 
the Kharif and Rabi crops, these rainfall deviations are strong predictors of annual 
income. 
 
Coefficients of rainfall deviations are larger for the sample of non-irrigated farms both 
in Kharif and Rabi. This result suggests that expenditure by non-irrigated farmers is 
more dependent on current year rains, and therefore on current income. The coefficients 
of rainfall deviations of the agricultural labourers’ regressions are more difficult to 
interpret. Expenditure of labourers in irrigated villages appears to be more responsive to 
income variations in Kharif, while the expenditure of labourers in non-irrigated villages 
is more responsive to income variations in Rabi. 
 
Table 3.22 Rainfall effects on annual consumption of farmers 
 Irrigated farms Non-irrigated farms 
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation (Kharif) 0.497** 0.246 0.696* 0.416 
Deviation squared (Kharif) 0.752 0.503 0.208 0.846 
Rainfall deviation (Rabi) 0.074* 0.044 0.182** 0.058 
Deviation squared (Rabi) -0.062** 0.029 -0.073** 0.036 
Selection term -0.025 0.080 0.061** 0.029 
Observations 2216  779  
R-square 0.41  0.46  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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Table 3.23 Rainfall effects on annual consumption of agricultural labourers 
 Irrigated villages Non-irrigated villages 
 Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Rainfall deviation (Kharif) 1.094** 0.420 0.508** 0.199 
Deviation squared (Kharif) 1.541* 0.938 0.521 0.424 
Rainfall deviation (Rabi) 0.069 0.079 0.099** 0.039 
Deviation squared (Rabi) 0.061 0.084 -0.074*** 0.024 
Selection term 0.802*** 0.182 -0.359*** 0.075 
Observations 836  2852  
R-square 0.37  0.28  
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
 
The analysis of the impact of irrigation on consumption over the four survey rounds has 
important data limitations. First, unlike the analysis of seasonal expenditure, in which 
the allocation of expenditure over seasons was considered within a utility maximisation 
model, the analysis of expenditure over the years cannot be explained within a model of 
consumption and saving behaviour. The reason is that the four survey rounds available 
are not contiguous, hence no sequential decision modelling can be designed. A second 
limitation is that data on many determinants of consumption over the years are missing. 
Government policies and agricultural prices, for example, may affect decisions of 
irrigated and non-irrigated farms differently over the years and should be included as 
explanatory variables. Due to these two limitations, the conclusions presented in this 
section should be taken with caution, and be considered more as a descriptive exercise 
rather than a rigorous analysis.  
3.8 Conclusions 
This chapter assessed whether irrigation has a stabilising effect on income and 
expenditure of rural households. By providing water to dry areas and during times when 
rainfall is scarce, irrigation has a stabilising role on agricultural production, both over 
seasons and years. Over the years, irrigation reduces the negative impact of droughts, 
while within a given year it allows two or more cropping seasons. An intertemporal 
consumption model over the seasonal production cycle was built, which incorporates a 
precautionary motive for saving. In this model, seasonal consumption tracks seasonal 
income, though some consumption smoothing takes place as households save in the 
harvest season in order to spend in the lean season. Irrigation has the effect of increasing 
expected income and reducing expected income variability. In the empirical section of 
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this chapter, seasonal consumption patterns and the effect of rainfall and rainfall 
variability on household expenditure were estimated using a Roy model. Separate 
regressions were run for farmers and agricultural labourers with and without access to 
irrigation. The main findings of the empirical analysis are as follows: 
 
 Consumption by households with access to irrigation is more stable over the 
seasonal cycle. Expenditure of farmers’ households without irrigation fluctuates 
up to 10% in the harvest season compared to the lean season. Expenditure of 
agricultural labourers living in non-irrigated areas fluctuates up to 5% in the 
harvest season compared to the lean season.  
 Consumption by farmer households with access to irrigation is less affected by 
the size of expected income. In the lean season, current rainfall does not affect 
expenditure of farmers either with or without irrigation. In the harvest season, 
current rainfall affects expenditure of farmers without irrigation considerably. 
 Consumption by agricultural labour households in areas without irrigation tracks 
income more closely. Current rainfall, representing labour demand for sowing 
and harvesting, increases consumption of agricultural labourers in non-irrigated 
areas, but has no effect on consumption of households in irrigated areas in both 
the lean and harvest seasons. 
 Consumption by households with access to irrigation is less affected by expected 
income variability, represented by historical rainfall variability. The effect is 
statistically significant for farmer households but not for agricultural labour 
households. This is tentative evidence of precautionary saving behaviour. 
 Consumption by households without irrigation is more unstable over the years 
and more affected by current rains. The results of the year-to-year analysis 
however must be taken with caution. 
These results suggest that irrigation, by reducing the costs of seasonality, generates 
public and private savings. The size of the reduction in seasonal costs however is not 
easy to quantify because of the difficulty of estimating the three costs of seasonality 
described in Section 3.2: the welfare cost, the coping cost, and the cost of seasonal 
crises.  
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Standard household surveys do not capture the occurrence of seasonal poverty traps. 
Irrigation prevents seasonal crises because it reduces the occurrence of severe seasonal 
shocks and distress sales. However, these effects are not noticed by household surveys 
if seasonal shocks result in family dissolution, death or migration. The NSSO surveys 
interview households found in rural areas, thus missing out households that migrated or 
disappeared in consequence of seasonal shocks. The fluctuations in income and 
consumption observed by household surveys are therefore limited to fluctuations that do 
not produce seasonal crises and that are relatively small. 
 
No reliable estimates of the welfare cost of seasonal fluctuations can be produced. The 
estimation of the welfare cost of consumption fluctuations requires data on consumers’ 
preferences and their attitudes toward risk. Some estimates of the rate of time preference 
(‘impatience’) and of the degree of risk aversion are available for rural India 
(Binswanger, 1981, Pender, 1996). However, the experiments performed are too few, 
and the methodologies employed too questionable to provide reliable estimates 
(Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).  
 
Problems of data availability and of empirical identification prevent the estimation of 
the cost of coping strategies. The expenditure data of the NSSO, as those of most 
household survey, do not contain information on household savings, and panel data 
covering the seasonal cycle are extremely rare. Households’ expectations of future 
income can be approximated by rainfall data, but rainfall data are a very imprecise 
measure of production risk. Finally, the empirical estimation of precautionary savings is 
a lively area of research and no consensus has been reached on how it should be 
performed (Carroll and Kimball, 2007).  
 
While the present study cannot directly quantify the costs of seasonality and the benefits 
of irrigation, it does provide qualitative evidence of the fact that a) rural households 
without access to irrigation are not fully able to insure against seasonal fluctuations, and 
that b) households save for precautionary reasons. Both effects were found to be not 
very large. There are two possible explanations for the relatively small effect of the 
seasonal cycle on household expenditure: market development, and the operation of 
other smoothing mechanisms. These two explanations will now be discussed in turn. 
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It is unlikely that a rise in rural income may be responsible for a reduction in 
households’ vulnerability to seasonal fluctuations. Over the last 25 years Andhra 
Pradesh has experienced a considerable increase in incomes. However, as shown in 
Chapter 2, this did not result in a reduction in the share of income produced in 
agriculture, which is the income component more sensitive to seasonal fluctuations. Nor 
there is evidence of a significant development of financial markets that justifies an 
increase in households ability to save and borrow (Pradhan et al., 2003). 
 
It is more plausible that state interventions have helped households to smooth 
consumption fluctuations. Andhra Pradesh runs a policy of price support that stabilises 
incomes over the seasonal cycle by smoothing price fluctuations (Jairath, 2000). The 
state also runs an expensive programme of public distribution of food. In spite of 
serious inefficiencies, this programme provides most households with staple food at a 
fixed price over the year (Dutta and Ramaswami, 2001, Ravi and Indrakant, 2003). 
More recently the state also started a programme, the Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
which guarantees 100 days of employment to all requesting rural households (Devereux 
et al., 2008) and also some crop and weather insurance programmes on an experimental 
basis (Sinha, 2004, Vyas and Singh, 2006). Devereux et al. (2008) found large seasonal 
income fluctuations but no seasonal hunger among children in Andhra Pradesh, and also 
suggest that the impact of the seasonal cycle is smoothed by the large safety net 
operated by the state. 
 
The findings of this study can also be used to perform a comparative assessment of 
different irrigation systems. In Andhra Pradesh there are three types of irrigation 
interventions, which stabilise income and consumption streams in different ways. These 
interventions are canal irrigation, groundwater extraction and watershed development, 
and will now be discussed in turn. 
 
Investments in canal infrastructure by the Indian government have contributed to 
substantial poverty reduction. It is estimated that poverty in irrigated areas is one third 
of poverty in non-irrigated areas (World Bank, 2005). Andhra Pradesh has a long 
history of investments in large scale canal infrastructure with some spectacular results. 
The Godavari Barrage, built in the mid-19th century under British rule, transformed the 
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famine-wracked districts of the Godavari Delta into a granary, and the builder of the 
barrage, Sir Arthur Cotton, into a saint revered throughout coastal Andhra Pradesh 
(World Bank, 2005).  
 
Despite these successes, investments in canal infrastructure decreased substantially in 
the 1990s after reaching a peak in the early 1980s. The main reasons for the demise of 
investments in canal irrigation were inefficiencies in operation and maintenance 
(O&M), high investment costs, and negative social and environmental impacts (IEG, 
2007). Funds for O&M were inadequate and inefficiently spent. The poor quality of 
irrigation set off a vicious circle as farmers were unwilling to contribute financially to 
service delivery (Oblitas and Peter, 1999). The government responded in the late 1990s 
by transferring irrigation management from the state to civil society, and Andhra 
Pradesh became one of the leading areas in the world in implementing participatory 
irrigation management. In some areas users’ management of irrigation was built on 
existing institutions that had already performed this role very efficiently as documented 
by Wade (1988). However, in 1997 O&M was privatised, water charges were tripled, 
and water users associations (WUA) were created overnight all over the state. Impact 
studies of participatory irrigation management in Andhra Pradesh have found that this 
did not result in greater control over water use nor more equitable water distribution 
(IEG, 2007, Jairath, 2000). 
 
In areas irrigated by canals the timing and quantities of water releases are operated by 
the irrigation department, because WUAs are unable to manage the distribution of 
water. The irrigation department however is not able to release water to farmers in a 
timely and equitable way. In addition, the release of water in the dry season depends on 
the recharge of the reservoirs in the wet season, which in turn depends on rainfall. In 
areas irrigated by canals therefore the provision of water in the dry season and the 
stabilising effects of irrigation are not fully guaranteed. 
 
During the last 20 years Andhra Pradesh has witnessed a quiet revolution consisting of 
an increasing use of groundwater for irrigation. Today, groundwater provides the largest 
share of irrigated area in the state. There are several reasons for the expansion in of 
groundwater use (World Bank, 2005): electricity was slowly brought to rural areas; 
groundwater reduces waterlogging and salinity; cheap and easy to operate pumps have 
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become available; finally, groundwater can be applied just in time bypassing canal 
administrators.  
 
Groundwater extraction provides full insurance against rainfall shortfalls, because 
farmers can access water when they need it by operating water pumps. Protracted 
exploitation of groundwater however is unsustainable in the long term, because the 
costs of extraction are very high though mostly hidden (World Bank, 2005). First, it is 
estimated that between 10% and 30% of all electricity produced in India is absorbed by 
agriculture, and that every year it cost to the government 2.5 times the cost of 
maintenance of canals. Second, groundwater extraction depletes natural resources. Data 
show that in many areas of Andhra Pradesh water extraction is well above 100% of 
water recharge (Reddy et al., 2003a).  
 
The development strategy of the Indian government for semi-arid areas where canal 
infrastructure and groundwater are not available consists of watershed development 
(MRD, 1994). Watershed interventions consist of micro infrastructures for water 
harvesting and farming practices that help the recharge of the water table. In Andhra 
Pradesh watershed projects are in operation since the early 1980s in degraded areas in 
terms of soils and water availability. These projects often have a strong pro-poor 
orientation (Springate-Baginsky et al., 2002). Watershed projects employ the poor for 
the realisation of infrastructures, and often include microfinance and management of 
common property resources components. 
 
Watershed projects however are unlikely to help farmers smoothing seasonal 
fluctuations. Evaluations of watershed projects in India have found modest results in 
terms of both water conservation and poverty reduction (Kerr et al., 2002). The main 
reasons behind these disappointing results in Andhra Pradesh are the highly skewed 
distribution of land and the difficulty to involve marginal farmers, or the landless, in 
activities whose benefits mostly accrue to the land-rich (Kerr, 2002). 
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4 Income uncertainty and investments in human capital 
4.1 Introduction 
Andhra Pradesh fares poorly in terms of educational achievements. Illiteracy rates in the 
state are among the highest in India, and large disparities in educational attainments 
exist between boys and girls, rural and urban children, more developed and less 
developed regions, and across social groups. The causes of the poor state of education in 
Andhra Pradesh are well known (Prasad, 1987), though their relative importance is 
debated and a clear package of policies for the education sector is not available. 
Household poverty, discrimination in the labour market and within the household, and 
the paucity of state investments in education are among the main causes of the dismal 
state of education in Andhra Pradesh. 
 
One consequence of the poor state of education is the low qualification of the labour 
force. This in turn has potential negative effects on the prospects of long-term economic 
growth. As shown in Chapter 2, technical progress in agriculture generates a surplus of 
labour in rural areas that needs to be employed elsewhere. The lack of general education 
and of specific skills reduces the possibility for the excess labour generated in 
agriculture to find employment in the modern sector. The option of migrating to urban 
areas is precluded to the uneducated masses that live in near subsistence conditions in 
the rural areas. 
 
The weaknesses of the education system have long been recognised in India, and several 
programmes have been put in place to increase school attendance, particularly of girls. 
Possibly as a result of these programmes, considerable progress has been made over the 
last 15 years, and a much larger proportion of Indian children attend school today than 
15 years ago. It is not at all certain however that by 2015 each child in Andhra Pradesh 
will be able to complete primary school, and that the disparity between boys and girls at 
all education levels will be eliminated as stated by the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
This chapter assesses the impact of income uncertainty on household schooling 
decisions, a topic that has been largely neglected in the economics of education 
literature. It will be argued that high income uncertainty negatively affects investments 
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in human capital made by poor rural households, and reduces their ability to effectively 
plan for the future of their children. This chapter proceeds in eight sections. Section 4.2 
reviews the existing literature on the state of education in India and Andhra Pradesh, 
and on the effects of uncertainty and economic shocks on household schooling 
decisions. Section 4.3 builds an intertemporal utility maximisation model that relates 
child schooling to a number of determinants including income uncertainty. Section 4.4 
describes the data sources that are used in the empirical analysis. Section 4.5 discusses 
the econometric methods for estimating a model of education attainment and a model of 
education expenditure. Section 4.6 presents descriptive data that illustrate the state of 
education in rural areas of Andhra Pradesh. Section 4.7 presents and discusses the 
estimation results of the models of education attainment and education expenditure that 
were introduced in Sections 4.3 and 4.5. Section 4.8 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Basic education in India 
Dreze and Sen (2002) stress five ways in which investments in human capital, and in 
education in particular, contribute to socio-economic development in India. First, 
education has an intrinsic importance, as it is valuable in itself. Second, it opens up 
opportunities for the individual, and allows the achievement of economic goals. Third, it 
opens up opportunity for society, as it promotes the discussion of social needs and their 
representation in political demand. Fourth, it has an empowering role, by readdressing 
power relations between groups, sexes, and within the family. Finally, it generates 
positive externalities that benefit other household members, the community and the 
society at large. 
 
Despite these potential benefits, education has been largely neglected by Indian 
governments since the Independence. What is more striking is that educaiton has been 
neglected not only by governments and the elites, but also by political organisations, the 
unions and civil society (Dreze and Sen, 1995). Dreze and Sen (1995) point to three 
main reasons for this neglect. First, the conservative notion persists that lower castes do 
not require education and that child labour among poor people is acceptable. Second, it 
is believed that literacy imparted in primary school is inferior to education in a 
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Gandhian sense. Third, it has long been a belief among the Indian left that the existing 
education system is exploitative of the poor.
23
 
 
The result of governments’ neglect is that India’s educational accomplishments are poor 
in comparison to international standards. According to UNESCO (2007), the literacy 
rate in India over the period 2000-2004 was just 61%, a rate similar to those reported by 
sub-Saharan African countries. Riboud et al. (2007) report that the proportion of the 
population that was illiterate in India in 2004 was similar to the one observed in China 
around 1970 or in Malaysia around 1960, while the fraction of the population that 
completed secondary school in India in 2004 (14%) is half the figure prevailing in 
China in 1974.  
 
There is considerable horizontal inequality in educational achievements in India. 
Vaidianathan and Gopintham (2001) point to a number of regularities of the uneven 
distribution of educational achievements across social groups and geographic areas. 
First, literacy rates are much lower in rural areas compared to urban areas. The 
UNESCO (2007) reports that over 80% of out-of-school children in India live in rural 
areas. Second, literacy rates are much lower among girls. According to the UNESCO 
(2007) the ratio between literacy rates of female and male children is 0.65. Finally, 
educational achievements of children from scheduled castes and tribes are lower than 
those observed in the rest of the population. 
 
Few data on learning achievements are available in India, but the data available suggest 
that the quality of education being imparted in primary schools is very poor. Yadav et 
al. (2001) review the results of the achievement tests conducted in primary schools by 
the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) over the decade 
1990-1999. Test scores at state level show percentages around and above 40%. This is a 
reasonable mark if one considers that a 35% mark is a ‘pass’ in standard examinations 
across the country. However, it is a poor results if one considers that the minimum level 
of essential learning standard set by the NCERT requires a score of 80%. Kingdon 
                                                 
23
 A discussion of how education can reinforce existing power and unequal relations can be found in 
Levinson and Holland (1996). Jeffrey et al. (2005) are one example of an application of this type of 
analysis to rural India. They show how the expansion secondary education in a rural village of Uttar 
Pradesh resulted in a reinforcement of existing class and caste inequalities. 
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(2007) reports the results of two national large scale language and mathematics tests 
administered to primary school children in 2002 and 2005. These tests confirm that 
learning achievements of Indian pupils are very low. For example, nearly 55% of the 
students in grade five are not able to perform a simple arithmetic division, and 47% are 
not able to read a text of medium difficulty.  
 
The poor state of primary education in India has been explained in several ways. First, 
public education expenditure is very low and there are inconsistencies between official 
declarations and actual government policies. Tilak (2001) documents that public 
expenditure as a share of GNP increased in India from an average 1.8% in the 1950s, to 
2.8% in the 1960s, 3.1% in the 1970s, 3.2% in the 1980s and 4.1% in the 1990s. Despite 
this increasing trend, the 6% target set by the government of India in 1969 was never 
achieved. Lamentably, more than 90% of the education budget consists of teacher 
salaries rather than school buildings and teaching material. As a result, the quality of 
schools and teacher performance are very poor (PROBE Team, 1999), and teachers’ 
absenteeism is widespread (Kremer et al., 2005). Dreze and Kingdon (1999) use data of 
five northern Indian states to illustrate the negative impact on enrolment of general 
indicators of school quality, like school infrastructure, teachers’ training, and the 
provision of a midday meal. 
 
Second, India has historically invested disproportionately in higher education and has 
neglected primary education (Kochar, 2003). Tilak (2001) distinguishes four phases in 
the allocation of educational expenditure. The first phase between 1951 and 1956 (the 
first 5-year plan) saw a substantial fraction (three fifths) of total expenditure going to 
elementary education. The second phase, from 1956 to 1969 (second and third 5-year 
plans), witnessed a decline in resources allocated to elementary education and a 
doubling or trebling of resources to higher education, in an attempt to help the 
industrialisation of the country. The third phase, from 1969 to 1986, showed a slight 
reversal of the previous trend, with a an increase in the expenditure in primary 
education and a decline in the expenditure in higher education. Only the last phase, after 
1986, saw a return of emphasis on elementary education investments. 
 
Third, low returns to schooling and the extreme poverty of rural households discourage 
parents from investing in the education of their children (Dreze and Kingdon, 1999). 
165 
 
  
Returns to schooling are particularly low for elementary education. Using NSSO data 
Riboud et al. (2007) show that returns to primary and middle education are well below 
the standard 10% observed in most countries. In addition, returns have not been affected 
by recent economic growth. Openness to trade, rapid growth and technological 
innovation have increased returns to higher education, by increasing demand of skilled 
labour relative to unskilled labour, but have left returns to primary education unchanged 
over the period from 1993 to 2004. 
 
Fourth, parents’ attitudes toward schooling and cultural factors are obstacles to child 
education, particularly of girls. Kaul (2001) discusses how parents’ attitudes negatively 
affect schooling since a very early stage. A large percentage of Indian children entering 
primary schools are first generation learners who do not exhibit the desired level of 
readiness required for learning. Most children come from poor settings that do not 
provide sufficient stimulation in terms of adult-child interaction, sensory exposure and 
provision for play and learning. 
 
Parental conservatism and lack of motivation are particularly detrimental to girls’ 
education (Kambhapati and Pal, 2001). Dreze and Sen (2002) suggest a number of 
factors that shape parents attitudes against female schooling: parents are reluctant to 
send girls to other villages for studying; poor job perspectives and wages for women 
reduce the perceived benefits of female education (see also Kingdon, 1998, 2005, 
Kingdon and Unni, 2001); patrilocal residence and exogamy (the practice of settling in 
the husband’s village and severing the links with the family) does not encourage 
investing in girls’ education; the habit of marrying more educated boys (hypergamous 
marriage) increases the cost of the dowry if the girl is more educated. 
 
Fifth, there are intended and unintended discriminatory practices against scheduled 
castes and tribes that prevent children from progressing through school (Nambissan, 
1996). Nambissan and Sedwal (2001) discuss how caste dynamics at the village level, 
and even within the classroom, hamper the educational efforts and motivation of Dalit 
children. Jeffrey et al. (2004) illustrate how poverty and the lack of social connections 
in urban areas prevent children of Dalit families of a rural village in Uttar Pradesh from 
accessing salaried jobs. Hoff and Pande (2006) illustrate, by conducting an experiment 
in a rural Indian school, how discriminatory norms can be interiorised in such a way to 
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reproduce existing caste inequality. Sujatha (2001) discusses two main reasons for the 
poor achievements of children from scheduled tribes: the absence or poor quality of 
educational facilities in tribal communities, and a pedagogical system disrespectful of 
tribal languages and cultural norms. 
 
Finally, there are historical and social factors explaining poor educational performance 
and differences across Indian states. Banerjee et al. (2005) show the negative impact of 
British rule and of the landlord tenure system on education investments at the state 
level. Vaidyanathan and Gopinthanam (2001) discuss the role of the state in promoting 
universal education in Kerala; the pioneering role of Christian missionaries in Tamil 
Nadu; the success of community mobilisation and NGOs in demanding more resources 
for education in Rajasthan; the advantages deriving from vicinity to centres employing 
skilled labour like the army in Uttar Pradesh or the modern administration system in 
Kerala. The role played by non-agricultural development in fostering child education is 
also discussed by Kochar (2004), who tests the impact of wages in the nearest urban 
area on school completion of a sample of rural Indian students, and by Chambarbagwala 
(2008), who assesses the impact of expected returns to schooling, measured by the 
average wage of adult males, on enrolment of a sample of Indian children. 
 
Despite all these constraints, considerable progress has been made in primary education 
in India over the last 10-15 years. According to the UNESCO (2007), in 2004 the net 
enrolment rate in India was 90% in primary school and 54% in secondary school, and 
many of the social and geographical disparities outlined above was substantially 
reduced if not eliminated. Govinda (2001) summarises the strategies – often supported 
or promoted by external assistance - that made the 1990s the period of most intensive 
primary education development in the following way. New school facilities were 
established in small habitations reaching population living in remote areas. Participatory 
school mapping, micro-planning and community management and monitoring were 
introduced. A district specific approach to educational planning was adopted. Alternate 
and part-time schools were established to reach out-of-school children. Mobilisation 
campaigns were initiated to change negative cultural norms and parents attitudes. 
Several school feeding programmes were introduced along with many special 
programmes targeting female children and children from disadvantaged groups. 
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4.2.2  Uncertainty and investments in human capital 
There is considerable evidence that poor Indian households value education. Dreze and 
Sen (2002) discuss the myth of the lack of interest in education of Indian parents, and 
report a large body of evidence against it (for Andhra Pradesh see Prasad, 1987). 
Caldwell et al. (1985) find that in rural Karnataka most parents see education as the only 
hope for a different way of life, and that they strive to invest in the education of their 
children in order to secure a higher and more stable income in the non agricultural 
sector. Jeffrey et al. (2005) conducted a qualitative study in a village of Uttar Pradesh in 
2000-02 and assessed parents’ perceptions of schooling. They find that parents from 
both the high caste (Jat) and the low caste (Chamar) consider schooling as crucial in 
improving personal skills, social standing and employment opportunities, and that 
households invest large sums in the hope that they children will obtain salaried work. 
 
The importance attached by Indian parents to education is evidenced by the substantial 
expenditure in education and the rapid diffusion of private schools in rural areas (Tilak, 
2002). Sipahimalani (2000) reports the results of three distinct education surveys 
conducted by NCERT, NCAER and NSSO between 1993 and 1995. According to these 
surveys between 15% and 33% of Indian children are attending private primary schools. 
Even among very poor households (with a per capita income below Rs. 2,000 a year), 
4% of 6 to fourteen year old children are attending private schools. These figures 
indicate that private expenditure on education is large even among the poor. 
 
Parents spend large sum on education even for children that are enrolled in government 
schools, particularly in books, travel and uniforms (Sipahimalani, 2000). According to 
NSSO data used in this study, household in Andhra Pradesh spend on average 3% of 
total outlay on the education of their children. This figure is quite large if one considers 
the typical Indian household portfolio asset allocation. Data reported by Pradhan et al. 
(2003) for all Indian households show that 70% of households allocate less than 6% of 
their income per year to physical investments and less than 5% to financial investments. 
These data however include both urban and rural households, and the same report 
indicates that the urban saving ratio, as a multiple of rural saving ratio, is 1.7 for 
physical savings and 3.9 for financial savings. It would seem that for a large fraction of 
poor and landless rural households education is the most important form of investment. 
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As first observed by Stiglitz (1969), investments not only depend on expected returns 
but also on risk aversion, and high uncertainty and risk aversion may lead to 
underinvestment. Households in developing countries face a level of uncertainty that 
has been compared to the one prevailing during a state of war (Fafchamps, 2003). In the 
absence of insurance mechanisms and of access to credit, households adopt strategies 
that impair their ability to accumulate wealth. For example, Morduch (1990) shows that 
poor Indian farmers invest in technology that is less profitable but that provides a more 
stable income over time. There is also evidence that households store wealth in 
economically inefficient ways for precautionary reasons (Dercon, 2004). Banerjee 
(2004) builds a formal economic model showing how uncertainty and risk aversion may 
lead poor households to underinvest. Dela Cruz-Dona and Martina (2000) conducted a 
qualitative study in two rural villages of the Philippines and conclude that uncertainty of 
income flows and inability to insure against income uncertainty has a strong detrimental 
effect on parents’ schooling decisions (see also Jeffrey et al., 2005). 
 
The present study focuses on the impact of income uncertainty on schooling decisions 
of poor Indian households. Income uncertainty has received virtually no attention in the 
economics of education literature. In the original formulation of the human capital 
investment model by Becker (1975), little attention is paid to uncertainty, though 
Becker points out the potential riskiness of investments in human capital. First, 
investments in education are intangible and they cannot be sold in case they go wrong. 
Second, individuals face uncertainty about their learning ability and the quality of 
schooling at the time they make the schooling decisions. Third, there is the uncertainty 
with regard to the length of life and therefore the possibility of reaping the benefits of 
education. Finally, there is uncertainty regarding the future market valuation of the 
knowledge acquired, because the condition of market demand for the specialisation 
obtained cannot be known in advance. 
 
The literature on the economics of education has focused on the effects of uncertainty of 
future earnings on schooling decisions. The best formal treatment of this topic has been 
provided by Levhari and Weiss (1974), who define the theoretical conditions under 
which uncertainty of future returns discourages investments in human capital. The 
hypotheses formulated by this literature have found few empirical applications, 
probably due to the difficulty of estimating uncertainty of future returns. Kodde (1986) 
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tests the effect of uncertainty in future earnings among a sample of Dutch high school 
graduates using subjective perceptions of future incomes. Unexpectedly, he finds that an 
increase in the uncertainty of future income has a positive effect on the probability of 
pursuing additional education. Carneiro et al. (2003) use a sophisticated econometric 
technique to estimate the effect of uncertainty of future earnings on high school and 
college decisions among a sample of North American students. They find that if 
uncertainty is substantial, this has an impact on schooling decisions, but that this impact 
is very small compared to the effect of other determinants of schooling. 
 
All these studies on the effects of uncertainty on schooling decisions assume that returns 
from physical capital are certain or at least more certain than returns from human 
capital. This is a reasonable assumption in developed countries, but is rather unrealistic 
in a poor and rural society. In rural India, households face substantial production risk as 
farmers and agricultural labourers, two occupations that do not require schooling. 
Conversely, schooling allows the undertaking of non-agricultural activities, like public 
jobs, which have a more stable income than agricultural activities.  
 
The argument made in this chapter is that in the context of rural India, the uncertainty of 
agricultural incomes tends to reduce household investments in human capital. To see 
why this happens consider a rural household that is very poor and faces substantial 
production risk, with little opportunity to borrow. In these circumstances, uncertainty of 
future agricultural income has the effect of increasing the size of savings used to insure 
against income risk. This in turn has a negative impact on household investments. In 
other words, the uncertainty of future income forces households to invest their savings 
in an inefficient way, prioritising the protection of future consumption over investments 
in human capital. This theoretical construct can be seen as an application of the 
precautionary savings theory of consumption (Carroll, 2001, Deaton, 1991) to the 
standard Becker’s (1975) human capital investment model. 
 
The analysis pursued in this chapter bears some similarity with analyses of the impact of 
economic shocks on school attendance. Several studies have empirically investigated 
the effect of macro-economic and idiosyncratic shocks on schooling in developing 
countries. The evidence thus far is mixed. A number of studies have found no effect of 
economic shocks on schooling. For example, Duryea and Arends-Kuenning (2003) 
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investigate the effect of economic slowdowns in urban Brazil over the 1980s and the 
1990s and conclude that Brazilian economic crises did not contribute to an increase in 
child employment or a reduction in school attendance. McKenzie (2003) analyses the 
strategies adopted by Mexican households to cope with the economic crisis of 1994-95 
and finds that school attendance of primary school children increased during the crisis 
both in urban and rural areas. Similarly, Schady (2004) studies the effect of the Peruvian 
crisis of the early 1990s on schooling of urban children, and the evidence he collects 
suggests that children were more likely to be in school and complete their grades during 
the crisis.  
 
Other studies have found a significant impact of economic shocks on schooling. For 
example, Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) find that aggregate shocks, measured by 
fluctuations of village income, negatively affect schooling of Indian children. Jensen 
(2000) compares attendance rates of rural children exposed to rainfall shocks in Cote 
d’Ivoire and finds that attendance rates were lower in regions more negatively affected 
by weather shocks during the period 1986-1987. Thomas et al. (2004) investigate the 
effects of the economic crisis that affected Indonesia in 1998 and find that the crisis 
produced a decline in enrolment rates. The focus of all these studies is the impact of 
economic shocks on school attendance. This however is only loosely related to grade 
progression. Children may be withdrawn from school temporarily during a crisis or after 
an idiosyncratic shock, but can return to school once the crisis is over or the shock has 
been overcome. This point is clearly made in Thomas et al. (2004), while Skoufias and 
Parker (2006) find evidence that though the Mexican economic crisis of 1995 reduced 
girls’ school attendance, their overall grade progression remained unchanged. 
 
The present study adopts a different perspective from the studies described above. 
Rather than assessing the direct effect of income variability on school attendance, it 
investigates the effect of expected income variability on child progression through 
primary school. The hypothesis made is that households make schooling decisions 
taking into account the future probability of economic shocks. If this hypothesis is valid, 
household facing higher income risk will invest less in human capital.  
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4.3 A model of uncertainty and investments in human capital 
This section presents a version of the human capital investment model originally 
formulated by Becker (1975), in which households determine the level of consumption 
and investment in education by maximising the use of resources over the life cycle. 
Three crucial assumptions of the model are discussed: exogenous income risk in 
agriculture; diminishing returns to schooling; and precautionary saving behaviour. A 
formulation of the model under uncertainty is developed which will be tested 
empirically in Section 4.7. 
4.3.1 An intertemporal model of consumption and investments in education 
The model developed in this section is designed for rural households that are poor and 
whose income comes from agricultural activities, either as farmers or agricultural 
labourers. Irrigation infrastructure is poor and the agricultural income is heavily 
dependent on rainfall. Schooling does not increase the productivity of farmers and 
agricultural labourers, but it allows the undertaking of non-agricultural activities that 
earn higher returns. Household schooling decisions are framed as investments in human 
capital. Households invest in the education of their children if future benefits from 
schooling are larger than schooling costs. The benefits from schooling consist of the 
higher income, either in the form of wage income or self-employment income, that the 
more educated earn in the non-agricultural sector. Other benefits of schooling, like the 
potential increase in productivity of the farm or in the home and the pleasure of learning 
are ignored. Costs of schooling are of two types, direct costs and opportunity costs. 
Direct costs include tuition fees, and the purchase of books, stationery, transport, and 
uniforms. The opportunity cost consists of the unearned wage, or the farm product lost, 
for not engaging in agricultural activities while in school.  
 
In order to simplify matters, the starting point is a simple two-period model. In the first 
period households produce an agricultural income and make decisions regarding 
children schooling. In the second period household income, which includes the non-
agricultural income of schooled adults, is spent. A similar model was formulated by 
Levhari and Weiss (1974), and extended by Kodde (1986), and Snow and Warren 
(1990). These authors however considered the effect of uncertainty of future labour 
earnings on schooling investments. The model developed here takes future labour 
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returns as certain, and focuses on the effect of uncertainty of agricultural incomes on 
investments in education. 
 
Households maximise a utility function over a life cycle composed of only two periods 
(zero and one) of the form: 
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Households derive utility (U) from consuming the amount of goods c0 in period zero 
and c1 in period one. Utility in period one is discounted by the time preference factor 
(), which measures the consumer’s impatience. This is the extent to which the 
consumer prefers consumption in period one to consumption in period two. The 
expectation sign means that future income is uncertain and that the consumer has an 
idea of its probability distribution. Education is an investment good that generates 
benefits in the second period. No allowance is made for the fact that people acquire 
education for the simple pleasure of learning. Therefore, education does not have an 
independent effect on household utility and it is not a consumption good. 
  
Households invest in education by employing a proportion (l) between zero and one of 
their total available time (T) for studying in period one. Time spent in school in the first 
period earns a non-agricultural income (f(l)) in the second period, which is a function of 
the time spent on learning, and whose form will be specified later. Schooling entails two 
types of costs. The first consists of the direct costs of education (S), which is 
proportional to schooling time. The second is the opportunity cost of schooling, which 
is the income forgone in the agricultural activity (ya). Income in the two periods for the 
household investing in education is therefore: 
 
  00 1 ayly             (4.2) 
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At this point, several simplifying assumptions have already been made. First, it is 
assumed that household time is entirely spent either working in the farm or studying and 
leisure time or other work in the home is not considered. Second, all income generated 
in the two periods is spent and no bequest is left at the end of period one. Third, 
households can save in the first period and savings can be negative. However, there is 
an implicit restriction on borrowing originating from the fact that consumption in the 
second period must be positive, which in turn implies that borrowing in the first period 
must be lower than income in the second period discounted by the interest rate (r). 
Fourth, households have no initial assets that they can sell for consumption purposes or 
for education investments. The effects of different initial wealth positions on household 
investments are discussed later.  
 
Investments in education can be funded by reducing current consumption or by 
borrowing, thereby reducing future consumption. The budget constraint takes the form: 
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The first term on the right-hand-side is household saving in the first period, which can 
be negative if household spend in consumption and education more than they earn in the 
agricultural activity. The second term on the right-hand-side is household income in the 
second period, which is equal to the sum of the agricultural and the non-agricultural 
incomes. Households maximise utility by choosing the optimal levels of schooling (l) 
and of consumption in the first period (c0). Maximisation of utility (4.1) with respect to 
the budget constraint (4.4) yields the following first order conditions: 
 
 
 
0
1
1
100
















c
Ur
c
U
E
c
U
        (4.5) 
 
 
 
 





















10
1
1
1
1
)( aal ySry
r
lf
c
U
E
l
U

=0      (4.6) 
 
The first order condition (4.5) is the solution to the intertemporal consumption problem. 
It states that transferring consumption from one period to the other will not increase 
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utility, but will rather reduce it. The second order condition (4.6) equates costs and 
benefits of education. It states that the marginal utility value of additional benefits from 
education in the second period, resulting from investing in schooling, equals the 
marginal utility value of the cost of schooling in the first period. Therefore no utility 
gain can be made by reducing or increasing the amount of schooling in the first period. 
 
Equation (4.6) can be rewritten by applying the expectations operator (E) to each term. 
The expectation operator of the agricultural income term in period zero ( 0ay ) cancels 
out, because when schooling decisions are made agricultural income is known. The 
expectation operator of the marginal returns to schooling term )(lf l  also cancels out, 
because it is assumed that non-agricultural income is known with certainty. This 
assumption rules out the search for employment in the non-agricultural sector and 
unemployment spells, and all other uncertainty factors that were discussed in the 
previous section. It is a radical way to express the fact that non-agricultural incomes are 
more stable than agricultural ones. The expectation sign only applies to the agricultural 
income term of period one ( 1ay ), and equation (4.6) takes the form: 
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Under certain conditions, this equation shows that an increase of agricultural income 
risk reduces investments in schooling. These conditions consist of assumptions 
regarding the characteristics of the agricultural income process, the shape of the non-
agricultural income function with respect to schooling, and the shape of the utility 
function. Before showing the effect of uncertainty of agricultural income on education 
investments, these three conditions will be discussed in turn. 
4.3.2 Characteristics of the agricultural income process 
Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), the present analysis considers an uncertain 
agricultural income characterised by multiplicative risk. Agricultural income is a 
function of agricultural inputs (z), such as labour, land and livestock, and technology 
(τ), like irrigation, all multiplied by a risk coefficient (θ), with expectation 1
~
E  and 
variance 
2~  Var . Agricultural income is therefore: 
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In this formulation, the expected agricultural income is equal to ay  because 1
~
E , but 
the certainty equivalent income (which is the expected utility for that level of income) 
varies with the risk variance 2  and with the particular shape assumed by the utility 
function. Assuming risk-averse consumers with utility functions that are concave down, 
the certainty equivalent income is lower than expected income, and more so the larger 
its variance. 
 
Rainfall variability is the only source of agricultural income risk considered. For a given 
level of agricultural technology and irrigation infrastructure, weather variability 
determines the variability of agricultural output. Idiosyncratic risk in agricultural 
production is also important, and correlated to the inputs of the agricultural production 
function and to the demographic structure of the household. For example, farmers of 
poorer households are more likely to fall ill. However, for simplicity it is assumed that 
the sample of household is relatively homogenous in characteristics and that 
idiosyncratic agricultural production risk is randomly distributed across households. 
4.3.3 Returns to schooling in rural India  
This study makes the important assumption that returns to schooling are decreasing with 
levels of schooling. For example, returns to schooling f(l) have the form: 
 
lRclblalf  2
2
1
)(          (4.9) 
 
In this formulation non-agricultural income is a quadratic function of schooling (l), 
which is the available household time spent in school. Unlike empirical Mincerian 
functions, which either assume linear returns to schooling or let the returns be 
determined by the data, equation (4.9) explicitly assumes that returns to schooling are 
decreasing, as 0 Rclbf l , but 0 cf ll . Another important difference between 
equation (4.9) and Mincerian equations is the term R, which represents factors like 
individual ability and parental background that may increase returns to schooling if 
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operating in conjunction with learning. Hence, in the specification of the returns to non-
agricultural income used here, returns to schooling )(lf l  vary with factors like parental 
background included in R and are decreasing with schooling. 
 
The assumption that returns to schooling are decreasing is supported by a large body of 
evidence. Psacharopoulos (1985, 1994, 2002) produced the most extensive reviews of 
estimations of returns to schooling from all countries in the world. The results of his 
review with regard to the shape of the returns to schooling function can be summarised 
in the following way. First, rates of return decline with educational level and are the 
highest in primary school. The main reasons for this pattern are the low cost of 
investment in primary education and the larger productivity differential between 
primary graduates and illiterates. Second, rates of return decline with income across 
countries and over time within countries, because marginal returns to education are 
diminishing and as the stock of educated workers increases returns decrease. The 
evidence collected by the estimation of Mincerian equations in India, however, is of the 
opposite sign to what has been generally found in the rest of the world. Estimations of 
returns to schooling in India have found very low or insignificant returns to primary 
education and a U-shaped, or increasing, relationship between returns and educational 
levels. The evidence accumulated so far is so large to deserve some attention. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the results of empirical estimations of returns to schooling in India. The 
table is based on Kingdon’s (1998) and Dutta’s (2006) reviews of earlier studies and 
includes Kingdon’s and Dutta’s own estimates. Two main points can be made about the 
results reported in Table 4.1. First, returns to primary education are well below the level 
of 10% which is normally found in other developing countries. Second, returns are often 
increasing with educational level and are very high for secondary and higher education. 
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Table 4.1 Estimated returns to schooling in India 
 Year Primary Middle Secondary Higher 
Urban Uttar Pradesh
a 
1995 2.6 4.9 17.6 18.2 
Urban Tamil Nadu
b 
1995 2.9 9.0 17.0 15.6 
Urban Madhya Pradesh
b 
1995 3.1 9.7 12.5 13.5 
Dehli
c 
1975-76 2.4  6.9 11.4 
Urban Tamil Nadu
d 
1989 -1.8 8.5 -0.01 16.9 
Urban and rural India
e
 1983-84 3.3 2.4 5.3 9.0 
Urban and rural India
e 
1993-94 2.1 1.7 4.3 9.2 
Urban and rural India
e 
1999-00 2.4 2.0 4.6 10.3 
Urban and rural India
f
 1983-84 6.1 7.1 13.2 12.2 
Urban and rural India
f
 1993-94 6.2 6.4 12.6 12.2 
Rural Andhra Pradesh
g 
1990 9.9  3.2 7.0 
Urban Madhya Pradesh
h 
1987-88 1.4 6.9 14.2 9.6 
Urban Tamil Nadu
h 
1987-88 1.1 6.4 12.4 17.1 
Source: 
a
Kingdon (1998), 
b
Unni I (1995), 
c
Banerji and Knight (1985), 
d
Santaparaj (1996), 
e
Dutta (2006), 
f
Duraisamy (2002), 
g
Tilak (1990), 
h
Kingdon and Unni (2001).  
 
In light of the theoretical model developed for the present study the following 
observations can be made regarding these estimations. First, there are several technical 
problems with the estimation of this type of equations which are extensively discussed 
by Heckman et al. (2003). These include: endogeneity of schooling; omitted variable 
bias; neglect of school costs; and neglect of uncertainty. Few studies address all these 
sources of bias. In the case of the studies in Table 4.1, the neglect of school costs seems 
particularly important as these are likely to increase with schooling. Second, it is by no 
means clear that individuals should make schooling choices based on returns estimated 
by Mincerian regressions. This point is convincingly made by Heckman et al. (2003), 
who also show that if school decisions are based on observed average returns at 
different schooling level, and if the earning variability is larger for the less educated, as 
the evidence suggests, then Mincerian equations overestimate returns to schooling. 
Third, most studies reported in Table 4.1 are performed on small urban samples of wage 
earners. The only studies of rural households are those of Tilak (1990), who finds 
decreasing returns to schooling in Andhra Pradesh, and Dutta (2006), who finds U-
shaped returns for India. Lastly, it is not always clear whether the higher returns in 
secondary school are equally distributed between lower and upper secondary or are 
driven by higher returns in upper secondary. The latter prepares students for college and 
is not part of the primary education cycle that is the focus of this study.  
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4.3.4 Precautionary saving behaviour 
In the General Theory, Keynes (1936) identified eight motives for saving: precaution, 
foresight (the life-cycle motive), calculation (intertemporal substitution), improvement, 
independence, enterprise, pride, and avarice. Consumption theory has traditionally 
focused on the life-cycle and the intertemporal substitution motives. The precautionary 
motive has been recently incorporated in consumption theory by the precautionary 
savings theory of consumption. As Keynes puts it (1936), people save ‘to build up a 
reserve against unforeseen consequences’. 
 
Formally, precautionary savings are introduced in consumption theory through specific 
assumptions about the shape of the utility function. While risk-aversion requires the 
utility function to be concave, prudence requires the derivative of the utility function to 
be convex. Prudence, as risk-aversion, can be measured and the methods and theorems 
of risk-aversion almost equally apply to the analysis of prudence (Kimball, 1990).  
 
Risk-aversion means that income draws below expected income affect utility more than 
draws above expected income. In other words, risk-averse individuals fear losses more 
than they appreciate gains, and uncertainty of future income has the effect of 
impoverishing consumers. Formally this is represented by a concave utility function as 
those in the top charts of Figures 4.1 and 4.2. These two figures chart some of the most 
commonly used utility functions in theoretical work. All these functions are concave 
down, which implies consumers’ risk-aversion. 
 
Risk-aversion can be measured by the level of concavity of the utility function. A 
measure of risk-aversion is given by the absolute degree of risk-aversion (Newbery and 
Stiglitz, 1981): 
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The more concave the utility function, the more weight is given by the consumer to 
negative income draws compared to positive income draws, and the more the consumer 
is impoverished by income uncertainty. 
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Figure 4.1 Logarithmic and quadratic utility functions 
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Figure 4.2 CRRA and constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions 
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Prudence means that the consumer is willing to forgo current consumption to 
compensate for future uncertainty. This is so because to the eyes of the consumer 
income is more valuable in uncertain times. Formally this is represented by the 
convexity of the derivative of the utility function, as depicted in the bottom charts of 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2. An increase in the variance of income in a period increases 
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the value of marginal utility of consumption in that period. This is not true for all utility 
functions however. For example, the quadratic utility function on the top left of Figure 
4.1 has a linear derivative function, which rules out prudent behaviour.  
 
Prudence can be measured by the level of convexity of the derivative of the utility 
function. A convenient measure is the absolute degree of prudence (Kimball, 1990): 
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The more convex is the derivative of the utility function, the more valuable to the 
consumer is income in the period in which income is uncertain. Table 4.2 summarises 
the values of the derivatives of the four utility functions illustrated in Figure 4.1 and 
Figure 4.2, together with the values of the coefficients of risk aversion and prudence. 
 
Table 4.2 Properties of common utility functions 
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To see how prudence affects consumption behaviour, consider the result of the simplest 
intertemporal consumption model. Consumers allocate consumption over two periods, 
there are no initial assets and all income earned over the two periods is spent. In order to 
further simplify, assume that the rate of time preference equals the rate of interest so 
that their ratio is one. Maximisation of the intertemporal utility function gives the Euler 
equation: 
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The optimal allocation of consumption between the two periods is obtained when the 
marginal utility of consumption in the first and the second periods are equal. At this 
point, no gain can be made by transferring a unit of consumption from one period to the 
other.  
 
Suppose now that uncertainty in the second period increases. In the case of prudent 
consumers this will lead to a reduction in consumption in the first period. To see how 
this works, suppose that the variance of future consumption c2 increases, though its 
expected value E(c2) remains unchanged. This leads to an increase in the marginal 
utility of consumption of the second period )( 2cU  , because the derivative function of 
the utility function is convex. The term on the right-hand-side of the Euler equation 
increases and in order to preserve the equality the term on the left-hand-side must 
increase. In order for this to happen the marginal utility of consumption in period one 
must increase, which can only happen by reducing consumption in period one, because 
the utility function is concave. As consumers react to uncertainty of future income with 
an increase in current savings, these can only have a precautionary motive. 
 
Note that this result does not require the imposition of borrowing constraints, though an 
implicit constraint follows from the fact that consumption in the second period must be 
positive. This alone is sufficient to create in the consumer a reluctance to borrow, or to 
borrow too much, because the consumer fears that in a later period he might face a very 
low income and will not be able to repay the loan (Carroll, 2001). 
 
The extent to which the consumer saves against future uncertainty depends on the 
degree of convexity of the marginal utility function, which is measured by the 
coefficient of prudence (P). Bagliano and Bertola (2004) show how the size of this 
effect can be measured by applying a Taylor series expansion to the right-hand-side of 
the Euler equation )( 21 cUE   around consumption in period one c1. A second order 
expansion of this term, which ignores higher order terms, is: 
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Note that the term on the left-hand-side and the first term on the right-hand-side cancel 
out because they are the Euler equation. The expression can hence be rewritten as: 
 
 2121
1
1
121
)(
)(
2
1
)( ccE
cU
cU
ccE 


        (4.14) 
 
An increase in uncertainty increases the square of the expected difference between 
present and future consumption, which is the last term on the right-hand-side. Note that 
the expected value of c2 has not changed, but because it is the square of the difference 
which is calculated, the term increases in value. This increase has the effect of 
augmenting the difference between current and future consumption (the term on the left-
hand-side) by half the value of the coefficient of absolute prudence. The latter is always 
positive, because for prudent consumers it is the ratio of a positive third derivative of 
the utility function over a negative second derivative.  
4.3.5 Uncertainty and investments in human capital 
In order to model the behaviour of prudent consumers, it is assumed that the utility 
function )(cU is concave ( 0)(  cU and 0)(  cU ), and that the marginal utility 
function )(cU  is convex ( 0)(  cU ). As discussed in the previous section, prudence 
implies that the marginal utility function of consumption varies with the variance of 
expected income. Consider an increase in the variance of future income that leaves its 
mean unaffected. Given the convexity of the marginal utility function, this results in an 
increase in the marginal utility of future consumption. The value of future consumption 
increases when income is more uncertain and prudent households save in order to insure 
against future uncertainty.  
 
The impact of uncertainty on human capital investments can be seen by analysing again 
equation (4.7). Consider a mean-preserving increase of the income variance in the last 
term on the right-hand-side of the equation. Though future expected income has not 
changed, the marginal utility of consumption in the second period has increased. 
Households are more inclined to save in the first period as consumption in the second 
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period has become more valuable. In order for the equality to be preserved, the left-
hand-side of the equation must increase. Given that marginal returns to schooling are 
decreasing, this can only happen by a reduction in the size of l, which is the proportion 
of household time spent in school. An increase in uncertainty of future consumption has 
therefore the effect of reducing education investments. 
 
By inverting the left-hand-side of (4.7), the optimum level of household schooling (l*) 
can be expressed as a function of the marginal returns to schooling, the interest rate, the 
time discount rate, the expected agricultural income, and the cost of schooling: 
 
 Syrffl al ,,,,*            (4.15) 
 
For the purpose of empirical estimation, equation (4.15) can be expanded by specifying 
the determinants of its components. Marginal returns to schooling (fl), by inversion of 
equation (4.9), consist of the wage paid to increasing level of education ws, experience 
(approximated by age), and the factors included in R, which affect the market valuation 
of additional years of schooling. The main determinants of the returns to schooling 
included in R are: child’s gender and social group, because women and members of 
scheduled castes and tribes are discriminated in labour markets; parents’ background 
and motivation; child’s learning abilities; and the quality of the school attended. 
 
Expected agricultural income (ya) depends on the factors determining the income 
process described in equation (4.8): the amount of farm input used in production (z); the 
expected production risk (θ); and the production technology (η). The cost of schooling 
(S) consists of the opportunity cost, which is approximated by the wage for unskilled 
labour paid in agricultural labour markets (wuns), and of the direct costs of education, 
which are approximated by the demographic structure of the households (h); distance 
(d) to school; and other locality specific factors ( ), like the availability of school 
materials, school fees, etc. 
 
The theoretical model was formulated ignoring credit constraints. While these are not 
strictly needed for uncertainty to have an effect on education investments, households 
that are liquidity constrained have fewer opportunities to insure against income 
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uncertainty. Precautionary savings is one insurance mechanism, but it is likely to be the 
sole insurance mechanism only for very poor households that have no assets to sell or to 
use as collateral. Different levels of liquidity constraints could be included in the model 
by using household specific interest rates (ri). These however are hard to define and 
likely to be correlated with household assets. The discount rate (δ) can also be 
considered to vary with household wealth by assuming, as in Fisher (1930), that poorer 
households are more impatient. Household specific interest rates, the time discount rate, 
and household ability to borrow are better summarised by household wealth measured 
by assets (A). For estimation purposes equation (4.15) can therefore be rewritten in 
expanded form as: 
 
 ),,,(),,(~,,,*  dhwSzqARwfl unss        (4.16) 
 
Equation (4.16) will be estimated by a model of progression through school levels with 
data specific to each child. In principle, it would be interesting to estimate progression 
through school separately for household categories that are more dependent on 
agricultural output variability, like farmers and agricultural labourers with and without 
access to irrigation. The model of equation (4.16) however is not appropriate for this 
task because current household occupation is endogenous to schooling and is observed 
in the present, not at the time the schooling decisions were made. During the survey 
interview, households report past schooling achievements, but household income 
categories are defined at the time of the interview. Few households are entirely 
specialised in farming or wage work, and classifications of households as farmers or 
labourers are based on the assessment of household income shares at the time of the 
interview. Household classifications based on income shares from different sources are 
meaningful when current decisions are considered, but it is questionable that the current 
income generating process can be used to explain schooling decisions made in the past. 
First, the shares of income from different activities change over time. Second, the 
income generating process is endogenous to schooling, because past education 
achievements affect the share of non-agricultural household income in the present. 
Therefore the income classification of households cannot be used to explain schooling 
decisions. The distinction between irrigated and non-irrigated farm is even more 
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problematic because the irrigation status of a farm may change in any direction over a 
time span of ten to 15 years. 
 
Education expenditure data at the household level will therefore be used to compare 
schooling decisions of different household groups. In doing so, it is assumed that 
schooling is proportional to education expenditure. An inevitable drawback of this 
approach is that the analysis of household expenditure on education can only be 
conducted at the household level, thus loosing information that is specific to the 
individual child. 
4.4 Data  
This chapter uses data from four different sources: the NSSO expenditure data; the 
rainfall data available on the indiastat website; the DES data on agricultural wages in 
India; and data of the Census of Villages of Andhra Pradesh. The characteristics of 
these data sources and their use will now be discussed in turn. 
4.4.1 NSSO data 
The empirical analysis uses data from the last four large NSSO survey rounds in Andhra 
Pradesh, namely the 43
rd
 round of 1987-88, the 50
th
 round of 1993-94, the 55
th
 round of 
1999-00, and the 61
st
 round of 2004-05. Table 4.3 reports the size of the samples of 
rural households and children between the age of five and 18 for each survey round.  
 
Table 4.3 Rural observations by NSSO survey round 
Observations 43
rd
 (1987-88) 50
th
 (1993-94) 55
th
 (1999-00) 61
st
 (2004-05) 
Rural households 
Rural children 
6,016 
9,045 
4,908 
6,547 
5,181 
6,864 
5,555 
6,553 
All households 9,439 8,552 8,987 8,431 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The core of the NSSO survey is the expenditure module, where detailed information is 
collected of all expenditures incurred by the household over the month or the year 
preceding the interview. Data on education expenditure are collected with considerable 
detail and completeness, and will be used in the estimation of the expenditure models of 
Section 4.7.4. A specific survey module, the household roster, collects demographic 
data for each member of the household, including information on educational 
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achievements of all household members. These data will be used in the estimation of the 
school attainment model of Section 4.7.2. In addition to the expenditure module and the 
household roster, the survey questionnaire also includes an introductory section which 
collects data on several socioeconomic characteristics of the household, many of which 
will be used as explanatory variables in all models estimated for the present analysis. 
4.4.2 Rainfall data 
Rainfall data are collected by the DES and are available for download on the indiastat 
website. Rainfall data are in millimetres of rain, and are reported for every month and 
for each district of Andhra Pradesh from 1952 onwards. These data will be used to test 
the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical model in Section 4.3.5 regarding the effect 
of uncertainty on education investments. The empirical formulation of the model 
postulates that rural households form their expectations regarding rainfall variability 
based on their past experience of this variability, and that they use these expectations to 
predict future variability of agricultural income. 
4.4.3 DES data 
Since 1955, the DES has been collecting data on rural wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers for each district and state in India. These data are published for every 
agricultural year (from June to July) in the Agricultural Wages of India series of the 
DES (1975-2005). The series publishes data collected at specific locations in each 
district for rural skilled labour (carpenter, blacksmith and cobbler), and unskilled labour 
(field labour, other agricultural labour and herdsman).
24
 The series are further 
disaggregated by male, female and child labour.  
 
Wages are used in this study to approximate the opportunity cost of schooling and the 
perceived returns to schooling. Male and female wages for field labour are used to 
approximate the opportunity cost of schooling. Field labour wages are averages of 
wages paid to ploughmen, sowers, harvesters, weeders and transplanters. The reported 
wage of child labour was not used on account of the large number of missing 
                                                 
24
 Localities surveyed in the State of Andhra Pradesh are: Korasawada (Srikakulam), Vaddadi 
(Visakhapatnam), Bonangi (Vizianagram), Kothapalli (East Godavari), Keyyalaguden (West Godavari), 
Ghantasala (Krishna), Tadikonda (Guntur), Karamchedu (Prakasam), Tummur (Nellore), Sirvel 
(Kurnool), Bukkapatnam (Anantapur), Chitvel (Cuddapah), Gellapalli (Chittoor), Arutla (Ranga Reddy),  
Chandoor (Nizamabad), Sanga Reddy (Medak), Veldanda (Mahboobnagar), Athmakur (Nalgonda), 
Chagallu (Warangal), Cheral (Khamman), Chippial (Karimnagar), Basar (Adilabad). 
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observations and doubts regarding its representativeness of the value of child work, as 
only a small fraction of children is employed full time. The male wage of carpenters 
was chosen to approximate the perceived returns to schooling, because data on wages of 
blacksmiths and cobblers are largely incomplete and the skilled wage series are 
available only for male workers. In all cases, wages are reported for a normal working 
day of eight hours. 
4.4.4 Census data 
The population census of India is conducted every ten years and data of the census of 
rural villages of Andhra Pradesh are available for the years 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 
2001. These data report the population of each rural village in the state by sex, social 
group and occupation. They also report the number of literate individuals for each 
village. The data of the two more recent rounds (1991 and 2001) also report the 
availability of public facilities in the villages, such as schools and clinics, and detailed 
data on land use.  
 
Census data cannot be matched with data collected by the NSSO, because the latter does 
not provide census village codes for the clusters surveyed. They are used to present 
descriptive statistics on literacy rates in Section 4.6 and to build district level variables 
for the regression models in Section 4.7. In particular, the census data are used to 
calculate the per capita availability of primary, middle and secondary school in each 
district. 
4.5 Econometric methods 
This section describes the methods employed for the estimation of two econometric 
models. The first is a model of school attainment estimated by a Cox regression with 
time covariates. The second is an education expenditure model in share form estimated 
by four different econometric techniques. This section describes the rationale and the 
specification of the two models in detail. 
4.5.1 Estimation of the school attainment model 
The school attainment model estimates an empirical version of equation (4.16), focusing 
on the effect of households’ expectations of future income variability on children’s 
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school attainments. The specific variables included in the econometric model are 
discussed in detail in Section 4.7.1. 
 
The dependent variable of the school attainment model is the highest level of education 
completed by the child. The NSSO surveys do not report school attendance or highest 
year of schooling attained. Instead, the household roster categorises education of each 
household member in terms of highest level of education achieved in the following way: 
illiterate; below primary; primary; middle; secondary; higher secondary; graduate and 
above. There is also a category for non-formal education which includes titles obtained 
through Non-Formal Education Courses, Adult Education Centres, and Total Literacy 
Campaign. For the purpose of the present analysis all non-formal education is 
considered equivalent to illiteracy. 
 
The levels of education considered by the present analysis correspond to pre-higher 
education, which consists of primary, middle and lower secondary school, and are 
summarised in Table 4.4. These three levels cover the first ten years of schooling and 
upon completing lower secondary school students are awarded the Secondary School 
Certificate. Students may then progress to higher secondary school (grades XI and XII), 
which focuses on preparation for university. Upon completing higher secondary school 
students are awarded the Senior School Certificate in public examinations that give 
them access to universities. The two years of higher secondary have been excluded from 
the analysis because only a tiny fraction of rural children are reported to achieve this 
level of education. 
 
Table 4.4 Pre-Higher Education in India 
Level of education Age range Years of schooling 
Primary (grades I to V) 6 to 11 5 
Middle (grades VI to VIII) 11 to 14 3 
Lower Secondary (grades IX to X) 14 to 16 2 
 
The sample of children included in the present analysis are between the age of five and 
18, rather than between six and 16, because entrance and exit from school do not 
necessarily respect official age limits. Setting the lower limit at age five allows the 
inclusion of early entrants into primary and for age heaping around number five in the 
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reporting of age.
25
 Setting the upper limit at age 18, two years after the official 
completion of lower secondary, allows for late entrants and repeaters. 
 
The definition of attainment categories as in Table 4.4 implies censoring of 
observations. The problem of censoring derives from the fact that some of the children 
in the sample did not attain higher education levels simply because they were too young 
to do so. For example, a child aged 12 with a primary school title is censored, because 
she might be attending middle school. On the other hand, a child with the same title and 
aged 18 is a dropout, because she was not able to achieve a grade higher than primary. 
However, it is not obvious whether a 15-year-old child who completed primary should 
be considered a censored observation or a dropout. In order to operate this distinction it 
is necessary to use some reasonable cut-off points based on the child’s age. For the 
purpose of the present analysis, children above the age of six who had not achieved 
below primary at the time of the interview are classified as illiterate, while children 
aged six are censored observations. Children above 11 who had not achieved primary at 
the time of the interview are classified as below primary, while children below 12 are 
censored observations. Children aged above 14 who had not achieved middle are 
classified as primary, while children below 15 are censored observations. Finally, 
children above 16 who had not completed lower secondary are classified as middle, 
while children below 17 are censored observations. 
 
The structure of the dependent variable as an ordered categorical variable lends itself to 
estimation by an ordered choice model like the ordered probit. Estimating school 
attainment with a standard ordered probit model however poses two limitations, namely 
censoring and the presence of time-varying explanatory variables. These two limitations 
are now discussed in turn. 
 
Censoring generates a spurious correlation between attainment and variables that are 
correlated with age. By model construction, children of older cohorts are more likely to 
have reached higher school levels, which is often the opposite of what happens in 
reality. There are several ways to address the problem of censored observations. One 
straightforward and radical approach is to include only the uncensored observations in 
                                                 
25
 Age heaping is the rounding up or down of self-reported age. It is common in survey data to observe 
clustering of observations at ages five, ten, 15 etc. 
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the sample. This implies limiting the sample to children who have reached 18 years of 
age at the time of the survey. This would leave no ambiguity as to whether children are 
still in school or dropped out, because all children aged 18 had the opportunity of 
attaining the highest education level considered by this study. This approach has two 
main drawbacks. First, it drastically reduces the size of the sample. Second, it amplifies 
the problem of explaining past schooling decisions using current household 
characteristics. 
 
Another often used method for dealing with censored observations is the estimation of a 
censored ordered probit (Glewwe, 1999, King and Lillard, 1987). This method modifies 
the likelihood function of the standard ordered probit model in order to account for 
censored observations. A drawback of this approach is that the computation of the 
modified likelihood function can be cumbersome. In addition, the results of the ordered 
probit are not easy to interpret. The sign of the regression parameters can be interpreted 
as determining whether school attainment increases or not with the regressors. 
However, the marginal effects of the regressors on the probability of attaining a given 
level of education have to be computed separately, and the computation is not 
straightforward. 
 
The presence of time-varying covariates is a more serious limitation than censoring. It is 
standard practice in the estimation of school attainment models to explain schooling 
decisions made in the past with current values of the explanatory variables. Examples 
include: household expenditure in the year preceding the interview, local market wages 
for skilled and unskilled labour, and school availability at the time of the survey. 
However, household expenditure, wages and school availability vary over time. 
Assuming that they are fixed is a misspecification error, which would lead to some of 
the outcomes being explained by the wrong observations. In addition, this is a potential 
source of endogeneity, because some of the variables measured at the time of the survey 
are correlated with past educational attainments in the sense that they were determined 
by the level of education attained by children. For example, household expenditure can 
be large at the time of the interview due to higher wages earned by children who went to 
school, rather than the other way round.  
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In order to overcome both the problem of censoring and time-varying explanatory 
variables, the Cox proportional hazard model is used to estimate the determinants of 
school attainment (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). The Cox proportional hazard model 
estimates the determinants of dropouts rather than of school attainment. There are 
several advantages with using this approach. First, it deals effectively with the problem 
of censoring, hence all observations in the sample can be used without the risk of 
obtaining biased estimates. Second, the likelihood function is easy to compute 
compared to likelihood function of the censored ordered probit and most statistical 
packages have built-in routines to perform this computation. Third, the regression 
parameters are in the form of hazard ratios that are easy to interpret and provide not 
only a measure of the qualitative impact of the explanatory variable (the sign), but also 
the absolute value of its effect on the dependent variable. Finally, Cox proportional 
hazard models offer an easy solution to the problem of time-varying covariates, as these 
are easily incorporated into the model. 
 
There are however also some disadvantages with using the Cox proportional hazard 
model. First, the model estimates the probability of failure (school dropout) rather than 
attainment, and the reader interested in the determinants of attainment has to read the 
results in reverse. Second, the estimation requires a rather complex set-up of the data in 
order to be performed. The data used in the Cox regression need to report the time when 
the observation was recorded. In the school attainment model this corresponds to the 
educational level attained by the child, which is the dependent variable. A second 
variable that specifies whether the child was successful or failed at each school level, 
and one that indicates whether the observation is censored are needed. 
 
The structure of the dataset when using time-varying covariates is slightly more 
complex and is organised in the following way. Each child observation is repeated for 
every value of the independent variable from the lower until the highest value achieved 
or until censored. For example, an 18-year-old child dropping out of middle school 
would have three observations, one for the below primary decision, one for the 
completion of primary and another one for the failure in middle school. A 16-year-old 
child who completed middle school would be assigned three observations as in the case 
above, but with no failures and would be coded as a censored observation because at 16, 
the child could still complete secondary school. A child never enrolled will be classified 
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as a failure at below primary. In other words, the dataset contains multiple observations 
for the same child, each relating to success or failure at each value of the dependent 
variable until the child fails or is censored. Once the data have been structured in this 
way, the time-varying variable can easily be assigned to each child. This will reflect the 
point in time the child observation refers to. The time dependent covariates used in the 
model are external and ancillary (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, (1980). They are external 
because they are not directly involved with the process leading to dropouts, and they are 
ancillary because they are the result of a stochastic process external to the individual, 
whose marginal probability distribution does not involve the parameters of the model. 
4.5.2 Estimation of the education expenditure model 
The education expenditure model estimates the determinants of schooling of different 
household groups. This model rests on the assumption that progression in school is 
correlated to education expenditure. One advantage of this model over the school 
attainment model is that the dependent variable and the explanatory variables are 
observed at the same time and no misspecification bias arises when using the second to 
explain the first. A second advantage of this model is that the analysis can be performed 
separately for different household groups because income categories are not 
endogoneous to school choice, as it was the case for the school attainment model. The 
main disadvantage of this approach is that expenditure is observed at the household 
level, rather than at the child level, hence the dependent variable cannot be explained by 
factors specific to a particular child. 
 
A convenient form for the estimation of education expenditure is the Working-Leser 
specification (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). The advantages of this functional form 
were discussed in Section 2.5.1, and are only briefly summarised here. This form 
satisfies standard restrictions of demand theory, such as homogeneity and adding-up, 
and provides a realistic representation of consumer behaviour allowing for luxuries, 
necessities, and inferior goods. This specification models Engel curves that relate 
linearly household’s budget shares (w) of each good (j) to the logarithm of total 
expenditure (lnx): 
 
xbaw jjj ln           (4.17) 
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The education expenditure model estimates household education Engel curves. Shares 
of expenditure on education (we) for this model were obtained from the NSSO data by 
aggregating expenditures collected using a one-year recall period. The NSSO surveys 
collect detailed information on household expenditure on education disaggregated in the 
following way: purchase of books; purchase of stationery; payment of school fees; 
private tutoring; the cost of bus transport to school; and the payment of library cards. 
Some relevant education costs, like the purchase of school uniforms and the private cost 
of transport to school, are not explicitly coded but are likely to be included in the 
residual category called other education expenditure. All education expenditures, with 
the exception of bus transport costs, are reported on both annual and monthly recall 
basis. As education expenditures are made occasionally and at specific times of the 
year, like for example the beginning of the school year, expenditure from the annual 
recall rather than the monthly recall were used in order to reduce the number of 
observations with value zero. The shares were obtained by dividing education 
expenditure by total household expenditure in the course of the year.
26
 Expenditure data 
were also adjusted for regional and seasonal variation in prices by calculating household 
specific price indices, using the methodology outlined in Section 3.4.2. In order to make 
expenditure data from the four surveys comparable in real terms, the expenditure figures 
were further adjusted by the annual CPIAL of Andhra Pradesh provided by the DES. 
 
For estimation purposes the model of equation (17) is expanded to include sets of 
demographic and control variables: 
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Household expenditure shares are explained by the logarithm of household per capita 
expenditure (total household expenditure xi over household size si), the demographic 
composition of the household in terms of the ratios D of household members of a given 
age and sex category (j) over household size; the logarithm of household size; and a set 
of control variables Z. The latter includes all the variables that are likely to have an 
                                                 
26
 Expenditure categories, like food and miscellaneous non-food items that are reported on a monthly 
recall basis only, were multiplied by 12 before adding them to other household expenditure in order to 
obtain total household expenditure. 
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impact on educational choices. These are the same variables included in the schooling 
equation (16): school costs; returns to schooling; determinants of returns to schooling; 
factors affecting the ability to borrow; and expected income variability. 
 
A serious limitation in estimating equation (4.8) is that the majority of households in the 
sample reported zero expenditure on education. If we consider the whole sample of rural 
households of the four survey rounds, the average percentage of observations with zero 
expenditure on education is 62%. This percentage however has been decreasing over the 
years, from 81% in the 43
rd
 round, to 60% in the 50
th
 round, 55% in the 55
th
 round, and 
46% in the 61
st
 round.  
 
A model widely used in estimating demand equations with many zero values is the tobit 
model of Tobin (1958), which was originally developed to estimate household 
expenditure on durable goods. The tobit model can be seen as a hybrid of the probit 
model and ordinary least square. One shortcoming of the tobit model is that it produces 
biased parameter estimates in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Deaton, 1997), which 
is the norm when dealing with expenditure data from household surveys. Several 
alternatives to the tobit model have been put forward in the econometric literature. 
These are all based on different interpretations given to the observations with zero 
values. Some models consider these observations as censored, while other models 
consider zero observations as household decisions and suggest the use of selection 
models. None of the proposed alternatives to the tobit model is convincingly superior to 
the others. The strategy adopted in this study is therefore to estimate equation (4.18) 
using a battery of different models and identify the parameter values that are robust to 
different model specifications. The models used for this task are: standard OLS, the 
heteroscedastic tobit, a semiparametric version of the tobit model, and the two-part 
model. The characteristics of these models will now be discussed in turn. 
 
The first model used is standard OLS. Using OLS implies ignoring both the problems of 
censoring and selectivity. This model implicitly considers zero expenditure as a genuine 
household’s decision, but does not attribute this decision to any explanatory factors. The 
model estimates an average effect of the explanatory variable over both spenders and 
non-spenders. Given the distribution of the data points over total expenditure, with 
many zero observations on the left side of the expenditure distribution, the method of 
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least square tends to produce expenditure coefficients that are low compared to those 
produced by other models. 
 
The second model used is the heteroscedastic tobit. Heteroscedasticity is a constant 
feature of household expenditure data and arises in this particular case because richer 
household enjoy more discretionality in their expenditure decisions. This results in an 
increasing dispersion of education expenditures as total expenditure increases. 
Parameters estimated by the tobit model in the presence of heteroscedasticity therefore 
tend to be large compared to those obtained by other methods. One way of correcting 
the tobit model for heteroscedasticity is to make reasonable assumptions about the form 
of the heteroscedasticity and to substitute estimates of the standard deviation of the 
residuals in the likelihood function of the standard tobit model (Maddala, 1983, page 
180): 
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where the first summation sign refers to the observations for which expenditure is zero, 
and the second summation refers to the observations for which expenditure is larger 
than zero. The standard deviation of the residuals i is simultaneously estimated from 
the data by maximum likelihood using a linear specification 
n
j
ijii xba , where the 
x are all the explanatory variables of the original model or, alternatively, those that were 
found significant after running an OLS regression of the square residuals on all 
explanatory variables of the original model.  
 
The third model used is a semiparametric version of the tobit model discussed in Deaton 
(1997), which uses the censored least absolute deviation estimator. The algorithm to 
perform the estimation has been suggested by Buchinsky (1994, p. 412) and can be 
summarised in the following way. A median regression is run on the sample and the 
predicted values are calculated. All observations whose predicted values are negative 
are discarded, and a new median regression is performed on the new reduced sample. 
The predicted values are again calculated for the entire sample and those with negative 
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values are discarded. This procedure is iterated until convergence is achieved, which 
occurs when the number of observations in two consecutive estimations is the same. 
When the semiparametric version of the tobit model was run on the samples used for the 
present analysis, convergence was not always achieved and after a number of iterations 
the number of observations would oscillate around a set of close values. In these cases, 
parameter estimates of regression with the lower values of the sum of the absolute 
deviations from the median were considered. 
 
The last model used is the two-part model of Duan et al. (1983). This model separates 
the behaviour of spenders and non-spenders in two stages. In the first stage consumers 
decide whether to spend on education or not, a decision that can be estimated by a 
probit model. In the second stage the consumers decide how much to spend conditional 
on having decided to spend, which can be estimated by OLS after transforming the 
dependent variable in logarithmic form. The composed likelihood function is such that 
its estimation is equivalent to the separate estimation of the probit model for the whole 
sample and the least squares estimation of the logarithm of expenditure for the sample 
of spenders. The two-part model is therefore equivalent to running OLS regressions of 
the logarithm of per capita expenditure for households reporting positive expenditures. 
 
The education expenditure model was estimated using the four econometric 
specifications outlined above separately for household groups sharing specific 
characteristics: farmers and agricultural labourers, with and without access to irrigation. 
In order to avoid selection bias in the estimation of the parameters, the expenditure 
equations were estimated using the standard Heckman two-step procedure. First, a 
probit model was run to explain the probability of being in a given household category. 
Second, the inverse Mill’s ratio obtained from the probit model was included in the final 
expenditure regression. The selection equation models used are the same that were 
estimated in Chapter 3 to model the choice of farming and agricultural labour 
occupation.  
4.6 Descriptive statistics 
This section presents recent trends of educational indicators in Andhra Pradesh. First, 
trends in literacy rates across gender and geographic areas are calculated using census 
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population data. Second, completion rates of different household groups are calculated 
using NSSO data. Finally, trends in household education expenditure are discussed.  
4.6.1 Trends in literacy rates 
According to the census of India of 2001, Andhra Pradesh ranked 22
nd
 among 28 Indian 
states in terms of adult literacy, despite having a per capita income above the Indian 
average. Three main reasons are advanced to explain the poor educational performance 
of the state. These are the historical legacy of the pre-independence period, the low state 
investments in primary education, and the poor quality of schools (Reddy and Rao, 
2003).  
 
Vaidyanathan and Gopinathan (2001) emphasise the role of historical and social factors 
in shaping educational policies across Indian states. State efforts, social mobilisation, 
and missionary work were extremely important in promoting primary education in 
many parts of India, but played little or no role in Andhra Pradesh (Reddy and Rao, 
2003). Banerjee et al. (2005) investigate how social divisiveness produced by the British 
rule, landlord-based tenure systems and caste fragmentation affected public investments 
across Indian states during the post-independence period. They find that all these 
factors, and caste divisiveness in particular, had some negative impact on education 
investments. Banerjee et al. (2005) also recognise that some princely independent states, 
like the state of Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh, were more divisive and authoritarian 
than the British rule. Reddy and Rao (2003) confirm that the Nizams of the princely 
state of Hyderabad, ruling over the modern Telangana region, never promoted public 
education, while the local landlords – the  zamindars -  never encouraged universal 
education, and the work of missionaries was concentrated in very small areas of the rich 
Godavari and Krishna regions.
27
  
 
The task of universalising primary education was undertaken only after the formation of 
the state in 1956. Education spending has been traditionally neglected by the state 
governments of Andhra Pradesh. Data on public expenditure between 1980 and 1996 
show that the state invested less than 3% of the state GDP on education, which is below 
                                                 
27
 Zamindars were the landlords of pre-independence rural India. The institution has many similarities 
with the lords of medieval Europe. The Zamindars were preserved under British rule as tax collectors. 
The system was abolished soon after Independence. 
198 
 
  
the Indian average of 3.8% (Reddy and Rao, 2003). In addition, only around 40% of 
education expenditure was directed to primary education, which indicates a preference 
for investments in higher education (Reddy and Rao, 2003). Sipahimalani (2000) 
reports that spending per student in Andhra Pradesh was the lowest among all major 
states except West Bengal in both 1991-92 and 1997-98, and that the proportion of GDP 
spent in education by Andhra Pradesh over the 1990s fell slightly. 
 
Rural villages in Andhra Pradesh are reasonably provided with primary school 
buildings. The spatial concentration of rural agglomerations has helped to determine this 
pattern. In Andhra Pradesh, 70% of the population lives in villages above 2,000 
inhabitants compared to 50% in the rest of India. Data from the All India Education 
Survey (NCERT, 1997) show that in 1993, 70% of villages in Andhra Pradesh had a 
primary school and nearly 90% of villages had a school within a distance of 1km. 
However, the number of middle schools is much lower. The survey found that only 14% 
of villages had a middle school, though 80% had a middle school within a distance of 
3km. Investments in education infrastructure was uneven across villages and some areas 
of the state have been neglected. Twenty per cent of villages predominantly inhabited 
by tribal communities do not have a primary school within a distance of 3km.  
 
Though the number of schools in the state is relatively large, the quality of school 
infrastructure is rather poor. Data of the government of Andhra Pradesh, documented by 
Reddy and Rao (2003), report that only 75% of primary schools are pukka buildings 
(made of durable materials); half of them have a single room; and 40% have a single 
teacher. The provision of basic facilities, like water, is assured only in 30% of buildings, 
while only 14% of schools have toilets and a mere 8% have separate toilets for girls. 
These percentages are well below the minimum standards set by the Government of 
India. 
 
Despite this rather grim picture of the state of education infrastructure in Andhra 
Pradesh, considerable progress has been made particularly during the last 20 years. 
Table 4.5 shows the literacy rates calculated using the last five rounds of the population 
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census of India (Office of the Director of Census Operations, 2001),
28
 together with 
their growth rates.
29
 There is a considerable gap between the literacy rates observed in 
urban and rural areas. This gap however has reduced over the years as literacy rates 
increased substantially in rural areas particularly since 1991. A gap of comparable size 
exists between literacy rates of males and females living in rural areas. This gap 
however has also narrowed significantly, and the latest census data show a dramatic 
increase in female literacy rates. 
 
Table 4.5 Literacy rates in Andhra Pradesh (1961-2001) 
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 Growth rate 
Rural literacy 16.7 19.1 22.9 29.7 47.0 2.7 
Urban literacy 30.9 38.5 50.8 56.2 66.8 2.0 
Overall literacy 21.2 24.6 29.9 36.8 52.4 2.4 
       
Rural male literacy 25.0 27.2 32.0 39.3 56.3 2.2 
Rural female literacy 8.3 10.8 13.9 19.9 37.6 4.2 
Source: calculated from data of the Census of India (2001). 
 
Table 4.6 shows the rural literacy rates by district in order to see whether the spatial 
difference in educational achievements has increased or decreased over the years. There 
is considerable inter district variation in literacy rates, with the districts located in the 
more developed Coastal area of the state showing better educational performance. 
Differences between districts have however reduced over time. The growth rates in the 
last column show that literacy grew faster in districts with lower initial literacy rates. 
The coefficients of variation reported in the bottom row of the table show a steady 
decline over time in the dispersion of literacy rates across districts. The correlation of 
literacy growth rates with poor initial conditions, and the decline of the coefficient of 
variation over time imply that the districts have became more equal to each other over 
time. 
 
                                                 
28
 These are not the adult literacy rates reported in official statistics. The latter are calculated as the 
number of literate persons above the age of six. The version of the census population data used in this 
study does not contain information on the number of persons under six years of age. Hence, literacy rates 
were calculated over population of all ages. Inevitably, this results in an underestimation of the true 
literacy rate, because a large number of individuals were too young to be attending school at the time of 
the census. 
29
 Growth rates are per annum and were obtained from the coefficient of regressions of the logarithm of 
the literacy rate over time. 
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 Table 4.6 Literacy rates in Andhra Pradesh by district (1961-2001) 
 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 growth rate 
Adilabad 8.1 10.1 13.5 20.9 38.9 3.9 
Anantapur 16.3 18.9 23.4 30.0 44.6 2.5 
Chittoor 17.6 21.4 26.6 37.6 54.7 2.8 
Cuddapah 18.6 20.9 26.3 36.2 52.1 2.6 
East Godavari 22.6 26.8 30.4 36.1 54.2 2.0 
Guntur 24.2 25.6 30.8 34.1 50.9 1.8 
Karimnagar 11.1 12.6 17.0 26.1 43.4 3.4 
Khammam 12.2 14.6 19.8 27.4 44.4 3.2 
Krishna 25.9 28.6 33.9 37.5 56.9 1.8 
Kurnool 18.3 19.3 23.2 26.8 41.3 1.9 
Mahbubnagar 11.2 13.2 16.1 20.3 34.3 2.7 
Medak 12.2 13.6 17.7 22.0 40.2 2.9 
Nalgonda 12.0 14.8 18.8 27.6 45.9 3.3 
Nellore 19.0 21.6 26.0 35.0 53.7 2.6 
Nizamabad 11.3 13.3 16.8 23.2 40.8 3.1 
Prakasam 18.4 20.2 25.6 30.1 47.4 2.3 
Ranga Reddi 14.0 14.7 19.4 25.8 44.6 2.9 
Srikakulam 14.1 16.6 19.6 26.9 45.8 2.8 
Visakhapatnam 10.5 12.8 15.3 23.8 41.0 3.3 
Vizianagaram 13.1 15.1 16.9 23.8 39.8 2.7 
Warangal 11.7 13.7 17.7 26.4 44.3 3.3 
West Godavari 27.5 31.0 33.6 41.6 63.0 1.9 
Coefficient of 
variation 
0.34 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.15  
Source: calculated from data of the Census of India (2001). 
 
Part of the progress made in education in Andhra Pradesh may be due to a series of 
educational projects implemented by the Government of India and by the state of 
Andhra Pradesh over the last 20 years. This claim cannot be backed by evidence, 
because none of these projects has been rigorously evaluated (Kingdon, 2007). The two 
most important education projects currently being implemented in Andhra Pradesh are 
the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (Campaign for Universal Education, former DPEP), and the 
midday meal scheme.
30
 The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan aims at reaching universal primary 
education by 2010, and focuses on enrolling out-of-school children and improving 
school quality. Project inputs include the provision of additional teachers, civil works, 
teacher training, grants for teaching materials, free textbooks to low caste and female 
pupils, grants for disable pupils, and special facilities for girls. The midday meal scheme 
provides every child in government and government-aided school with a meal 
                                                 
30
 DPEP is the District Primary Education Programme launched in 2001 by the Government of India with 
the support of the World Bank. 
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containing the minimum requirement of calories and proteins. The scheme was scaled 
up to the national level in 2006 and is meant to serve school children for 200 days a 
year. The Government of India pays for the cost of transport, food, and food 
preparation, while state governments provide kitchens equipped with all necessary 
utensils. 
 
Other projects, now phased out but relevant for the period considered in the present 
analysis, include the Operation Black Board (OBB) and the Andhra Pradesh Primary 
Education Project (APEP). The OBB was funded by the Government of India, and 
focused on school infrastructure. It aimed at providing all primary schools in India with 
at least two pukka classrooms, two teachers, and blackboards, maps, charts, and a 
library. The APEP, which merged with DPEP after 1995, was funded by ODA and 
aimed at improving school quality through teacher training and school construction.
31
 
 
It is important to note here that both past and present education programmes have 
focused on improving access to school for girls and children of disadvantaged 
communities. This was also the goal of a number of campaigns promoted by the 
Government of Andhra Pradesh, like Mabadi (our school) and Chanduvkundam (back to 
school), which were targeted to women and children living in small and disadvantaged 
communities. 
4.6.2 Completion rates by household groups 
The census data do not report literacy rates by the occupational categories used in the 
present analysis (farmers and agricultural labourers with and without access to 
irrigation). In addition, the census only provides literacy rates and no other data on 
educational achievements. Therefore, the NSSO data, which cover a shorter period of 
time, will be used to analyse how different socioeconomic groups progress in school. 
 
The charts in Figure 4.3 show completion rates in primary, middle and lower secondary 
school disaggregated by gender, social group, and regional location. The charts plot 
average completion rates over annual birth cohorts of rural individuals. By doing so, 
educational attainments for a period of 30 years prior to the oldest NSSO survey 
                                                 
31
 ODA was the United Kingdom Overseas Development Administration, which was replaced in 1997 by 
the Department for International Development (DfID). 
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available can be calculated. The birth cohorts were constructed in the following way. 
The data from the four survey rounds where joined and the average completion rates 
were computed for each birth cohort from Independence to the year 1992. In order to 
avoid censoring of observations, only children above 12 were considered for primary 
school, only children above 15 for middle school, and only children above 17 for lower 
secondary. The data points were also smoothed around a five-year moving average to 
make the reading of the chart easier.  
 
Figure 4.3 Completion rates by birth cohort (1945-1992) 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
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The three top charts of Figure 4.3 compare completion rates of male and female birth 
cohorts for the three educational levels. Girls have almost closed the large gap in 
primary completion rates they had with boys at the time of Independence. As the chart 
shows, much of the reduction in the gap occurred in the last 15 years. Differences 
between male and female completion rates are however still large in middle school. 
Interestingly, the female completion rate in secondary school has increased 
exponentially from the early 1980s and the gender gap has been eliminated. 
 
The three charts in the middle of Figure 4.3 show completion rates by social groups. 
Theses reflect differences in income, attitudes towards education, discrimination 
policies (both negative and positive) and discrimination in labour markets. The charts 
show that children from scheduled castes have closed the gap with members of other 
backward castes and higher castes at all three school levels. Children of scheduled tribes 
however, continue to lag behind. While the gap in primary completion rates between 
them and other social groups has narrowed over the last 15 years, it has remained large. 
Worse still, the gap in completion rates in middle and secondary schools between 
scheduled tribes and other social groups has increased over time. 
 
The charts at the bottom of Figure 4.3 show the completion rates in the three macro-
regions of Andhra Pradesh. The data used to draw these charts should be considered 
with caution because they ignore migration. The region where the interview took place 
is not necessarily the region where the person was born or attended school, and many 
children who were born and studied in rural areas had migrated to towns by the time of 
the interview. However, assuming that migration patterns in the three macro regions are 
comparable, the charts show that completion rates are very similar in the three regions. 
The rich and more developed Coastal region does not have higher completion rates than 
the other two regions. It may be also observed that the Telangana region, which was 
lagging behind the other two regions after Independence, is now ahead at all school 
levels, while the Rayalseema region begun lagging behind the other two regions from 
the mid 1980s. 
 
The charts in Figure 4.4 show completion rates of different income groups: farmers, 
agricultural labourers and other households living in rural areas. The three charts at the 
bottom further disaggregate data on farmers by whether the farm household has access 
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to irrigation or not. Households were assigned to the occupation groups used in Figure 
4.4 based on the criteria described in Section 3.5.2. A farm was hence considered 
irrigated if any portion of the cultivated land is irrigated irrespectively of size, while 
agricultural labour households with access to irrigation are those who live in irrigated 
villages.  
 
Figure 4.4 Completion rates by occupational group (1987-2005) 
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Note: survey rounds are 1987-88 (1), 1993-94 (2), 1999-00 (3), and 2004-05 (4). 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Birth cohorts of farm and agricultural labour households and of households with and 
without access to irrigation cannot be calculated because occupational group and 
irrigation status vary over time. Farms that now have access to irrigation might not have 
been irrigated ten years earlier, and households whose current main source of income is 
farming might have been agricultural labourers a few years before. In addition, the 
occupational status can be endogenous because household who invested in schooling in 
the past are less likely to be farmers and agricultural labourers today. In order to use 
data that is representative of each occupation category, the analysis was limited to the 
completion rates of school age children in the five years preceding the survey. In 
addition, at each data point the sample was limited to children older than the minimum 
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age required for each school level in order to avoid censoring. The four data points 
corresponding to each survey round were connected by simple linear interpolation. 
 
The top three charts in Figure 4.4 show that occupational groups can be ranked in the 
following order in terms of completion rates. Households working in non-agricultural 
activities have the highest completion rates, followed by farmer households and, at a 
considerable distance, by agricultural labour households. It appears that in primary 
school the gap between agricultural labourers and other households has decreased over 
the period considered. However, the gap in the completion of middle and secondary 
school has remained stable. The three bottom charts of Figure 4.4 show that children of 
households with access to irrigation have higher completion rates than children of non-
irrigated farms. These differences might simply reflect income and location effects, as 
irrigated farms are on average richer and more likely to be located in areas that are more 
socioeconomically developed. The difference in completion rates for primary and 
middle school between the two groups has not changed over time. There was however a 
slight increase in the difference of completion rates at the secondary school level 
between the two groups. 
4.6.3 Expenditure on education in Andhra Pradesh 
According to the Indian Constitution, education is compulsory and free up to the age of 
14, which is the official age for the completion of middle school. In practice however, 
rural households incur several costs in sending their children to primary school. These 
costs can be divided in three categories: opportunity costs, compulsory costs, and 
discretionary costs.  
 
The opportunity cost of schooling consists of the income forgone because the child is 
not working. The size of the opportunity cost depends on the numbers of hours the child 
would work if not in school and on the wage paid for these hours. Data collected by the 
PROBE team (1999) found that a small percentage of children (20% of boys and 22% 
of girls) was engaged in full time work and that an even smaller percentage (5% for 
boys and 1% for girls) was employed in wage labour. Most child work consists of 
housework spent on activities like fetching wood and water, grazing and child minding. 
However, to the extent to which this work substitutes for work otherwise performed by 
adults, and therefore releases adult time for paid work, it does have a monetary value.  
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In principle the opportunity cost of schooling might be calculated by multiplying the 
number of hours spent studying by some average wage. This simple computation 
however ignores that children attending school also contribute to housework. The 
PROBE team estimated that the average number of working hours per day is four for 
boys and five for girls. The PROBE team also estimated that out-of-school children – 
both boys and girls – work approximately two hours more than children attending 
school. As the average number of school days in a year in Indian villages is 150, 
children not attending school work approximately 300 extra hours. These data suggest 
that the opportunity cost of schooling is relatively small. However, given that the 
monetary costs of schooling are small, and that many poor household do not spend on 
education, the opportunity cost is probably the most important component of overall 
school costs. In addition, opportunity costs increase over time for each household, 
because as children grow, they can earn higher wages in the labour market or help the 
household more efficiently in unpaid work.  
  
Table 4.7 reports the average expenditures on education of rural households in Andhra 
Pradesh and the percentage of households with non-zero expenditures for a sample of 
households with children aged between six and 17. School expenditure has increased 
considerably over the last 20 years, as has the number of households reporting non-zero 
expenditure. Education expenditure is approximately 3% of average household 
expenditure. 
 
Table 4.7 Average household expenditure on education 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Average expenditure
a 
173 272 392 807 
Percentage with non-zero expenditure 22.3 56.5 65.6 75.6 
Average non-zero expenditure
a 
775 481 597 1,067 
Note: 
a
expenditure is in 2005 Rupees. 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
Monetary education expenditure can be subdivided into compulsory expenditure and 
discretionary expenditure. Compulsory expenditure consists of the payment of school 
fees. However, research conducted by the PROBE team found that public primary 
school charge only negligible fees, and most monetary expenditure is discretionary. 
Table 4.8 reports the shares of education expenditure by item as reported by the NSSO 
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expenditure survey for households with school age children. One important item, school 
uniform, is missing from the list and is possibly reported under the voice ‘other 
education expenditure’. This omission is unfortunate, because the cost of school 
uniforms can be substantial and is paid by the large majority of households. Total 
household education expenditure might therefore be underestimated, though it is 
difficult to say by how much. 
 
Table 4.8 Share of education expenditures by item 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
Books 25.7 32.0 28.0 16.4 
Library 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.1 
Stationery 21.5 15.7 16.9 15.7 
Fees 27.1 32.9 44.2 60.1 
Private tutor 7.8 10.2 6.5 2.0 
Bus 0.1 0.7 1.0 4.6 
Other 17.7 7.5 3.2 0.1 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The purchase of books and stationery, and fee payment account for the majority of 
household expenditure on education. School fees today account for more than 50% of 
household expenditure on education and have been increasing over the period 
considered. Given that fees for public schools are negligible, the rise in fee expenditure 
over the last ten years is likely to reflect the spread of private education in rural areas. 
Muralindharam and Kremer (2006) conducted a large scale survey of Indian public and 
private schools in 2003 and found that 30% of the villages sampled in Andhra Pradesh 
had a private school. The NSSO data do not indicate whether children attend public or 
private schools, or whether there is a private school in the village surveyed. It is 
therefore not possible to investigate the increase in private education for the sample 
considered here.  
 
The main reason behind the expansion of private schooling is likely to be the poor 
quality of government schools. Muralindharam and Kremer (2006) found that the 
presence of private schools in rural villages was positively correlated with teacher 
absence in public schools and negatively correlated with income per capita in the state. 
This suggests that private schools develop in areas where the quality of public schools is 
poor, independently of income per capita. They also found that teacher absenteeism in 
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Andhra Pradesh was above 20% and that only 50% of the teachers present were actively 
engaged in teaching. These percentages are in line with those found for all India.  
 
Household expenditure on bus transport to school has increased over the last 20 years. 
This may reflect the increase in attendance of schools outside the village in particular 
middle and secondary schools, which are not available in the majority of villages. Tilak 
(2002) uses data from a survey of 33,000 households conducted by the National Council 
of Applied Economic Research in 1,765 villages of 16 Indian states in 1994 and finds 
that household expenditure on education increases with the level of education. He also 
finds that, on average, the cost of secondary education is nearly twice that of primary 
education due to fee payment and transport.  
 
The chart in Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between expenditure on education and 
total household expenditure in the four NSSO surveys. The curves were obtained 
nonparametrically using LOWESS on samples of rural households with school age 
children. In order to make the data comparable across surveys, the expenditure figures 
are all expressed in 2005 Rupees using appropriate multipliers obtained from the 
Andhra Pradesh CPIAL.  
 
Figure 4.5 Education expenditure and total household expenditure 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
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The upward shift of the curves shows that education expenditure increased over time, 
and that the largest increase was recorded between the last two survey rounds. The 
curves are flat on the left of the chart due to many zero values and because expenditure 
of rich households is several times that of poorer ones. The shape of the curves is nearly 
exponential, which indicates an expenditure elasticity larger than one.  
 
An expenditure elasticity larger than one implies that the share of education expenditure 
over total expenditure increases with income and over time. Table 4.9 shows the shares 
of education expenditure for different household income groups across the NSSO 
surveys rounds. The share of education expenditure has increased over the four survey 
rounds from 0.7% to nearly 3%. Households not engaged in agricultural activities spend 
proportionally more on education than farmer households, and the latter spend 
proportionally more than agricultural labour households. Expenditure shares of all 
household groups are increasing over time, though the increase is less pronounced for 
households not engaged in agriculture. The last two rows at the bottom of Table 4.9 
show the education expenditures shares of farmers with and without access to irrigation. 
Education expenditure of irrigated farms is larger in all survey rounds and the 
expenditure shares of the two groups are increasing over time at a similar rate.  
 
Table 4.9 Education expenditure shares by occupational group 
 1987-88 1993-94 1999-00 2004-05 
All households 0.7 1.1 1.5 2.9 
Agricultural labourers 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.7 
Farmers 0.8 1.2 1.6 3.6 
Others 1.2 1.6 2.7 3.7 
     
Irrigated farms 0.9 1.5 1.9 4.9 
Non-irrigated farms 0.7 1.0 1.4 3.1 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
4.7 Empirical results 
This section presents the results of the estimation of determinants of schooling (equation 
4.16), using the duration model with time covariates described in Section 4.5.1. Before 
presenting the results of the empirical analysis, the explanatory variables included in the 
model and their potential effect on the dependent variable are discussed. 
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4.7.1 School attainment model: variables used 
The school attainment model estimates the determinants of children’s progression 
through school and assesses the effect of income variability on households’ education 
investments. The dependent variable is the highest school level completed by children 
between the age of five and 18 over five school level categories described in Section 
4.5.1: illiterate; below primary; primary; middle; and lower secondary. The model uses 
a large set of explanatory variables in order to take into account all possible 
determinants of schooling. These are now discussed in the order in which they appear in 
Table 4.10. 
 
The econometric specification chosen consists of a duration model with time covariates. 
The latter are: demographic variables; wages; school availability; and rainfall 
variability. The construction of each time-varying variable and the rationale for its 
inclusion in the empirical model will be discussed in detail. The first variable of the 
model is a dummy for female children. Girls’ educational achievement in rural India are 
notoriously poorer than boys’, though as shown in Section 4.6.2, the gap has 
significantly narrowed in Andhra Pradesh over the last 15 years. Parents’ attitudes and 
conservative behaviours are often blamed for girls’ poor educational achievements. For 
example, parents may not want their daughters to travel long distances to go to school 
because it is socially unacceptable. Pal (2004), using data from a sample of children 
collected in West Bengal in 1987-89, concludes that only one third of the of the 
difference in schooling between boys and girls can be attributed to the market 
characteristics included in the regression model. Economic reasons however are 
probably more important for girls’ discrimination within the household. Job 
opportunities for women are limited in rural areas and households may not reap the 
benefits of girls’ schooling if they leave the households once married (PROBE Team, 
1999). In other words, parents may find it more profitable to invest their limited time 
and monetary resources on the schooling of boys.  
 
Number of siblings captures the number of children in the household. This is a time-
varying variable, whose value is measured at the time the schooling decision for each 
child is made. While household size changes frequently and unpredictably as new 
household members join the household and others leave to form new households, the 
number of sibling is more stable. The number of siblings can increase, as couples have 
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more children, or decrease, as some children become adult. The past values of this 
variable however cannot be recovered with absolute precision from the NSSO data 
because we cannot account for child mortality and child fostering. While the latter is not 
common in rural India, mortality rates of children under five were as high as 10% in 
rural Andhra Pradesh in the 1990s and even higher in the 1980s, particularly for 
disadvantaged households. Therefore the number of sibling at the time the schooling 
decision was made could be underestimated, particularly for households with high rates 
of child mortality, like the very poor and scheduled castes and tribes. Despite this 
limitation, the time-varying number of siblings calculated from the household roster of 
the NSSO data is a better explanatory variable than the current number of siblings, 
though inevitably imprecise. 
 
Table 4.10 Explanatory variables of the school attainment model 
Variable Description 
Female child One if the child is female 
Siblings Number of children in the household (time varying) 
Birth order Child’s rank by age among her siblings 
Father’s and mother’s 
education 
Education level of the parents: illiterate, below primary, 
primary, lower secondary, senior secondary, higher. 
Muslim household One if the household is Muslim 
Christian household One if the household is Christian 
Scheduled caste One if household belongs to scheduled castes 
Scheduled tribe One if household belongs to scheduled tribes 
Land owned Number of hectares of land owned, including 
uncultivated and leased land 
Traditional fuel Wood or dung is used as primary source for cooking 
Electricity Electricity is the primary source for lighting in the home 
Skilled wage Average wage of carpenters in the district (time 
varying) 
Unskilled wage Average wage of male field labour in the district (time 
varying) 
Schools per capita Number of primary, middle and secondary schools per 
head by district (time varying) 
Rainfall variability Standard deviation of rainfall during the ten years 
preceding the period relevant to the schooling choice 
(time varying) 
Time of schooling 
decision 
five-year time intervals from 1976 to 2005 in which the 
school choice is made 
Districts Dummies for 23 administrative district subdivision 
 
In households with many children, each child receives a small fraction of the resources 
available to the household, which includes parents’ time as well as economic resources. 
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In environments where school quality is poor, like rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, 
children require considerable parents’ attention, for example in the form of motivation 
or help in doing homework. The household time constraint may thus play unfavourably 
for children living in households with many children (Hanushek, 1992). 
 
The birth order of the child captures the child’s ranking in terms of birth with respect to 
her siblings. The first born in the household has rank one, the second has rank two, and 
so forth. This variable is fixed in time as the birth order cannot change. It is obtained 
from the household roster and not from the mother’s birth history. Therefore, birth order 
is underestimated because it is affected by the mortality bias discussed above. Birth 
order is positively correlated with child schooling. In rural areas, children often 
contribute to the housework and girls in particular are responsible for caring for younger 
siblings while parents are away for work. Older children are more likely to be employed 
in housework and children of higher order have better opportunities of attending school 
(PROBE Team, 1999). Ota and Moffat (2007) use data from 100 households from six 
villages of Andhra Pradesh to analyse the impact of birth order on schooling decisions. 
In addition to the operation of a ‘resource dilution’ effect, which predicts that for lack of 
resources a family has to prioritise the education of some children over others, they 
suggest the operation of a ‘teaching effect’, whereby siblings have a positive impact on 
schooling achievements of younger children by learning sharing. Their empirical 
analysis finds that first-born children are less likely to be in school regardless of gender 
and that the likelihood of being in school increases with the birth order of the child. 
They also find that younger children are more likely to be in school if older siblings are 
girls, which they explain with the need of elder sister to work to provide resources for 
education of the younger siblings rather than with the need of caring for the infants. A 
different result is obtained by Krishnaji (2001) who uses household data from two 
districts of Andhra Pradesh (Mahaboobnagar and Adilabad) in order to assess the 
determinants of school enrolment at the village and household level. His results suggest 
that first-born children have a higher probability of being in school. 
 
Father’s and mother’s education are categorical variables representing the highest 
school level completed. These variables are fixed in time and uncensored, as it is 
assumed that parents are no longer studying at the time their children are attending 
school. The education categories used are: illiterate, below primary, primary, middle, 
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lower secondary, upper secondary and higher. Parents’ education may affect child 
schooling in different ways. First, more educated parents are more favourably inclined 
to child schooling, while uneducated households may not perceive the advantages of 
education. Secondly, more educated parents may support their children by providing 
motivation, help with the homework and a role model. Third, and more importantly for 
the purpose of the present analysis, education is a strong correlate of household income. 
Household expenditure reported at the time of the interview cannot be used to measure 
household income, unless some radical assumptions are made regarding the equality 
between expenditure and permanent income. First, current expenditure may be very 
different from expenditure at the time when schooling decisions were made. Second, 
current expenditure is partly endogenous to past schooling decisions. In the absence of 
household expenditure, parents’ education represents a good portion of household 
income generating capacity. 
 
Religion may influence attitudes toward education. The empirical model includes a 
dummy variable for Muslim households and another for Christian households. Muslims 
and Christians are religious minorities in rural Andhra Pradesh. Ninety-two per cent of 
rural household in the NSSO data are Hindu, 4% are Muslim and 3% are Christian. 
Figures for other religious affiliations are negligible.  
 
The model includes dummy variables for households belonging to scheduled castes and 
tribes. These groups are notoriously victims of discriminatory practices in rural India, 
and they represent 22% and 7% of our sample respectively. Children of scheduled 
castes and tribes are less likely to progress through primary school for several reasons. 
First, members of scheduled castes and tribes are discriminated in labour markets and 
their perceptions of returns to schooling are lower than those of members of higher 
castes. Second, scheduled castes and tribal communities are discriminated by state 
policies. An example of this is the paucity of state investments in education in areas 
inhabited by the scheduled tribes. Third, children of disadvantaged groups are victim of 
social exclusion. Schools, though accessible in the village, may be socially distant 
(PROBE Team, 1999) if scheduled castes and tribes live in remote and isolated hamlets, 
or if access to school is banned by families of higher castes. Against this backdrop of 
social exclusion and discrimination, it must be recognised that development projects are 
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often targeted to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged groups and that state 
policies include positive discrimination in school and in the working place. 
 
Land owned is the number of hectares owned by the households, including land that is 
not cultivated or is leased out. Some 80% of rural households in the sample own some 
land, though only 44% of households own more than one acre, which is the minimum 
amount for a farm to generate a minimum level of income. Land is the most important 
determinant of agricultural output and is a strong correlate of farm income. In addition, 
land is used as collateral for loans, hence it also captures households’ ability to borrow. 
 
Traditional fuel is a dummy variable for households that use woods or dung as their 
primary energy source for cooking instead of other methods, like charcoal, kerosene, 
gas and electricity. The number of households in our sample that are relying on 
traditional cooking fuel is very large though decreasing over time (93% in 1987-88, 
94% in 1994-94, 87% in 1999-00, and 80% in 2004-05). This variable captures aspects 
of poor housing and living conditions and distance from urban centres and schools of 
good quality.  
 
Electricity is a dummy variable for households that use electricity as their primary 
source of energy for lighting alternatively to other methods, like kerosene, gas and oil. 
The number of rural household using electricity is relatively small in our sample 
thought it has increased substantially over time (33% in 1987-88, 50% in 1994-94, 69% 
in 1999-00, and 84% in 2004-05). Electricity in rural areas is provided by the state and, 
though it is paid by the household, is a poor correlate of household income. The use of 
electricity however may be an indicator of urbanisation and of easier access to quality 
education. In addition, electricity helps schooling directly by allowing students to do 
their homework and attending classes in otherwise dark rooms. 
 
The skilled wage is the wage for skilled labour at the district level described in Section 
4.4.3. The district skilled wage is intended to represent parents’ perceptions of future 
returns to schooling. It is assumed that parents’ expectations about future wages are 
based on the average of current wages in the district. The skilled wage is a time-varying 
variable that was assigned to each child in the following way. Wage time series over the 
time period spanned by the four surveys (from 1975 to 2005) were obtained for each 
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district. Three-year averages were calculated and assigned to each child observation 
based on when the schooling decision was made and child’s age. For children who 
attained (or might have attained) below primary, the average wage for the period the 
child was aged five to seven was used. For children who completed (or might have 
completed) primary, the average wage for the period the child was eight to ten was 
used. For children who completed (or might have completed) middle school the average 
wage between the time the child was aged 11 and 13 was used. Finally, for children who 
completed (or might have completed) lower secondary school, the average wage for the 
period the child was 14 to 16 was used.  
 
Unskilled wage is the wage for agricultural labour at the district level described in 
Section 4.4.3. This variable was obtained and assigned to each child in the same way as 
the skilled wage variable. Unskilled wage is intended to represent the opportunity cost 
of schooling. It is an indicator of the potential income obtainable if the child leaves 
school or if she substitute adults’ work in the home thus releasing adult working time. 
 
The number of schools per capita is the number of primary, middle and secondary 
school per 1,000 inhabitants calculated at the district level. These figures were obtained 
by dividing the numbers of school of each level by the number of individuals in the 
district reported by the population censuses of 1981, 1991 and 2001. The variable was 
then assigned to each child based on the time when the schooling decision was made 
and on the school level relevant to the decision. For example, if the decision to progress 
to middle school was made between 1995 and 2005, the number of middle school in the 
district from the 2001 census was used. The number of schools is intended to represent 
the quality of schooling at the district level. This is an imperfect indicator of school 
quality because it overlooks important quality characteristics like the quality of the 
facilities and of teaching. Moreover, most villages have a primary school and access to a 
middle school in the radius of one or two kilometres. However, the assumption is that 
other quality characteristics are correlated with the number of school buildings. 
 
Rainfall variability is the standard deviation of district rainfall during the ten years prior 
to when the schooling decision was made. This is a time-varying variable which is 
assigned to each child based on the child’s age and on the time when the schooling 
decision was made. The procedure followed for assigning the variable to each child 
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observation is the same used for the assignment of the wage variables. There is no 
rigorous rationale for the choice of a time span of ten years for the calculation of the 
standard deviation. It seems reasonable to use a number of observations that provides a 
sufficient range of weather realisations and that at the same time does not go too far 
back in time. The standard deviation of district rainfall captures household expectations 
of rainfall variability and therefore expectations of agricultural output variability. It 
must be emphasised that this is a very rough indicator of household expectations of 
output variability. First, as already mentioned, the choice of using the standard deviation 
over ten years is arbitrary and not based on a psychological observation of farmers’ 
behaviour. Second, the variability is calculated at the district level, though there might 
be large variability within each district. Finally, rainfall variability does not immediately 
translate into output variability, as other factors matter, like the intensity of rains, their 
spacing over the year and the monsoons onset. Despite these limitations, this variable 
provides a broad indication of the agricultural output variability expected by rural 
households. Its effect however cannot be measured with precision, because if there is an 
effect of income variability on education investments, this is likely to be obfuscated by 
the factors outlined above in the empirical estimation. The analysis however is fully 
legitimate from a qualitative point of view, because it allows to conclude whether there 
is an effect or not and to give a broad indication of the size of this effect. 
 
The time of schooling decision is a series of variables acting as time trends dummies. 
They are meant to capture historical improvements in schooling not explained by other 
variables and determined by factors such as changes in incomes, public expenditure in 
education, and people’s attitudes toward education. These variables were built in the 
following way. Children between the age of five and 18 were selected and the data from 
the four surveys were merged to create a single dataset spanning 30 years of schooling 
from 1975 to 2005. The data from the four surveys overlap in terms of schooling as, for 
example, 18-year-old children interviewed in the fourth survey in 2005 were in primary 
school at the time of the second survey in 1993-94. Given the spacing of the surveys, 
most observations (80%) lie in the time interval between 1985 and 2000 and fewer 
observations are located at the tails of the distribution, as they are covered only by the 
first and last surveys. The 30 years spanned by the four surveys were then divided into 
six five-year time intervals. Finally, each observation was assigned to a time interval 
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based on the age of the child and her level of schooling at the time when the schooling 
decision was made.  
 
The regression model also includes 23 dummies for each of the administrative districts 
in which the state is subdivided. The aim of these variables is to capture district specific 
characteristics that are not otherwise revealed by the data, like expenditure and quality, 
and the presence and efficacy of education projects at the district level.  
4.7.2 School attainment model: coefficients estimates 
Table 4.11 shows the results of the school attainment model for a sample of rural 
children aged from five to 18. A value of the hazard ratio larger than one means a larger 
probability of dropping out of school, while a value below one means a higher 
probability of completing school. In the case of dummy variables, like sex or social 
group, the hazard ratio is the ratio between the probability of dropping out of school for 
a child with a given characteristics and the probability of dropping out for a child 
without that characteristic. In the case of continuous variables, the hazard ratio is the 
ratio of probabilities after a one unit increase in the value of a particular characteristic. 
As a result, continuous variables tend to have small hazard ratios because they have 
large absolute average values. Small hazard ratios for continuous variables should not 
be confused with lack of explanatory power. 
 
Most hazard ratios are highly significant and display dropout risk of the expected sign. 
Female children are at much higher risk of dropping out of school. The probability of 
completing school decreases with the number of siblings in the households and 
increases with the birth order of the child. The educational background of both parents 
is extremely, and equally, important for the child’s success in school. The household’s 
religious affiliation seems to matter only marginally. Children of Christian households 
are more likely to progress in school, while children of Muslim households are more 
likely to drop out, but the latter effect is not statistically significant. The findings on 
completion rates by social groups confirm those of the descriptive analysis conducted in 
Section 4.6.2. Children of scheduled caste households are only marginally more at risk 
of not completing school, and the coefficient is not statistically significant. Conversely, 
children of scheduled tribe households are at a very high risk of dropping out.  
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The size of land owned by the household has a positive effect on the probability of the 
child completing each school level. The value of the hazard ratio is low but notice that 
an increase in land holdings by three hectares, which implies a move from a small to 
large farm category, has a 10% impact on school progression at any school level. 
Children of households using traditional cooking methods and households with 
electricity are respectively less and more likely to progress through school. The hazard 
ratios associated with these variables are large and capture income effects, as well as 
factors like school distance and quality that are associated with urbanisation.  
 
Wages of skilled and unskilled labour have the expected effect on school completion. 
The size of the skilled wage provides incentives to school progression, while the 
unskilled wage, which represents the opportunity cost of schooling, discourages 
schooling. The hazard ratios of skilled and unskilled wages are low, but it should be 
kept in mind that they represent changes in relative probabilities for changes in wages 
by one Rupee.
32
 For example, an increase of the skilled wage by 50% would increase 
the completion probability by 9%, while an increase of the unskilled wage by 50% 
would decrease the completion probability by 5%. The number of schools per 1,000 
individuals in the district has a significant and large effect on the probability of 
completing each school level. This variable shows the extent of the progress that can be 
made by investing more in school quality and infrastructure. 
 
The model also includes time and location fixed effects. The time variables are 
important for two reasons. First, the model contains variables that are varying over time, 
wages in particular, and it is important to avoid spurious correlations between increases 
in wages and attainment levels. The diverging effects of the skilled and the unskilled 
wages, though the latter is not statistically significant, seem to suggest that the effects 
captured by these variables are not spurious. Second, the time variables represent 
historical changes not otherwise captured by the model. These variables show that 
children’s chances of staying in school have increased substantially over time. The 
regional dummies are highly significant and some hazard ratios are relatively high. 
Children living in the southern, dry and poor districts of Rayalseema and in the 
Telangana districts of Rangareddy, Adilabad, Mahaboobnagar and Prakasam are at 
                                                 
32
 The sample averages of skilled and unskilled wages are 70 and 47 Rupees respectively. 
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much higher risk of dropping out of school. Among all districts, the hazard ratios of 
Kurnool and Anantapoor are particularly high.  
 
Table 4.11 School attainment model 
 Hazard ratio Standard error Z-statistic P-value 
Female child 1.484*** 0.028 21.2 0.000 
Number of siblings 1.082*** 0.007 12.6 0.000 
Birth order 0.876*** 0.011 -10.9 0.000 
Father’s education 0.775*** 0.009 -21.3 0.000 
Mother’s education 0.776*** 0.018 -10.8 0.000 
Muslim household 1.042 0.041 1.1 0.290 
Christian household 0.885** 0.054 -2.0 0.046 
Scheduled caste 1.007 0.025 0.3 0.778 
Scheduled tribe 1.351*** 0.042 9.7 0.000 
Land owned 0.972*** 0.005 -5.8 0.000 
Traditional fuel 1.753*** 0.117 8.5 0.000 
Electricity 0.736*** 0.016 -14.5 0.000 
Skilled wage 0.997** 0.001 -3.1 0.002 
Unskilled wage 1.002* 0.001 1.3 0.179 
Schools per capita 0.650*** 0.059 -4.8 0.000 
Rainfall variability 1.001** 0.000 2.9 0.004 
Schooling decision time     
2001-2005 0.195*** 0.014 -22.4 0.000 
1996-2000 0.350*** 0.017 -21.7 0.000 
1991-1995 0.487*** 0.019 -18.6 0.000 
1986-1990 0.587*** 0.021 -14.9 0.000 
1981-1985 0.807*** 0.032 -5.4 0.000 
Vizianagaram 1.129* 0.079 1.7 0.085 
Vishakhapatnam 1.023 0.074 0.3 0.754 
East Godavari 1.082 0.086 1.0 0.323 
West Godavari 1.050 0.077 0.7 0.503 
Krishna 1.029 0.090 0.3 0.747 
Guntur 1.152** 0.080 2.0 0.042 
Prakasam 1.342*** 0.089 4.4 0.000 
Nellore 1.253** 0.091 3.1 0.002 
 
Chittor 1.079 0.074 1.1 0.269 
Cuddapah 1.491*** 0.119 5.0 0.000 
Anantapur 1.592*** 0.112 6.6 0.000 
Kurnool 1.598*** 0.126 5.9 0.000 
Mahaboobnagar 1.335*** 0.098 4.0 0.000 
Rangareddy 1.216** 0.101 2.4 0.019 
Medak 1.173** 0.088 2.1 0.035 
Nizamabad 0.962 0.080 -0.5 0.640 
Adilabad 1.203** 0.084 2.6 0.008 
Karimnagar 0.867* 0.075 -1.7 0.099 
Warangal 1.027 0.078 0.4 0.724 
Khamman 1.107 0.084 1.3 0.180 
Nalgonda 0.901 0.081 -1.2 0.245 
Observations 56000    
Log likelihood -108048.12    
P-value (chi2) 0.000    
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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The effect of rainfall variability has the expected effect on schooling decisions. More 
variable weather conditions reduce investments in education by rural households. The 
size of the hazard ratio is small, but it should be kept in mind that it represents the ratio 
of probabilities for a unit change in the standard deviation of district rainfall, which 
averages 198 for the whole sample.  
 
One advantage of estimating the impact of uncertainty on schooling decisions by 
including a variable measuring uncertainty is that once the estimation has been 
performed, it is possible to compare the predicted values at the desired values of the 
explanatory variables, including the case where the uncertainty is zero. The charts of 
Figure 4.6 show the survivor and hazard functions obtained after the estimation of the 
Cox regression of Table 4.11. The survivor function represents the probability that a 
child completes a given school level, while the hazard function represents the risk that a 
child drops out at a given level conditional on having completed the previous level. 
There are three education levels on the chart: primary, middle and secondary. The first 
school level in the charts corresponds to the below primary level, which can be 
considered equal to the ever enrolled case.  
 
The survivor and hazard functions of the two top charts of Figure 4.6 were calculated at 
the mean values of the explanatory variables, while the dotted lines were calculated 
after setting rainfall variability (sigma) to zero. The elimination of rainfall variability 
would produce an increase in completion rates by two to five percentage points at each 
school level. This effect is small but not negligible and does not look insignificant 
compared to what would be obtained by eliminating all factors that prevent children of 
scheduled tribes from attending school. The latter is shown in the two bottom charts 
which compare the functions of scheduled tribes to those of all other households. 
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Figure 4.6 Survivor and hazard functions with and without rainfall variability 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
4.7.3 Education expenditure model: variables used 
The education expenditure model assesses the effect of rainfall variability on household 
education expenditure for groups of households whose incomes are differently affected 
by weather variability. The dependent variable is the share of education expenditure 
over total household expenditure. Most explanatory variables used in the school 
attainment model are also used in the education expenditure model. These variables 
affect education expenditure in the same way as they affect school progression and need 
not to be discussed again.  
 
There are however some important differences in the specification of these two models. 
First, education expenditure is reported in the surveys at the household level, and cannot 
be linked to any particular child. The analysis can therefore only be household specific, 
rather than child specific, and the demographic variables used in this model are different 
from those used in the school attainment model. Second, data of the expenditure model 
measure household characteristics at the time of the interview and there are no time-
varying covariates. Consequently, current household expenditure can now be included 
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in the model. Third, the education expenditure model is run for subgroups of the whole 
sample of households, and selection terms are included in the regressions in order to 
reduce selection bias. These three main differences will now be discussed in more 
detail. Explanatory variables used in the expenditure model that were not included in the 
school attainment model are listed in Table 4.12. 
 
Following Deaton (1997), the demographic structure of the household is included in the 
model using age-groups ratios. These ratios are obtained dividing the number of 
household members of each age-group by the total number of household members. It is 
a convenient way of including demographic characteristics in the model because it 
allows the identification of the effect of changing household composition while keeping 
household size constant. The age groups used in the model were defined based on the 
age ranges specific to different education levels (see Table 4.4). In the empirical 
specification of the model these groups are further disaggregated by sex in order to 
account for the unequal distribution of resources within the household. When 
performing the estimation, the category for female elderly is dropped in order to avoid 
collinearity.  
 
Age group coefficients show how education expenditure varies as children of different 
age are added to the household. In principle, the coefficient values should be larger for 
older age groups because schooling costs are increasing by grade. However, not all 
children attend middle and secondary school and the coefficients for older age groups 
may reflect this. The disaggregation of age groups by gender is intended to assess the 
extent of differential treatment of boys and girls within the household. The econometric 
literature has often found different education expenditure coefficients for boys and girls 
in India, but standard tests have normally rejected the statistical significance of these 
effects. Kingdon (2005) found evidence for the hypothesis that this may be the result of 
a particular type of selection bias.  
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Table 4.12 Explanatory variables of the education expenditure model 
Variable Description 
Non-school age children  Number of children aged zero to five 
Primary school age children  Number of children aged six to ten 
Middle school age children  Number of children aged 11 to 14 
Secondary school age children  Number of children aged 15 to 18 
Adults  Number of household’s members aged 19 to 59  
Elderly  Number of household’s members aged 60 and 
above 
Household size Logarithm of household size 
Per capita expenditure Logarithm of total household per capita expenditure 
adjusted for regional and price variations within 
each survey and by the CPIAL across surveys 
Primary schools Number of primary schools per capita in the district 
Middle schools Number of middle schools per capita in the district 
Secondary schools Number of secondary schools per capita in the 
district 
Survey rounds Dummies for the four survey rounds 
Selection terms Selection term for the occupational choice 
calculated in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.6) 
Note: demographic variables are included in the model as ratios over household size.  
 
The demographic characteristics of the household also include the logarithm of 
household size. This variable shows the effect on expenditure of increasing the number 
of household members while keeping per capita expenditure constant. Effects of this 
sort can be attributed to economies or diseconomies of scale in household consumption. 
A share of household expenditure is for public goods, whose consumption increases less 
than proportionally with household size. Adding more household members at a given 
level of per capita income has the effect of releasing resources that can be spent on 
education.  
 
The most important explanatory variable is the logarithm of per capita expenditure. The 
estimated coefficient of this variable describes the education Engel curve, which shows 
how expenditure on education varies as total expenditure increases. The functional form 
chosen for the specification of this model is the Working-Leser share form which allows 
for necessities (declining shares), and luxuries (increasing shares). The parameter 
estimates of the logarithm of per capita expenditure will be used to calculate the 
expenditure elasticity of education. The variables for skilled and unskilled wages 
capture the averages district level wages over the three years preceding the interview. 
Rainfall variability is the standard deviation of annual rainfall at the district level over 
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the ten years preceding the survey interview. Three survey dummies were included in 
order to capture historical changes in education expenditure not otherwise explained by 
the other variables in the model.  
 
The regressions are run for subgroups of the whole sample of households, namely 
farmer and agricultural labour households with and without access to irrigation. While it 
can be argued that the entire rural economy is to some extent dependent on agricultural 
output, incomes of farmer and agricultural labour households are more likely to depend 
on agricultural output and weather variability than those of other occupations (Walker 
and Ryan, 1990). Distinguishing between households with and without access to 
irrigation is important because irrigation reduces the output risk related to weather 
variability, and households with access to irrigation are more protected from drought 
and have access to water even when rainfall is scarce.  
 
Once the original sample is divided in sub-samples based on households’ 
characteristics, the sample is no longer a random sample of the rural population and 
parameter estimate may be biased. In order to reduce the selection bias, the model 
includes selection terms obtained using the econometric techniques described in Section 
4.5. The characteristics of the selection bias and the empirical specifications of the 
selection models were discussed in Section 3.7.1 and this discussion will not be 
repeated here. 
4.7.4 Education expenditure model: coefficients estimates 
Results of the estimation of the education expenditure model are presented in Tables 
4.14 and 4.15 for samples of farmer and agricultural labour households. The models 
were run using five different econometric specifications: standard OLS, standard tobit, 
tobit corrected for heteroscedasticity, semiparametric tobit, and a two-part model.
33
 
Most demographic coefficients corresponding to age groups of primary, middle, and 
secondary school age are positive and significant. Coefficient values are also slightly 
increasing with age group, reflecting the increasing cost of schooling by school level.  
 
The demographic coefficients are larger for boys than for girls, pointing to the presence 
of gender discrimination in the allocation of education expenditure within the 
                                                 
33
 Regression results of the standard tobit are not shown. 
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household. Appropriate tests however failed to find a statistically significant difference. 
Demographic coefficients are larger in the farmers’ models than in the labourers’ one, 
especially the coefficients for female children. Farmers’ male coefficients of secondary 
school age are much larger than agricultural labourers’, while labourers’ female 
coefficients are negative. The coefficient of household size is always positive and 
highly significant. The fact that the share of education expenditure increases with 
household size while keeping per capita household expenditure constant suggests that 
households are exploiting economies of scale in consumption. 
 
Much of the variation in education expenditure across households is explained by the 
logarithm of household per capita expenditure. The estimated coefficient of this variable 
is better interpreted once transformed into elasticity. The elasticity is the change in 
education expenditure for a proportional change in total expenditure. Expenditure 
elasticities ε for the household group i are calculated using the following formula: 
 
1
ei
i
w
b
            (4.20) 
 
where b is the estimated coefficient of the logarithm of per capita expenditure and wei is 
the average expenditure share on education for the sample of households considered. 
The elasticities obtained from the four specifications of the model and for the two 
household groups are shown in Table 4.13. 
 
Table 4.13 Education elasticities of farmers and agricultural labourers 
Econometric model Farmers Agricultural labourers 
OLS 1.55 1.68 
Tobit 1.99 1.78 
Heteroscedastic tobit 1.85 1.38 
Semiparametric tobit 1.44 1.14 
2-part model 1.61 1.91 
Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
All estimated elasticities are larger than one, meaning that education is a luxury for 
these samples of Indian rural households and that the share of expenditure on education 
increases as total expenditure increases. The different values of the elasticities obtained 
by applying different econometric models tend to conform to econometric theory 
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(Deaton, 1997). Estimates obtained by the heteroscedasticity adjusted tobit and the 
semiparametric method yield lower values compared to those obtained by tobit 
estimation. Farmers’ education elasticities are often, but not always, larger than those of 
agricultural labour households. These values are similar to values found by other 
studies. For example, Subramanian, quoted in Kingdon (2005), found an education 
elasticity of 2.14 in Andhra Pradesh, while Kingdon (2005) found values of 1.49 and 
1.21 under two different specifications. 
 
The district level skilled wage has no effect on education expenditure in any of the 
specifications and for any of the samples. There is some evidence of a negative effect of 
the unskilled wage (the opportunity cost of schooling) on education expenditure of 
farmers, but such effect is weak for agricultural labourers. Education expenditure 
increases with parents’ education, reflecting both parents’ attitudes towards schooling 
and income effects. Muslim household spend significantly less on education, while no 
difference in any direction is found for Christian households. Scheduled caste 
households spend less if they are farmers, but not if they are engaged in wage labour. 
There are very clear indications that tribal households are spending considerably less in 
education than other households, both as labourers and farmers. Land has no effect on 
education expenditure of labourers, while it appears to have a negative effect on 
expenditure of farmers. The use of traditional fuel for cooking and electricity have 
strong and opposite effects on education expenditure of both farmers and labourers.  
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Table 4.14 Education expenditure model: farmers 
 OLS Heterosced. 
tobit 
Semi 
parametric 
2-part 
 Coeff. Coeff Coeff. Coeff. 
Non-school age children (M) -0.015 -0.015 -0.022*** -1.695*** 
Non-school age children (F) -0.019** -0.023** -0.028*** -1.942*** 
Primary school age children (M) 0.019* 0.060*** 0.038*** 0.116 
Primary school age children (F) 0.011 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.322 
Middle school age children (M) 0.018* 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.695 
Middle school age children (F) 0.018* 0.048*** 0.038*** 1.038** 
Secondary school age children (M) 0.020** 0.034*** 0.025*** 1.739*** 
Secondary school age children (F) 0.009 0.001 0.021*** 1.279** 
Adults (M) -0.024** -0.033*** -0.018*** -0.701 
Adults (F) 0.006 0.000 0.010** 0.037 
Elderly (M) -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.311 
Household size  0.001 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.710*** 
Per capita expenditure  0.008*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 1.031*** 
Skilled wage 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
Unskilled wage  -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.010* 
Rainfall variance -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*** -0.001** 
Father’s education 0.001** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.071*** 
Mother’s education 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.120*** 
Muslim household -0.003* -0.007** -0.013*** -0.422** 
Christian household 0.005 0.007 -0.003 -0.120 
Scheduled caste -0.002 -0.003 -0.004** -0.213* 
Scheduled tribe -0.003** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.404*** 
Land owned -0.001* 0.001 -0.001*** -0.017 
Traditional fuel -0.015*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.516*** 
Electricity 0.001 0.004** 0.007** 0.142* 
Primary schools  -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.362 
Middle schools -0.070 -0.120* -0.030 -8.688** 
High schools 0.092 0.257** 0.033 12.369** 
50
th
 survey round (1993-94) 0.003** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.128 
55
th
 survey round (1999-00) 0.009** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.820*** 
61
st
 survey round (2004-05) 0.026*** 0.044*** 0.035*** 1.588*** 
District dummies (22)     
(output omitted)     
Selection term -0.010* -0.011* -0.011*** -0.346 
Constant -0.065** -0.207*** -0.099* -4.358*** 
Observations 5190 5190 2308 2701 
R-square 0.21  0.08 0.44 
Log-likelihood  3770.7   
P-value (F, chi
2
) 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Notes: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
Convergence in the semiparametric model was achieved after 23 iterations, and the number of 
observations reported (2308) are those corresponding to the last iteration. (M) is for male and (F) is for 
female. 
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Table 4.15 Education expenditure model: agricultural labourers 
 OLS Heterosced. 
tobit 
Semi 
parametric 
2-part 
 Coeff. Coeff Coeff. Coeff. 
Non-school age children (M) -0.006 -0.018** -0.015*** -1.140** 
Non-school age children (F) -0.007 -0.021** -0.017*** -1.313** 
Primary school age children (M) 0.011 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.761* 
Primary school age children (F) 0.004 0.031*** 0.013*** -0.097 
Middle school age children (M) 0.017** 0.045*** 0.022*** 1.641*** 
Middle school age children (F) 0.006 0.022** 0.017*** 1.132** 
Secondary school age children (M) 0.016** 0.015* -0.002 2.345*** 
Secondary school age children (F) -0.005 -0.030*** -0.011** 1.243** 
Adults (M) -0.009 -0.030*** -0.015*** 0.207 
Adults (F) -0.005 -0.013* -0.011** 0.179 
Elderly (M) 0.003 0.003 -0.010* 0.438 
Household size  0.003** 0.016*** 0.004*** 0.719*** 
Per capita expenditure  0.005*** 0.003** 0.001 0.765*** 
Skilled wage -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
Unskilled wage  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009* 
Rainfall variance 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
Father’s education 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.096** 
Mother’s education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.033 
Muslim household 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.100 
Christian household -0.002 -0.003 -0.004** -0.118 
Scheduled caste -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Scheduled tribe -0.001* -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.296** 
Land owned 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.047 
Traditional fuel -0.011*** -0.020*** -0.004** -0.133 
Electricity 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.210** 
Primary schools  -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.416 
Middle schools -0.034 0.001 -0.017 -6.321** 
High schools 0.071 0.056 0.042 4.960 
50
th
 survey round (1993-94) 0.001 0.020*** 0.014*** -0.115 
55
th
 survey round (1999-00) 0.001 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.581*** 
61
st
 survey round (2004-05) 0.010*** 0.034*** 0.021*** 1.297*** 
District dummies (22)     
(output omitted)     
Selection term -0.018** -0.028** -0.004 -0.002 
Constant -0.036** -0.043* -0.019* -1.728 
Observations 5776 5776 1903 2262 
R-square 0.14  0.08 0.37 
Log-likelihood  3556.5   
P-value (F, chi
2
) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
Convergence in the semiparametric model was achieved after 29 iterations, and the number observations 
reported (1903) are those corresponding to the last iteration. (M) is for male and (F) is for female. 
 
The number of primary and middle schools has a negative effect on household 
expenditure, though only the effect of the middle school variable is statistically 
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significant. This result is reasonable if households’ expenditure substitutes for the poor 
quality or the availability of schools in the district. Conversely, the number of secondary 
schools in the district has a positive effect on expenditure and the effect is often 
statistically significant. The survey dummy variables show that education expenditure 
has increased over time, particularly between the last two surveys.
34
 This effect is 
statistically significant for both household groups and in most specifications of the 
model. The selection terms are significant in the majority of cases and their inclusion 
reduced the selection bias introduced by using sub-samples of farmers and labourers. 
 
Rainfall variability has the expected negative effect on household education 
expenditure. The significance of the effect is supported by three of the four 
specifications of the model in the case of farmers, and by two specifications in the case 
of agricultural labourers. The size of the effect is larger for the sample of farmers, 
though this is not apparent from the output of tables 4.14 and 4.15, because coefficient 
estimates were rounded to the third decimal place. This does not mean that labourers 
face less uncertainty than farmers, rather it suggests that labour markets are not 
particularly affected by agricultural output variability or that agricultural labourers are 
relatively insulated from output fluctuations by other means. 
 
The charts in Figure 4.7 show the shares of education expenditure predicted by the 
model plotted against household per capita expenditure. The predicted shares were 
obtained using the coefficient estimates of the semiparametric tobit, because it is the 
only model that found a highly statistically significant effect of rainfall variability on 
education expenditure for both farmers and agricultural labourers. The plots were 
produced nonparametrically by applying LOWESS only to the positive values of the 
predicted shares. 
 
                                                 
34
 The increase in education expenditure between the last two surveys may be biased by the 
overestimation of total household expenditure in the survey of 1999-00 due to changes in the household 
questionnaire discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
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Figure 4.7 Predicted education expenditure shares with and without rainfall 
variability 
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Source: calculated from NSSO data. 
 
The purpose of the charts is to simulate the effect of eliminating the uncertainty about 
agricultural output determined by rainfall variability. The dotted lines plot the predicted 
shares after setting rainfall variability (sigma) to zero, while the solid line is calculated 
at the average values of all explanatory variables. Note that the two charts are plotted on 
different scales of shares and per capita expenditure because in the sample of farmers 
these variables are on average twice the size of those of agricultural labour households. 
The charts show a small but clear effect of weather variability on education expenditure. 
The effect is slightly larger in the case of farmers, and increasing with per capita 
expenditure.  
 
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 show the results of the expenditure model run separately for 
samples of irrigated and non-irrigated farmers and for samples of agricultural labour 
households living in irrigated and non-irrigated villages. Only a limited number of 
coefficient estimates are reported, because most coefficients of the full specifications do 
not add any new insight. The demographic variables have larger effects among irrigated 
households, both in the case of farmers and labourers. Expenditure increases with the 
age group of the child and more so for irrigated households. The skilled wage is never 
statistically significant, while the unskilled wage is occasionally significant and has the 
expected negative sign in some of the specifications for non-irrigated farm households.  
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Rainfall variance is rarely statistically significant, and when it is, its negative sign points 
to a negative effect on education expenditure of irrigated farmers and labourers. The 
estimated effect is of the opposite sign of what expected. In other words, farmers and 
agricultural labourers with access to irrigation seem to spend more on the education of 
their children and up to higher grades, but they are also more affected by rainfall 
variability than their non-irrigated counterparts. While the income effect is positive, the 
effect of the variance is negative. 
 
One possible interpretation of this result is that the strategy adopted to overcome the 
selectivity problem was not the right one. But assuming that the selection bias was 
removed from the estimation, an alternative explanation is needed. One possibility is 
that farmers and labourers with access to irrigation derive a larger fraction of their 
income from agriculture. As a result, their incomes vary more widely with weather 
fluctuations though weather fluctuations have in general a lower effect on their 
agricultural output. Therefore, households with access to irrigation invest more in 
education than non-irrigated ones due to their higher incomes and not because they are 
less affected by income uncertainty. 
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Table 4.16 Education expenditure model: irrigated and non-irrigated farmers 
 OLS Heteroscedastic tobit Semiparametric tobit 2-part 
 Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Non-school age children (M) -0.007 -0.024 -0.013 -0.008 -0.014** -0.041*** -1.192* -2.098** 
Non-school age children (F) -0.011 -0.030** -0.017 -0.030* -0.027*** -0.028** -1.568** -2.678** 
Primary school age children (M) 0.033** -0.005 0.059*** 0.058** 0.048*** 0.018** 0.793 -1.152 
Primary school age children (F) 0.018 -0.004 0.040*** 0.032* 0.047*** 0.020** 1.051* -0.843 
Middle school age children (M) 0.034** -0.013 0.071*** 0.049** 0.057*** 0.027** 1.168** -0.302 
Middle school age children (F) 0.034** -0.012 0.051*** 0.041** 0.043*** 0.021** 1.703*** -0.304 
Secondary school age children (M) 0.023* 0.019 0.035** 0.026 0.031*** 0.013 2.151*** 0.923 
Secondary school age children (F) 0.016 -0.005 0.009 -0.014 0.028*** -0.018* 1.911** 0.283 
Skilled wage 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.006 
Unskilled wage (male) -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.020** 
Rainfall variance 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Selection term -0.162*** -0.022 -0.034** -0.015 -0.025 -0.069** -6.485** 0.392 
         
Observations 3679 1473 3679 1473 1605 677 1953 738 
R-square 0.23 0.25   0.08 0.11 0.44 0.47 
Log likelihood   2657.3 1094.2 34 17   
P-value (chi2) 0.000 0.000       
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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Table 4.17 Education expenditure model: agricultural labourers of irrigated and non-irrigated villages 
 OLS Heteroscedastic tobit Semiparametric tobit 2-part 
 Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Irrigated Non-
irrigated 
Non-school age children (M) -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.020** -0.013** -0.020*** -0.819 -1.138** 
Non-school age children (F) -0.009 -0.004 -0.021 -0.020** -0.013** -0.025*** -1.495** -1.046* 
Primary school age children (M) 0.014 0.011** 0.064*** 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.923 0.684 
Primary school age children (F) 0.003 0.007 0.048*** 0.024** 0.014** 0.002 -0.030 -0.034 
Middle school age children (M) 0.006 0.030** 0.049*** 0.044*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 1.034 2.409*** 
Middle school age children (F) 0.006 0.008 0.034** 0.016 0.017*** 0.012*** 1.142* 1.316** 
Secondary school age children (M) 0.023* 0.011* 0.039** 0.002 0.001 -0.009** 2.676*** 2.118** 
Secondary school age children (F) -0.008 -0.001 -0.030** -0.029** -0.011* -0.019*** 1.873** 0.875 
Skilled wage 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 
Unskilled wage (male) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.008 
Rainfall variance 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
Selection term -0.021* -0.012 -0.025 -0.025* -0.019** 0.007 -0.955 0.906 
         
Observations 2631 3145 2631 3145 1063 1014 1075 1187 
R-square 0.13 0.18   0.09 0.11 0.37 0.41 
Log likelihood   1613.5 1907.7 24 18   
P-value (chi2)         
Note: *statistical significance at 10%, **statistical significance at 5%, ***statistical significance at 1%. 
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4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter assessed the impact of income uncertainty on schooling decisions made by 
rural households. A simple model of educational choices was developed for rural 
households that are poor, liquidity constrained and face substantial income risk. 
Schooling decisions are modelled as solutions of a utility maximisation problem, which 
includes costs and benefits of education over the life cycle. The hypothesis that 
uncertainty of agricultural income forces households to save resources that could be 
otherwise invested in education is tested using an educational attainment model, set up 
as a duration model with time covariates. This empirical model includes historical 
rainfall variability among the explanatory variables as a predictor of perceived income 
uncertainty. Models of household education expenditure are also estimated in order to 
assess the effect of uncertainty on different households groups. The results of the 
empirical analysis are as follows: 
 
 Andhra Pradesh has made considerable progress over the last 50 years in 
increasing completion rates in primary education, and in reducing disparities in 
educational attainments between boys and girls, social groups, and regions. 
Completion rates increased from less than 20% in the 1950s to more than 80% in 
the 1990s in primary school, from less than 15% to 60% in middle school, and 
from less than 5% to 50% in lower secondary school. Girls have almost closed 
the gap with boys in primary and lower secondary schools in the 1980s and 
1990s, though differences still remain in middle school. By the early 1990s, 
children of scheduled caste had almost entirely closed the gap with children of 
higher castes in primary, middle and lower secondary school. Children of 
scheduled tribes however are lagging behind and the gap in completion rates has 
increased over time with the exception of primary school completion rates, 
where the gap was slightly reduced. No substantial regional differences in 
completion rates were found across the three macro regions, though there are 
signs that the Rayalseema region was lagging behind other regions in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. 
 Socioeconomic parents’ background, returns to schooling, and school 
availability are important determinants of children progress through school. 
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Income uncertainty, represented by historical rainfall variability, significantly 
reduces the probability that a child will attain higher education levels. When 
compared to other determinants of progress through school the effect is found to 
be modest but not negligible.  
 The socioeconomic status of the household and the opportunity cost of schooling 
are important determinants of expenditure on education by farmer households. 
Households spend less in the education of girls compared to boys, but the 
differences were not found to be statistically significant. Expected income 
variability was found to negatively affect household expenditure on education in 
three of the four specifications of the model. 
 Expenditure on education of agricultural labourers is largely explained by the 
socioeconomic status of the household. Agricultural labour households spend 
less in the education of girls compared to boys, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. Expected income variability was found to negatively 
affect household expenditure on education in two of the four specifications of 
the model. 
 Determinants of education expenditure, including income variability, do not 
affect farmers with and without irrigation differently. Agricultural labour 
households with access to irrigation are negatively affected by income 
uncertainty in two of the four model specifications. 
The empirical analysis found that income uncertainty negatively affects schooling 
decisions of rural households and expenditure on education of farmers and agricultural 
labourers. Because output variability was approximated by rainfall variability rather 
than being observed directly, the size of this risk is not easily quantifiable. In order to 
measure weather-related risk we would need to know rainfall probabilities at a much 
more disaggregated level. The lack of extensive historical rainfall data is a main 
constraint to the analysis conducted in this chapter. In addition, it is not certain that 
farmers assess future income risk based on the historical record of rainfall patterns 
(Luseno et al., 2003). 
 
Rainfall risk however can only underestimate the effect of uncertainty on households’ 
decisions, because the idiosyncratic risk faced by Indian households is much higher than 
236 
 
  
the one represented by rainfall variability. Morduch (2004) finds that idiosyncratic risk 
constitutes between 75% and 95% of total income variability in the ICRISAT villages 
of south India. Following the influential study by Townsend (1994), most development 
economists have tended to dismiss the importance of idiosyncratic risk. Townsend 
(1994), using the ICRISAT data, showed that Indian households were able to insure 
consumption against idiosyncratic shocks through community exchange of gifts and 
financial help. Similar results were obtained in other contexts, suggesting that policy 
makers should focus their attention on region-wide shocks rather than on idiosyncratic 
ones (Besley, 1995, Fafchamps, 1992, Udry, 1994). However, in a follow-up study Lim 
and Townsend (1998) found that consumption smoothing in the ICRISAT villages 
happened through self-insurance, by building up and drawing on grain reserves, rather 
than through informal community based sharing. This evidence is corroborated by 
several empirical studies pointing to the inability of rural households to fully insure 
against idiosyncratic risk (Carter, 1997, Dercon and Krishnan, 2000b, Gertler and 
Gruber, 2002). The impact of overall uncertainty, resulting from both its idiosyncratic 
and covariate components, on households’ investment in human capital is likely to be 
much higher than the one detected by this study. The advantage of using rainfall 
variability as a predictor of uncertainty is that it offers a source of risk variation that is 
exogenous to household characteristics.  
 
The obvious remedy against the negative effects of uncertainty is the provision of 
insurance. Some economists believe that the provision of insurance to the poor will be a 
major milestone in the fight against poverty (Dercon, 2007). The reasons for the 
absence of insurance in poor rural areas relate to the notions of moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Ray, 1998). First, once insured, farmers may be less likely to make 
production decisions that increase their chances of success. In this way, insurance may 
increase the probability of losses. Second, those more willing to purchase the insurance 
are also those more inclined to make risky decisions, but insurers cannot know in 
advance who is most risky. The application of a flat insurance rate has the effect of 
pushing away safe buyers, while a reduction in the premium would reduce the insurer’s 
profits.  
 
In addition to these information-related problems, there are some practical issues in 
offering insurance to poor farmers (Dercon, 2004, Morduch, 2006). Contracts with 
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farmers are for small amounts. As a result, the collection of payments and the 
verification of damage can be difficult to carry out in rural areas and there are no 
economies of scale to exploit. In other words, the transaction costs of an insurance 
scheme in rural areas are very high. For these reasons, market-based insurance in rural 
areas of poor countries is rare, and even when it is supplied or subsidised by 
governments or external assistance it is difficult to implement (Hazell, 1992, Hazell et 
al., 1986).  
 
Andhra Pradesh is currently running two innovative insurance programmes. The first is 
the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) that since 1999 provides seasonal 
insurance at the area level (mandal) for a number of crops including: rice, groundnut, 
castor, cotton, chillies, and sugarcane. In the agricultural year 1999-00, nearly 16% of 
farmers were insured in the Kharif season (Vyas and Singh, 2006). Under this scheme, 
all farmers growing a given crop in a given area, and accessing bank loans, make 
compulsory insurance payments. Crop failure is evaluated at the mandal level in terms 
of shortfall of yields or rainfall respect to an historical average. Payment is made in 
terms of part or of the entirety of the loan given. The second insurance programme run 
by the state is the rainfall insurance scheme implemented by the ICRISAT and the 
World Bank since 2004 in the Mahaboobnagar and Anantapur districts (Gine et al., 
2008). Similarly to the NAIS, this scheme compensates farmers for losses deriving from 
rains below a minimum historical threshold at the area level. The advantage of these 
schemes is that they avoid the information-related problems outlined above. By insuring 
every farmer in a given area and by assessing an average damage, they prevent the 
occurrence of both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In addition, the 
regional coverage of the schemes simplifies the administration task and reduces 
transaction costs.  
 
The evaluation of these and other insurance programmes is in its infancy, and the 
evidence available in support of a microinsurance revolution is thin, though the 
perception of its need is very high (Morduch, 2006). Evaluations of microinsurance 
programmes have so far focused on issues of take-up and welfare outcomes in terms of 
expenditure levels and income stabilisation (Cole et al., 2009, Gine et al., 2008, Gine 
and Yang, 2007). The results presented in this chapter suggest that a proper assessment 
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of insurance schemes should include an evaluation of their impact on long term 
household decisions and on investments in human capital in particular.  
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5 Conclusions 
This concluding chapter offers some explanations of the persistence of poverty in rural 
Andhra Pradesh based on the findings of the three previous chapters. The first section 
illustrates the poverty trap model, while the following sections discuss the findings of 
the previous chapters in light of the poverty trap model. Each section also discusses a 
number of possible directions for future research. 
5.1 The poverty trap model 
Standard neoclassical economic theory is based on models in which countries and 
individuals face opportunities that reward efforts and savings. Bowles et al. (2006a) call 
these models the achievement models of income determination. According to these 
models, over the long term all countries converge to the income level of rich countries 
(Solow, 1956), while over the generations incomes of poor households converge to 
those of richer households (Loury, 1981). The empirical evidence available does not 
conclusively support these models. There is considerable evidence of the lack of 
convergence in the rates of economic growth across countries (see for example 
Pritchett, 1997, Ray, 1998), and studies of intergenerational transmission of wealth 
point to the presence of substantial social immobility both in developed and developing 
countries (see for example Bourguignon et al., 2007, Mazumder, 2005). 
  
In contrast to the neoclassical model, poverty traps models explain why poverty and 
inequality persist among countries, generations and individuals. Generally speaking, a 
poverty trap is any self-reinforcing mechanism that causes poverty to persist (Azariadis 
and Stachurski, 2005). The idea of a poverty trap is one of the oldest in economics. The 
population model of Malthus, in which economic growth is constrained by population 
growth, and the Ricardian trap of diminishing rates of profits that bring the economy to 
a ‘stationary state’, are early examples of poverty trap models (Hayami and Godo, 
2005). Several poverty traps models were formulated in the early stages of development 
economics. Rosenstain-Rodan (1943) argued that the industrialisation of south-eastern 
Europe was constrained by the small size of the markets. Singer (1949) described the 
presence of vicious circles within vicious circles of poverty, whereby low productivity 
entailed inability to save, from which modest investment and poor productivity would 
follow. Nurske (1953) maintained that underdeveloped countries were trapped in 
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vicious circles of poverty and capital accumulation, whereby inability to save would 
lead to low productivity levels and viceversa. Leibstein (1957) illustrated how some 
economies were trapped in a low level equilibrium, resulting from the predominance of 
income-depressing forces over income-raising forces at very low levels of income. 
Myrdal (1957) discussed how processes of cumulative causation determined backwash 
effects in less developed areas within and across countries. In these processes, capital 
and labour moved to growing areas, while non-growing area spiralled down into 
depression.  
 
The fundamental intuition behind early poverty trap models is the importance of 
increasing returns to scale in the process of economic growth. The idea that investment 
decisions depend on the size of the market and that the size of the market in turns 
depend on decisions to invest is already present in the Wealth of Nations of Adam Smith 
(1970). Early development economist further elaborated this idea describing various 
processes of positive feed-back, vicious circles and cumulative causation as 
fundamental explanations of the poverty of nations. The theoretical treatment of the 
topic by early development economists was however informal and making little use of 
mathematical and graphical notation, which largely contributed to its neglect by 
mainstream economic literature (Krugman, 1997). The interest in this type of models 
was recently revived by the formal work of Murphy et al. (1989a), Matsuyama (1991), 
and Krugman (1991), among others. 
 
Though poverty traps may emerge from endogenous dysfunctional institutions and 
social interactions (Bowles et al., 2006a), we are concerned here with threshold poverty 
traps that originate from market imperfections (Azariadis, 2006). Two main market 
imperfections may generate threshold poverty traps: increasing returns to scale and 
liquidity constraints. The exposition of the threshold poverty trap model begins with a 
description of the positive feed-back mechanism that generates multiple equilibria. 
 
The canonical threshold poverty trap model (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005, Carter and 
Barrett, 2006) is best illustrated with the use of a phase diagram (Chiang, 1974). 
Poverty traps are generated by feed-back mechanisms like those produced by increasing 
returns to scale. If output depends on output scale, income increases over time as 
income increases, and income in the next period (yt+1) is a function of income in the 
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present period (yt). This iterative process is represented algebraically by a difference 
equation of the form yt+1 = f(yt). While linear difference equations can be solved 
explicitly, nonlinear difference equations cannot. When nonlinearity occurs difference 
equations can be analysed qualitatively with the use of a phase diagram like the one 
depicted in Figure 5.1. The curve corresponding to f(yt) is a phase line and describes the 
dynamic path of income over time. 
 
Figure 5.1 Phase diagram of the canonical poverty trap model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 45
 
degrees line in Figure 5.1 represents all points in which income in the current 
period and income in the following period are exactly equal. If we start from an initial 
value of income on the horizontal axis, we can trace the subsequent values of income in 
the following way. First, find the value of income in the following period on the phase 
line. Second, transplot this value in the next period on the horizontal line. This can be 
accomplished by hitting the 45
 
degrees line from the phase line and then reporting the 
value on the horizontal axis. Proceeding in this way by iteration, we move along the 
dynamic path of income over time.
 
 
Figure 5.1 was drawn in such a way to show three intertemporal equilibrium points, of 
which two are stable (A and B) and one is unstable (C). Starting from values of income 
in the immediate right and left of point A, income converges to the equilibrium point A. 
Similarly, starting from values of income to the near left and right of point B, income 
A 
B 
C 
yt+1 
yt 
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converges to point B. By contrast, the equilibrium point C is unstable, and any 
movement from this point brings income either to point A or B.  
 
The chart in Figure 5.1 depicts two stable equilibrium points, one characterised by a 
high income level and one characterised by a low income level. Point A is a poverty 
trap: small income increases beyond A lead income to converge again to A. The 
intersection of the phase line with the 45
 
degrees line at point C is the poverty trap 
threshold. Movements of income beyond this point push a country or household 
permanently from one equilibrium state to the other. 
 
One implication of this model is that temporary events may have permanent 
consequences (Azariadis, 2006). Random events like wars, natural disasters or wrong 
policies may compromise long term economic development by pushing a country below 
the critical threshold. In the same way a massive foreign aid programme may have long 
term consequences if it is able to push the country beyond point C. Similarly, 
households trapped in the low equilibrium of point A need a substantial injection of 
income in order to go beyond the threshold C. Once the threshold is overcome, the 
household continues along the positive dynamic path that brings to the high equilibrium 
point B. By contrast, a catastrophic health shock may push a household temporally from 
point B to below point C. From point C the household is then permanently attracted to 
the poverty trap of point A.  
 
Threshold poverty traps arise for several reasons both at the macro and microeconomic 
levels. An obvious one is the presence of increasing returns to scale related to the 
characteristics of the production process (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005) or to the 
process of urbanisation (Fujita et al., 2001). At the micro level poverty traps arise, for 
example, because individuals have no access to the best technologies available (Carter 
and Barrett, 2006), or because do not have the level of income or assets that allow them 
exploiting economies of scale. 
 
One necessary condition for poverty trap to occur is the presence of liquidity 
constraints. If households or countries were able to borrow freely, nothing would 
prevent them from reaching the threshold and adopting the technologies leading to the 
high level equilibrium path. One important assumption of poverty traps model is 
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therefore that household are unable to borrow. In the presence of liquidity constraints 
the only strategy countries and households can adopt in order to reach the high return 
technology is autarchic saving. Household and countries may sacrifice current 
consumption in order to accumulate assets. However, very poor households may not be 
able to reduce consumption any further in order to invest in more profitable activities. 
The decision on whether to adopt such a autarchic saving strategy may depend on the 
distance from the point where increasing returns can be exploited (Carter and Barrett, 
2006). If the distance is very large, then the adoption of an autarchic saving strategy 
may be undesirable. This issue was explored at length by Zimmerman and Carter 
(2003), who identified a critical asset threshold below which an autarchic accumulation 
strategy is not rational nor feasible. 
 
Poverty trap models provide little scope in terms of quantitative restrictions and 
implications that can be tested using empirical data (Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005). 
Examples of empirical tests of poverty trap models at the country level include Bloom 
et al. (2003) and Graham and Temple (2006), while at the microeconomic level, 
Ravallion and Jalan (2002) find evidence of poverty traps in rural China, though 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) cannot find evidence of poverty traps in rural Mexico. 
One reason for the difficulty of testing the validity of poverty traps models is the lack of 
panel datasets that map out the dynamics of income and other key variables over time. 
In addition, there are a number of identification and estimation problems that to date 
have found no solution (Carter and Barrett, 2006). 
 
The three chapters of this dissertation do not investigate the presence of dynamic paths 
leading to permanent poverty, and the simple observation of poverty over time cannot 
be taken as evidence of poverty traps. However, all three chapters describe mechanisms 
that maintain households into poverty. These mechanisms are necessary ingredients of 
poverty trap models. In the following sections, the determinants of persistent poverty 
identified in each chapter are discussed in more detail within the theoretical poverty trap 
model described above. 
5.2 Chapter 2: The under-consumption trap 
Chapter 2 focused on the fundamental determinants of structural change in the eonomy 
of Andhra Pradesh: technological progress in agriculture and inelastic food demand. 
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The effects of food demand on the development of the agricultural sector were analysed 
in comparative statics for a change in technological progress. The derivative 2.21 
obtained from the solution of the model described in Section 2.3 shows that the share of 
employment in agriculture decreases with technological change. Since the model 
assumes increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, linked to population size in urban 
areas, migration from agriculture induced by technical change gives rise to a dynamic 
growth path for the entire economy. 
 
The analysis of the derivative 2.21 also shows that the negative effect of technological 
change on agricultural employment does not take place under certain conditions. First, if 
agriculture does not produce enough food to satisfy minimum requirements, any 
increase in income translates in an increase in food demand that turns to positive the 
value of the derivative 2.21. When the rural population lives below a minimum 
subsistence level, an increase in labour productivity results in an increase in labour 
employment and food consumption. Second, the larger the propensity to consume food 
out of current income, the smaller is the value of the derivative 2.21, and hence the 
smaller is the effect of technological change on agricultural employment. Even if living 
standards are above minimum food requirements, the effect of technical progress on 
labour demand vanishes if food demand is very high. Third, the analysis conducted in 
Section 2.6.3 shows that this effect is reinforced by the shape of the income distribution. 
Higher income equality is associated with higher food demand. The income food 
elasticity is large when most population lives in rural areas in similar conditions of 
extreme poverty. 
 
The conclusions to Chapter 2 discussed the validity of the results of this model under 
the more realistic assumption that the economy is open to international trade rather than 
closed. It was acknowledged that in the open economy case the conclusions of the 
model would be different. However, the role of exports in fostering industrialisation is 
often overplayed (Murphy et al., 1989b). For example, Chenery et al. (1986) conclude 
that domestic demand is the main determinant of industrial growth. Using a sample of 
rapidly growing economies over the period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, they 
find that domestic demand accounts for more than 70% of the increase in domestic 
industrial output. The investigation of the effects of technological progress in the open 
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economy case is a potential area of further research that would require data on the trade 
balance of Andhra Pradesh versus the rest of India and the rest of the world. 
 
Chapter 2 offers an interpretation of the inability of Andhra Pradesh to industrialise 
which is in line with theoretical expositions of poverty traps found in the 
macroeconomic literature (Ros, 2000). The extreme poverty of rural population limits 
the market for industrial products. Since increasing returns to scale are at the origin of 
the industrialisation process, demand factors prevent the economy to take off until the 
basic nutritional requirements of the population are satisfied. Similar interpretations of 
underdevelopment based on limited market size for industrial product can be found in 
Murpy et al. (1989b) and in Eswaran and Kotwal (1993). 
 
There are two main policy implications to be drawn from this analysis. First, 
redistributive policies and policies that increase the living standards of the poorest 
sectors of the population have a positive impact on long term prospects of economic 
growth. It is suggested that chronic extreme poverty prevents agrarian economies like 
Andhra Pradesh from taking off. Second, state interventions in agricultural markets may 
slow the pace of the agricultural transformation. Andhra Pradesh subsidises agricultural 
producers though the provision of cheap fertiliser, electricity free of charge, and by 
purchasing unsold production at minimum support price (Gulati and Narayan, 2003, Jha 
et al., 2007). These subsidies result in an increase in the production of food and labour 
demand in agriculture which retard the process of industrialisation. 
 
One shortcoming of the model developed in Chapter 2 is that the results are entirely 
discussed in comparative statics while a dynamic analysis would be preferable. Because 
different sectors of the economy display different returns, changes in demand 
composition and in income distribution brought about by technical change in agriculture 
affect overall economic growth. In turn, changes in income distribution generate 
changes in demand composition and therefore in factor demands, which may change 
income distribution again. The interactions between demand composition, factor 
demand, income distribution and growth need to be analysed dynamically (Ray, 1998). 
One way to perform this analysis is by using a Computable Genereal Equilibrium 
model, whose formulation is well beyond the scope of this chapter. This exercise is left 
for future research.  
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5.3 Chapter 3: Irrigation and the liquidity trap 
Chapter 3 explored the effect of irrigation on consumption and saving decisions of poor 
farmers and agricultural labourers. The hypothesis was formulated that irrigation 
stabilises households’ consumption by reducing uncertainty of future output. The 
empirical analysis found that consumption of rural households with access to irrigation 
is more stable over the seasonal cycle, and that consumption of households without 
access to irrigation tracks current income more closely. The empirical analysis also 
found that farmer households without irrigation tend to save more for precautionary 
reasons. Irrigation, by reducing risk, affects consumption smoothing and precautionary 
saving. 
 
The inability to smooth consumption and the presence of precautionary savings alone 
are not evidence of poverty traps. They are however important contributing factors. 
Precautionary savings are an inefficient form of storing wealth. By stocking savings in 
cash or jewellery the poor forego investments in more profitable activities (Deaton, 
1990). Moreover, production risk reduces the ability to borrow even if credit is 
available. This happens because if credit contracts are enforced and if the risk of being 
unable to repay a loan is high, poor household will not be able borrow (Carroll, 2001). 
Risk has therefore the effect of reinforcing poverty traps. The poor are cut out of the 
credit market below a given level of wealth because are unable to provide valid 
collateral (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In this context, production risk has the effect 
of further reducing the ability to repay and of increasing the wealth required to access 
credit. 
 
Credit constraints, risk and inability to borrow would not matter if households were able 
to save out of current consumption in order to accumulate wealth. One additional 
assumption of the model of Chapter 3 is therefore that the poor cannot reduce 
consumption below a minimum level. The idea that poor households are impatient, 
meaning that they are pressed to spend their income over the short term, dates back to 
Fisher (1930) and it is a common ingredient of dynamic consumption models (see for 
example Deaton, 1991, Glewwe, 1999). 
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Two main policy implications follow from this analysis. First, programmes providing 
production insurance or other form of income protection might have an impact on 
investment behaviours. A consensus is now emerging around the idea that the provision 
of insurance for the poor might represent a milestone in the fight against poverty 
(Dercon, 2004). The implementation and the study of insurance programmes in 
developing countries however are only in their infancy. Few evaluations of such 
programmes exist and those available do not go beyond the analysis of the conditions 
for insurance uptake by the intended beneficiaries (Cole et al., 2009, Gine et al., 2008, 
Gine and Yang, 2007). The analysis of the impact of these interventions on 
consumption and investment behaviour is an interesting area of future research. 
 
The second policy implication is that the provision of credit to the poor is a promising 
area of intervention. This policy has already been adopted by the government of Andhra 
Pradesh on a large scale. Over the last 10 years the state has witnessed the explosion of 
the self help group movement. A number of programmes run in collaboration with the 
UNICEF, the World Bank and other donors since the late 1990s has provided millions 
of women with microcredit, capacity building and social empowerment (Galab and Rao, 
2003). The data used in this study do not reflect the impact of these programmes 
because the most recent survey round of NSSO used dates back to 2004-05. However, 
recent impact evaluations of microcredit programmes in Andhra Pradesh, have found 
positive effects on consumption, nutritional status and asset accumulation even for the 
poorest households (Deininger and Liu, 2009). 
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the conclusions of this theoretical and empirical 
investigation rest on strong assumption regarding precautionary saving behaviour and 
time preferences. These assumptions are rarely tested using empirical data. Few studies 
have tried to assess the size of precautionary savings (Carroll and Kimball, 2007). These 
studies have found that in rich countries the amount of wealth held in the form of 
precautionary saving against future uncertainty is rather high (Carroll and Samwick, 
1998). The extent of risk faced by rural household in developing countries would 
suggest that precautionary savings in poor areas should be even higher, but no similar 
studies have been attempted in developing countries. This represents an exciting area of 
future research. 
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The assumption that the poor are impatient makes appeal to common sense, but has 
been rarely tested. Barry and Packard (2000) found the rich to be more patient in a 
sample of Chilean pensioner, but Kirby et al. (2002) found no correlation between time 
preferences and wealth in a sample of Bolivian horticulturalists. The evidence in this 
area is mixed and more behavioural experiments are needed in developing countries to 
test fundamental assumptions of models used by development economists (Cardenas 
and Carpenter, 2008). 
5.4 Chapter 4: the educational poverty trap 
Chapter 4 investigated the effect of income uncertainty on child schooling, a topic 
largely neglected by the literature on the economics of education. The hypothesis was 
made that income uncertainty negatively affects investments in human capital of rural 
households. The empirical analysis found that output uncertainty increases the risk of 
school dropouts of rural children, and reduces household expenditure on education, 
particularly in farmer households. This outcome is a result of liquidity constraints. Poor 
household cannot access credit in order to invest in early childhood development and 
successive schooling because a market for this type of loans does not exist (Loury, 
1981). In the absence of credit markets the alternative strategy a household can adopt is 
autarchic saving out of current income. Poor households however can hardly adopt such 
a strategy because their rates of time preference for immediate consumption are very 
high (Glewwe, 1999). 
 
Risk makes credit constraints more stringent (Banerjee, 2004). Poor households are 
more risk averse than richer ones and production risk in rural areas is very high. As a 
result, poor household underinvest and do not adopt the educational and occupational 
careers that offer the highest rates of return. This occupational trap is a source of 
persistent inequality because the existing distribution of income is reproduced across the 
generations. It is also a source of inefficiency because does not allow people at the 
lower end of the income distribution to fully exploit their capabilities (Ray, 1998). The 
interplay of credit constraints and inability to invest in human capital generates 
economy wide inequality and inefficiency (Galor and Zeira, 1993, Ljungqvist, 1993). 
 
Credit market imperfections and high production risk contribute to polarise the society 
between skilled workers exploiting high returns to education, and a mass of uneducated 
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wage workers that are too poor to save up the funds required for schooling. This 
polarising effect is stronger in India than elsewhere because of the characteristics of the 
recent process of economic growth. Technological innovation and openness to 
international trade have resulted in an increase in demand for highly skilled occupations 
and their corresponding wages (Riboud et al., 2007). The review of the literature on 
returns to education conducted in Section 4.3.3 confirms this. Returns to schooling in 
India are diminishing from primary to middle school but increasing over higher 
education levels.  
 
To summarise, uninsured risk contributes to the negative effect of credit market 
imperfections on investments in human capital. This in turn reduces the overall 
efficiency of the economy and generates wide and persisting income disparities. Two 
policies are particularly promising in addressing these issues: the provision of insurance 
for the poor and the provision of incentives for school attendance. The first type of 
policies is in its infancy and has been discussed in the previous section. Andhra Pradesh 
is currently running interesting experiments in the provision of weather insurance 
(Lilleord et al., 2005). The evaluation of these experiments is a new area of research. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 4 suggests that the evaluation of these programmes 
should be performed over the long term in order to assess to what extent a reduction in 
risk affects investment decisions, including investments in human capital. 
 
The provision of conditional cash transfers is another policy that might increase 
enrolment and reduce drop-out rates. Conditional cash transfer programmes, which 
provide money to poor families contingent on ensuring school attendance, have proved 
to be successful in a number of Latin American countries (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005). 
Most evidence on conditional cash transfer programmes however is on their impact on 
immediate welfare outcomes like consumption, health and school attendance. The 
evaluation of the effectiveness of these programmes in orienting educational and 
occupational decisions of the rural poor over the long term is an area of potential future 
research. 
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that the models discussed in this section and the model 
of educational choice under production risk described in Section 4.3.1 , are based on the 
assumption that poor households are risk averse, and more risk averse than richer ones. 
250 
 
  
This hypothesis has found limited support in empirical tests (Binswanger, 1981, Pender, 
1996). Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) in reviewing the experimental literature on risk 
aversion conclude that there is no support for the idea that poor people in developing 
countries are more risk averse than rich people in developed countries. This is an 
important area of research as it provides the micro foundations for our understanding of 
household decision making in developing countries.  
 
Related to the issue of assessing risk attitudes is the problem of measuring risk. Most 
studies, including the present one, attempting to analyse the impact of risk and 
uncertainty on households’ economic decisions rely on indicators of rainfall variability 
(see for example Gurgand, 2003, Jacoby and Skoufias, 1998, Jensen, 2000). Rainfall 
however is a very imperfect indicator of risk because rainfall data are collected over 
large areas with high heterogeneity in precipitations. Rainfall data are used as a matter 
of convenience because are easily available, but new and imaginative ways of 
measuring risk should be sought in order to shed light on the impact of risk on the 
welfare of the poor. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of demand functions 
 
Derivation of homothetic (Cobb-Douglas) demand functions 
Consumers maximise the utility function: 
 
  1ma CCU            (A.1) 
 
with respect to the following budget constraint: 
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Set the Lagrangean function: 
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Two solutions are possible. Either substitute the first order conditions in the budget 
constraint and obtain that 

U
Y    , then substitute U in the first order conditions to 
obtain the demand equations: 
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or equate the lambdas from the first order condition to obtain: 
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Income elasticities are equal to one: 
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Derivation of quasi-homothetic (LES) demand equations 
Consumers maximise the utility function: 
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with respect to the budget constraint: 
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Set the Lagrangean function: 
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By equating the lambdas: 
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Substituting in the budget constraint: 
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The final demands for the two goods are: 
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Appendix B: Solutions of the agricultural transformation 
model  
 
Homothetic preferences 
The basic equations of the model are: 
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A
wa     and   mm P
N
M
w
)1( 


  
cYCa     and   
m
m
P
Y
cC )1(   
 
Notice that in order to simplify the algebra, land (L), and capital (K) were considered 
fixed and were not included in the agricultural and manufacturing production functions. 
The aim of this exercise is deriving expressions for the effect of technological change 
on agricultural employment, and the inclusion of land and capital in the solution of the 
model would not alter the main results.  
 
Setting the equality of wages in the two sectors gives an expression for the terms of 
trade between agriculture and the modern sector: 
 
a
a
M
A
Pm


1


          (B.2) 
Substituting the terms of trade in the consumption function: mma PC
c
c
C


1
, an 
expression is obtained for consumption of the agricultural good: 
 
M
A
a
a
C
c
c
C ma



1
1 

        (B.3) 
 
Setting the equilibrium in the product markets the production functions in the two 
sectors are substituted for consumption of the two goods in the expression above: 
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M
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M
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
1
1 

        (B.4) 
 
)1()1(   cca          (B.5) 
 
 ccca  )(          (B.6) 
 
Therefore the share of employment in agriculture is fixed: 
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c
a



          (B.7) 
 
 
Hierarchic preferences 
The basic equations of the model are: 
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


 NBM m 1   (B.8) 
aN
A
wa     and   mm P
N
M
w
)1( 


  
 
YCa    and  
0mC    if  a
gY 
     (B.9) 
 
gCa    and   am gyC    if  agY   
 
As long as income is less than the minimum food requirement Y<gaN, all labour is 
employed in agriculture Ca=A. The share of employment in agriculture is therefore 
equal to one, and there is no manufacturing sector. The share of employment in 
agriculture does not change until income reaches a level that allows the consumption of 
the manufacturing good. When this level of income is achieved, consumption and 
production in agriculture remain fixed at the level given by the minimum food 
requirement: ANgC aa   . 
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Starting from the agricultural production function, by setting the equality in the market 
for the agricultural good, the production function becomes: 
 
NgNaB aa 
                    (B.10) 
 



111


 aa BNga                    (B.11) 
 
and the derivative of a with respect to Ba is: 
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Non-homothetic preferences 
The basic equations of the model are: 
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Setting the equality of wages in the two sectors an expression is obtained for the terms 
of trade between agriculture and the modern sector: 
 
a
a
M
A
Pm


1


                   (B.14) 
Substituting the terms of trade in the consumption function: )(
1
NgC
c
c
PC aamm 

 , 
we obtain: 
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                (B.15) 
 
Setting the equality in the product markets: 
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Differentiation of a with respect to Ba is not simple, but can be calculated implicitly 
using: 
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and therefore: 
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In order for the derivative to be negative, the denominator must be negative. Since the 
first term in the denominator is negative (because  c ), and the second term is 
positive (because all the variables and parameters are positive), the derivative is 
negative if the first term is larger than the second term in absolute value, that is if: 
 
)1)(1()(   cNgccA a                  (B.27) 
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                  (B.29) 
 
The factor multiplying g on the right-hand-side of the inequality is less than one. 
Therefore, the inequality is assured provided A/N is at least as large as g.  
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Appendix C: Semiparametric elasticities by food category 
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Appendix D: The constant relative risk aversion utility 
function 
 
The CRRA utility function is: 
 
 






1
1
1
s
t
c
cu ,  with  0        (D.1) 
 
This utility function incorporates the property of constant relative risk aversion, which 
makes the cost of risk increasing proportionally with farmers’ incomes. The number one 
in the numerator is required to make the expression defined also in the special case 
where γ, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, is equal one.  
 
The first derivative of the utility function is positive: 
 
 ccu )(           (D.2) 
 
and utility increases with consumption. 
 
The second derivative is negative: 
  
)1()(  ccu          (D.3) 
 
and the utility function is concave down, which implies risk aversion on the part of the 
consumers.  
 
The third derivative, that is the derivative of the marginal utility function, is positive: 
 
)2()2()(   ccu         (D.4) 
 
which implies prudence.  
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The absolute coefficient of risk aversion is positive: 
 
ccucu /)(/)(           (D.5) 
 
which means that the consumer prefers a certain level of consumption to an uncertain 
level of consumption having the same expected value. 
 
Finally, the relative degree of risk aversion is constant: 
 
 uu /           (D.6) 
 
meaning that the cost of risk is proportional to the level of consumption.  
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Appendix E: Solution of the seasonal consumption model 
 
This appendix illustrates the step-by-step derivation of the seasonal consumption 
equations (17) in the text. These equations were obtained using the method of dynamic 
programming. The notation used is the same already introduced in the main text. 
 
The objective of this dynamic program is to find the level of consumption ct, at each 
time over the period considered, that maximises the sum of the net benefits at all times: 
 



T
t
tt
c
cuV
t 1
)(max           (E.1)
  
 
Maximisation occurs subject to the transition equation that characterises the 
accumulation or decumulation of assets over time: 
 
),(1 tttt cAhA           (E.2) 
 
In this particular case the aim is finding the seasonal consumption path c1, c2, c3, that 
maximises the sum of discounted utilities over three periods (seasons): 
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subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
)(1 ssss cyArA           (E.4) 
 
Where 
seas



1
1
 is the time preference seasonal discounting factor, and )1( sir  is 
the seasonal interest rate. 
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The following conditions are set: A1=0 (there are no assets in the first period), A4=0 (all 
assets are consumed by the end of the third period), and y3=0 (no income is produced in 
the third period). 
 
In the last period the value function to maximise is: 
 

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subject to: 
 
0)()( 333334  cArcyArA        (E.6) 
 
Consumption in the last period is simply: 33 Ac       (E.7) 
 
This value is substituted in the value function of the third period: 
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In the second period the value function is: 
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subject to: 
 
)( 2223 cyArA                     (E.10) 
 
Now A3 is substituted in the value function: 
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Now differentiate the value function with respect to c2: 
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Then set the derivative to zero and solve for c2: 
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Set   
1
1 rd in order to simplify the expression: 
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Consumption in the second period is: 
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The value function of the second period can now be rewritten and simplified in the 
following way: 
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Now notice that: 
 
 dr 1     and   ddr   11 11   
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Now write the value function for the first period: 
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subject to the constraint: 
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Substitute A2 in the value function: 
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Differentiate the value function with respect to c1: 
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Set the derivative to zero, simplify the expression, and solve for consumption in the first 
period: 
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